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ABSTRACT 
The 2009 United Nations climate conference in Copenhagen 
has been widely viewed as a failure—a referendum in the eyes of 
many on the top-down, comprehensive approach to climate 
governance embodied in the Kyoto Protocol and carried forward in 
efforts to negotiate a successor regime.  Despite a modest 
agreement on future work toward a new agreement, the most 
recent climate meeting in Cancún Mexico reinforces this view, 
underscoring the conclusion that Copenhagen represents an 
important inflection point for international climate policy.  
Although much of the post-Copenhagen commentary has correctly 
identified various problems, even fatal flaws, with the process, 
very little has been particularly helpful in marking out a 
constructive way forward.  This Article takes some steps in that 
direction, offering a partial re-conceptualization of the nature and 
possibilities of global climate governance in the post-Copenhagen 
era.  It starts from the premise that any realistic approach to 
climate governance must begin with the facts of globalization, legal 
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pluralism, and fragmentation rather than the view that climate 
change is a particular kind of global problem that can only be 
solved through a top-down, supra-national regime aimed at 
managing the Earth system.  As argued here, this “Earth systems 
governance” approach to the climate change problem, which 
derives from radically enhanced scientific and technical ways of 
understanding global environmental change and a particularly 
narrow view of collective action, has become deeply embedded as 
a basic objective of climate policy.  The resulting logic of global 
environmental managerialism, however, is very much at odds with 
the plural, fragmented nature of the international legal and 
political order—a fact well illustrated by the limited results coming 
out of the recent climate meetings in Copenhagen and Cancún as 
well as the near total disarray that marks the current climate policy 
discourse in the United States and other major emitting countries.  
In contrast, an alternative, post-Copenhagen approach to the 
problem of climate governance that starts with the facts of 
globalization and its implications for law and legal order trains 
attention to new and different, and much messier, ways of 
coordinating efforts across jurisdictions and building enabling 
environments for collective action.  This Article maps several key 
elements of post-Copenhagen climate governance through an 
analysis of efforts to bring reduced emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation (“REDD”) into climate policy.  Although 
deforestation, nearly all of which occurs in the tropics, accounts for 
some fifteen percent of global carbon dioxide emissions, it has only 
recently become a major focus of climate policy, emerging as one of 
the few areas of consensus in the international climate 
negotiations.  As a new paradigm for land use that implicates 
multiple legal and institutional orders at multiple levels, the REDD 
experience illustrates both the opportunities and the challenges of 
constructing climate governance through the complex articulation 
between distinctively global projects and particular national and 
sub-national institutions.  Approaching climate governance from 
this perspective provides a basis for some more general claims 
regarding the possibilities of global environmental law in the 
context of a plural, fragmented international legal order. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This Article starts from the premise that climate change is not 
simply another environmental problem, but rather “a key site in 
the global transformation of world order.” 1F1  By now, of course, the 
scale, scope, and potential severity of global climate change have 
been well documented.  Expected impacts such as sea-level rise, 2F2 
melting ice sheets,3F3 receding glaciers, 4F4 altered precipitation 
 
1 Clark A. Miller & Paul N. Edwards, Introduction: The Globalization of Climate 
Science and Climate Politics, in CHANGING THE ATMOSPHERE: EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 3 (Clark A. Miller & Paul N. Edwards eds., 2001). 
2 See Gerald A. Meehl et al., Global Climate Projections, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE 
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 747, 820–22 (Solomon et al. eds., 2007) (reviewing projections regarding 
sea-level rise). 
3 See Peter Lemke et al., Observations: Changes in Snow, Ice and Frozen Ground, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING 
GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 337, 361–69 (reviewing evidence regarding ice 
sheet mass loss in Greenland and Antarctica); Meehl et al., supra note 2, at 816–20 
(reviewing projections regarding ice sheet loss in the twenty-first century). 
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patterns,5F5 increased frequency and intensity of hurricanes,6F6 
drought, 7F7 new and amplified disease vectors,8F8 ocean acidification,9F9 
species loss,10F10 and all manner of social and economic 
consequences 11F11 have been discussed extensively in the relevant 
literatures.  So too the unique governance challenges presented by 
the problem of climate change—the long atmospheric residence 
times of greenhouse gases and the essentially “irreversible” 
warming effects of such gases,12F12 the inertia of a global energy 
 
4 See Lemke et al., supra note 3, at 356–60 (reviewing evidence regarding 
glacier and ice cap loss); Meehl et al., supra note 2, at 814–16 (reviewing 
projections regarding glacier and ice cap loss). 
5 See Meehl et al., supra note 2, at 768–70, 782, 784 (discussing climate model 
projections of precipitation extremes). 
6 See id. at 786, 788–89 (discussing climate model projections of tropical 
cyclones and extra-tropical storms). 
7 See id. at 768–70, 782 (discussing climate model projections of increased risk 
of drought in certain areas). 
8 See Ulisses Confalonieri et al., Human Health, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO 
THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 391, 407–12 (Parry et al. eds., 2007) (reviewing “projections of climate-
change-related health impacts”). 
9 See Meehl et al., supra note 2, at 793 (discussing ocean acidification resulting 
from increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide). 
10 See Andreas Fischlin et al., Ecosystems, Their Properties, Goods and Services, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION 
OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 8, at 211, 239–45 
(discussing projections regarding biodiversity impacts of climate change). 
11 See Tom Wilbanks et al., Industry, Settlement and Society, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF 
WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 8, at 357, 364–77 (reviewing wide range of 
projected social and environmental impacts of climate change). 
12 See David Archer & Victor Brovkin, The Millennial Atmospheric Lifetime of 
Anthropogenic CO2, 90 CLIMATIC CHANGE 283, 294 (2008) (“[T]he substantial 
fraction of projected CO2 emissions will stay in the atmosphere for millennia, and 
a part of fossil fuel CO2 will remain in the atmosphere for many thousands of 
years.”).  Susan Solomon and her co-authors elaborate on the “irreversible” effects 
of carbon dioxide emissions: 
It is not generally appreciated that the atmospheric temperature 
increases caused by rising carbon dioxide concentrations are not 
expected to decrease significantly even if carbon emissions were to 
completely cease.  Future carbon dioxide emissions in the 21st century 
will hence lead to adverse climate changes on both short and long time 
scales that would be essentially irreversible []where irreversible is 
defined here as a time scale exceeding the end of the millennium in the 
year 3000 . . . . 
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system marked by trillions of dollars in fixed capital with very long 
turnover times,13F13 deeply entrenched patterns of land use,14F14 the 
generation-scale time lags separating the costs of mitigation from 
any benefits, 15F15 the uncertainties with respect to responses and 
feedbacks of dynamic systems,16F16 the radically uneven and unequal 
challenges associated with adaptation needs and capabilities 17F17—a 
“super wicked problem” if ever there was one.18F18  Indeed, when 
viewed as a mitigation challenge, any serious attempt to solve the 
 
Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 
106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1704, 1704 (2009) (internal references omitted); see also 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., CLIMATE STABILIZATION 
TARGETS: EMISSIONS, CONCENTRATIONS, AND IMPACTS OVER DECADES TO MILLENNIA 6 
(2010) (”[C]ertain levels of warming associated with carbon dioxide emission 
could lock the Earth and many future generations of humans into very large 
impacts . . . .”). 
13 See John P. Holdren, The Energy Innovation Imperative: Addressing Oil 
Dependence, Climate Change, and Other 21st Century Energy Challenges, 1 
INNOVATIONS TECH. GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 3, 6 (2006) (“The replacement 
cost of today’s global energy-supply system . . . is in the range of $12 trillion, and 
this immense capital investment turns over with a characteristic time of 30–40 
years, the average operating lifetime of the facilities involved.”). 
14 See Gert Jan Nabuurs et al., Forestry, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION, 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 541, 546–47 (Metz et al. eds., 
2007) (discussing forest sector emissions and removals); Pete Smith et al., 
Agriculture, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  MITIGATION, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING 
GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra at 497, 503–05 (discussing regional and global trends in 
emissions from agricultural practices). 
15 See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: DEVELOPMENT 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE 49 (2010) (noting that “the costs of mitigation policies are 
borne immediately, and the possibly large benefits of such policies (avoided 
damages) are enjoyed far in the future”). 
16 See Kenneth L. Denman et al., Couplings Between Changes in the Climate 
System and Biogeochemistry, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 499, 526–33 
(discussing terrestrial and ocean carbon cycle processes and feedbacks to climate). 
17 See W. Neil Adger et al., Assessment of Adaptation Practices, Options, 
Constraints and Capacity, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND 
VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 8, at 
717, 733–37 (discussing “limits and barriers to adaptation”); Kirstin Dow et al., 
Exploring the Social Justice Implications of Adaptation and Vulnerability, in FAIRNESS IN 
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 79, 79–96 (W. Neil Adger et al. eds., 2006) 
(outlining asymmetries in worldwide adaptive capacities). 
18 See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: 
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009) 
(discussing the “super-wicked” nature of the climate change problem). 
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climate change problem entails nothing short of a full-scale 
reorganization of the fossil energy system that currently provides 
more than 80% of world energy19F19 and fundamental changes in 
global land-use patterns. 20F20  Viewed as an adaptation challenge (and 
it is clear that such a view must proceed in tandem with 
mitigation), climate change goes to the very core of structural 
vulnerabilities in the world system, the resilience and adaptive 
capacity of social and ecological systems, the obligations of the rich 
to the poor, the prospect of seemingly permanent states of 
emergency.  More recent proposals entertaining the possibility of 
planetary-scale geoengineering to manage the Earth’s radiation 
balance and the global carbon cycle entail a degree of intentional 
human intervention in the Earth system that would be truly 
unprecedented. 21F21 
The rapidly growing body of legal scholarship on climate 
change addresses many of these issues, focusing on questions of 
instrument choice, institutional design, federalism, the rights and 
obligations of various actors, the challenges of adaptation, and the 
implications for administrative law (to name a few).22F22  Not 
 
19 See BRITISH PETROLEUM, BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY 41 (2010) 
(reporting world energy consumption by fuel, with fossil fuels accounting for 
approximately 88% of total world energy consumption). 
20 See Terry Barker et al., Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  
MITIGATION, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 14, at 
25, 29 (identifying sectoral contributions to GHG emissions with forestry (17.4%) 
and agriculture (13.5%) accounting for more than 30% of the total). 
21 See generally THE ROYAL SOC’Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, 
GOVERNANCE, AND UNCERTAINTY (2009) (discussing geoengineering techniques 
and related governance issues); David G. Victor et al., The Geoengineering Option: A 
Last Resort Against Global Warming?, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 64, 64–72 (2009) (evaluating 
geoengineering proposals). 
22 See generally Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: 
Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1 (2009) 
(discussing the challenge of uncertainty regarding the effects of climate change for 
natural resource governance); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate 
Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009) (exploring interplay between state and 
federal responses to climate change); Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—
Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 
HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 9 (2010) (proposing a “principled flexibility” approach to 
climate change in order to adapt to changing environmental conditions); Daniel 
A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879 
(2008) (discussing the relationship between federal and state responses to climate 
change); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 Geo L.J. 1565 
(2008) (positing that the United States’ role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
should be independent from notions of corrective or distributive justice); Jedediah 
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surprisingly, and with good reason, much of the existing literature 
has approached the problem in the context of traditional 
understandings of environmental law, often with a domestic focus, 
but usually with a recognition that such understandings do not 
suffice in terms of the response options that are needed to 
comprehend, much less govern, such a daunting set of challenges.  
Everyone, it seems, recognizes the mismatch between the scale of 
the problem and existing legal and governance capabilities, 
manifest in the notable absence of any global law-making body or 
world environmental authority capable of stepping in to steer the 
world community toward a solution.23F23  Likewise, the fragmented 
nature of the various institutions and regulatory authorities that 
would need to be engaged in any comprehensive approach to 
global climate change, not to mention the deep political divisions 
between nations, is readily apparent to even the most casual 
observer.  The radically incomplete effort by the parties to the 
international climate regime to forge a comprehensive legal 
instrument for the post-2012 period bears witness to these 
difficulties.24F24  So too does the difficulty of enacting domestic 
 
Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and Democracy, 
119 YALE L.J. 1122 (2010) (contextualizing approaches to climate change within a 
discussion of American environmental and political history); J.B. Ruhl & James 
Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative 
State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 65 (2010) (investigating 
challenges facing administrative agencies charged with responding to complex 
environmental problems such as climate change); Amy Sinden, Allocating the Costs 
of the Climate Crisis: Efficiency Versus Justice, 85 WASH. L. REV. 293 (2010) 
(evaluating alternative proposals to assign responsibility for reducing greenhouse 
gases and advocating on behalf of a per-capita approach); Katherine A.  Trisolini, 
All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate 
Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669 (2010) (arguing that local governments 
have an important role to play in responding to climate change); Jonathan B. 
Weiner, Radiative Forcing: Climate Policy to Break the Logjam in Environmental Law, 
17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 210 (2008) (discussing political logjam facing climate 
legislation in the U.S.). 
23 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 18, at 1160–61 (“Climate Change is ultimately a 
global problem.  But there is an absence of any global lawmaking institution with 
a jurisdictional reach and legal authority that match the scope of the problem.”). 
24 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Rep. of 
the Conf. of the Parties on its 15th Sess., Dec. 7–19, 2009, Copenhagen Accord, 
Decision 2/CP.15, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010) 
[hereinafter Copenhagen Accord]; William D. Nordhaus, Economic Aspects of Global 
Warming in a Post-Copenhagen Environment, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11721 
(2010) (concluding that the actions contemplated by the Copenhagen Accord, even 
if carried out in full,  would not be sufficient to meet prudent stabilization 
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climate change legislation in the United States and other major 
emitting countries.25F25 
In sum, there is on the one hand clear recognition that the 
incredibly complex, multidimensional problem of climate change 
demands a comprehensive global solution; while on the other hand 
it is all too apparent that the existing international legal and 
political order is not up to the task.  The “perils of global 
legalism”—to use Eric Posner’s phrase—serves as an apt 
description of both the limited efficacy of international law and the 
problems that ensue from an exaggerated faith in the ability of the 
current international legal system to solve this massive collective 
action problem.26F26  The recent Copenhagen Accord, and now the 
Cancún Agreement, provide unambiguous confirmation that the 
existing United Nations process is limited, at best, and unlikely to 
be a major driver of climate governance in the coming years.27F27  
Once all the rage, Multilateral Environmental Agreements now 
seem to be limping along as hollow reminders of a more optimistic 
time when coherent global environmental governance seemed 
within reach. 28F28  Where, then, does this leave us?  Where do we go 
after Copenhagen? 
 
targets).  The recently completed Cancún Agreement, which narrowly averted a 
complete breakdown of the U.N. climate process, represents a very modest step to 
enshrine and elaborate on some of the pledges embodied in the Copenhagen 
Accord and keeps the process alive for at least another year.  See UNFCCC, 
Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention, Nov. 29–Dec. 10, 2010, Cancún Draft Decision            
-/CP.16, Advanced Unedited Version (Dec. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Cancún 
Agreement]. 
25 The difficulties of enacting domestic climate legislation in the United States 
and other countries have been very apparent in recent months.  See, e.g., Carl 
Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Climate Bill Effort, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 22, 2010, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/us 
/politics/23cong.html (“The effort to advance a major climate change bill through 
the Senate this summer collapsed . . . .”); Australia Shelves Key Emissions Trading 
Scheme, BBC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8645767.stm 
(“The Australian government has put plans for a flagship emissions scheme on 
hold until 2013 at the earliest.”). 
26 See ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 7–8 (2009) (discussing 
difficulties of solving global collective action problems such as climate change in 
the absence of world government, and criticizing “global legalism” as a naïve 
faith in the ability of “law without government” to solve such problems). 
27 See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 24; Cancún Agreement, supra note 24. 
28 This is not to say that Multilateral Environmental Agreements are 
somehow unimportant or wholly without success.  Witness the effectiveness of 
the Montreal Protocol in stemming the destruction of the stratospheric ozone 
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This Article offers some provisional answers to these questions, 
proposing a partial re-conceptualization of the nature and 
possibilities of climate governance in the post-Copenhagen era.  
The argument proceeds in three steps.  First, our extraordinary 
ability to see and understand global environmental problems such 
as climate change has facilitated an unrealistic view that the path to 
solving such problems must lead to global institutions capable of 
governing the Earth system in a comprehensive manner.  Put 
another way, our unprecedented ability to see environmental 
problems as global problems has instilled an unrealistic penchant 
for globalism in environmental law and governance. 29F29  When 
combined with the seemingly ubiquitous logic of technocratic 
managerialism that drives dominant approaches to contemporary 
environmental regulation, 30F30 this way of seeing has underwritten a 
series of attempts within the field of international environmental 
law and diplomacy to construct top-down, supra-national 
architectures that are deeply at odds with the contemporary 
international legal and political order. 31F31 
Second, if we look at how globalization is actually proceeding 
and what scholars of globalization outside of the environmental 
field are telling us; that is, if we accept as fact the fragmented, 
plural nature of the international legal and political order, we must 
look to new and different (and much messier) architectures for 
coordinating efforts across different jurisdictions.32F32  In doing so, we 
 
layer.  See JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, RED SKY AT MORNING: AMERICA AND THE CRISIS OF 
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 95–96 (2004) (reviewing the performance of major 
international environmental agreements). 
29 See Clark A. Miller, Democratization, International Knowledge Institutions, and 
Global Governance, 20 GOVERNANCE 325, 339 (2007) (describing globalism as “the 
explicit framing of policy issues as being capable of identification, analysis, and 
management on scales no smaller than the planet as a whole”); see also Elinor 
Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 3–4 (World Bank 
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 5095, 2009) (arguing against waiting for a 
single global solution to the climate change problem). 
30 See generally DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010) (critiquing the role of 
technocratic knowledge practices such as risk-assessment and cost-benefit 
analysis as dominant ways of thinking in contemporary environmental law). 
31 The Kyoto Protocol is perhaps the most obvious example.  Kyoto Protocol 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 
2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]; see discussion infra Section 1. 
32 According to Paul Berman, 
[a]s a descriptive matter, pluralists argue that legal fragmentation and 
the contest among plural sources of norms are not realities that a 
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need to move away from the simplified notion of the state as a 
unitary actor with its international analogue of consent-based 
treaty regimes; away from “a policy instrument theory of state 
capacity” 33F33 with its international analogues of instrument choice 
and regime architectures toward a more nuanced appreciation for 
the ways in which global projects are made, inserted into, and 
reworked through a complex mix of national and sub-national 
institutions. 
All of which makes the task of trying to understand the current 
conjuncture exceedingly difficult, ensuring that any effort to re-
conceptualize climate governance in the post-Copenhagen period 
is necessarily provisional.  That said, and this is the third step in 
the argument, it is clear that we need a fresh vocabulary, an 
expanded set of concepts, alternative ways of framing the 
challenges, but more importantly, new ways of understanding the 
conditions of possibility for climate governance that build upon 
past efforts without sliding back into the worn grooves of prior 
thinking.  To be sure, a number of commentators have bemoaned 
the problems inherent in the way that international environmental 
law has heretofore approached climate change and have suggested 
alternative approaches to the problem—trade; technology; 
 
hierarchically situated actor can choose to permit or reject; pluralism is 
simply a fact because multiple communities assert norms that have 
impacts . . . . Accordingly, instead of bemoaning either the fragmentation 
of law or the messiness of jurisdictional overlaps, we should accept them 
as necessary consequences of the fact that communities can be neither 
homogenized into a single universal collective nor hermetically sealed 
off from one another.  More normatively, we can go further and consider 
the possibility that this jurisdictional messiness may, in the end, provide 
important systemic benefits by fostering dialogue among multiple 
constituencies, authorities, levels of government, and nonstate 
communities. 
Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism: Defining the Field, 5 ANN. REV. L. 
& SOC. SCI. 225, 238 (2009).  But see David Kennedy, One, Two, Three, Many 
Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Cosmopolitan Dream, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 641, 641 (2007) (“Legal pluralism is not a fact about the world.  
It is a professional experience: the experience that things don’t add up, that 
coherence fails, that incommensurability must be acknowledged.”).  
Whether fact or experience—and it is not clear why the experience of legal 
pluralism is not itself a fact about the world—the proliferation of legal and 
normative orders is something that lawyers and legal scholars must confront 
in any serious engagement with globalization. 
33 SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL 
ASSEMBLAGES 227 (2006). 
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development; security; etc. 34F34—all of which have their respective 
merits, lending further support to the observation that this is a 
problem that cuts across many domains and one that deeply 
implicates, and thus cannot escape, the basic facts of pluralism and 
fragmentation. 
But any re-conceptualization true to its charge needs at least to 
attempt a rethinking of basic concepts and approaches.  
Accordingly, instead of starting with the usual suspects of actors, 
interests, and institutions; principles and norms; levels of 
governance; instruments and implementation—all basic concepts 
deployed by leading analytical perspectives on international 
environmental law35F35 and all very important in their own right in 
understanding the landscape of climate governance—the re-
conceptualization advanced here (partial as it is) begins with the 
view that climate governance, in its emerging manifestations, 
operates through a constellation of global forms or projects that 
have a distinctive capacity for de-contextualization and mobility 
(think, for example, of specific policy instruments such as cap-and-
trade, new forms of property such as emissions allowances and 
offset credits, certain principles and norms, standards regimes for 
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) reporting and accounting, or widely 
accepted social and environmental safeguards) that are being 
 
34 See, e.g., Scott Barrett, A Multitrack Climate Treaty System, in ARCHITECTURES 
FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-KYOTO WORLD 
237 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2007) (proposing a new 
“architecture” for climate policy that begins with the objective of sustainable 
development); David G. Victor, Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations, 
in ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE 
POST-KYOTO WORLD 150–51 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2007) 
(“Conceptualizing the climate change issue as one of economic cooperation might 
help to mobilize attention to better precedents.”); Jon Barnett, Security and Climate 
Change, 13 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 7 (2003) (exploring climate change as a security 
issue). 
35 See, e.g., DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 108–35 (2010) (describing key actors and their interests and 
roles in international environmental law); PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2nd ed., 2003) (discussing key principles 
and norms of various substantive areas of international environmental law); 
Jeffrey L. Dunhoff, Levels of Environmental Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 86 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007) 
(discussing “allocation of authority over environmental issues among different 
levels of governance”); Richard B. Stewart, Instrument Choice, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 148 (Daniel Bodansky et al. 
eds., 2007) (examining various environmental regulatory instruments and their 
role in international environmental law). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
BOYD.DOC    
468 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:2 
assimilated and worked out in particular national and sub-national 
circumstances.36F36  Put more abstractly, this Article contends that in 
order to understand the nature and possibilities of climate 
governance in the Post-Copenhagen context, we need to look at 
how certain forms and techniques of globalization—instruments, 
ideologies, calculative rationalities, expert systems, networks, 
legalisms of various kinds—are materialized through the “thick 
environments” of national and sub-national institutions and what 
this entails for efforts to coordinate efforts across various 
jurisdictions.37F37  The metaphor that best captures this is not that of a 
“download” from higher levels of governance to lower, or that of a 
“transplant” from one legal system to another (though both are 
important), but rather that of an “assemblage” of various global 
forms and projects on the one hand and their instantiations in the 
partial, situated, contingent settings of national and sub-national 
institutions on the other. 38F38 
 
36 This characterization borrows from the notion of “global forms” advanced 
by Stephen Collier and Aihwa Ong: 
Global phenomena . . . have a distinctive capacity for decontextualization 
and recontextualization, abstractability and movement, across diverse 
social and cultural situations and spheres of life.  Global forms are able to 
assimilate themselves to new environments, to code heterogeneous 
contexts and objects in terms that are amenable to control and valuation. 
Stephen J. Collier & Aihwa Ong, Global Assemblages, Anthropological Problems, in 
GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND ETHICS AS ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
PROBLEMS 11 (Aihwa Ong & Stephen J. Collier eds., 2005). 
37 See SASSEN, supra note 33, at 227 (advocating for research on the ways that 
“global systems insert themselves in national domains where they were once 
nonexistent.  The outcome of this negotiation between standardizing global 
systems and the thick environments of the national can easily be packaged as 
national even though its actual content pertains to new global systems.”).  This 
conceptualization bears some similarity to Sally Engle Merry’s research on the 
“vernacularization” of international human rights ideas or norms in particular, 
local circumstances.  See Sally Engle Merry, Transnational Human Rights and Local 
Activism: Mapping the Middle, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 38, 44–49 (2006) 
(“Vernacularization falls along a continuum depending on how extensively local 
cultural forms and practices are incorporated into imported institutions.”). 
38 Although the concept of assemblage has a rich theoretical provenance, it is 
used here primarily as a descriptive term that provides an alternative to an 
exclusive focus on levels or scales of governance in order to highlight the 
emergent, contingent combinations of people, practices, technologies, and 
rationalities in particular domains.  See SASSEN, supra note 33, at 5 n.1 (2006) 
(discussing theoretical understandings of the concept of assemblage, while 
arguing for a simple, descriptive use of the term that captures different 
combinations of territory, authority, and rights in the context of her inquiry into 
globalization).  Aihwa Ong describes the “space of analysis” that is captured by 
the concept of global assemblage as one that “bypasses structural analysis, scalar 
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From a normative standpoint, such a perspective departs from, 
but need not be inconsistent with, the dominant approach to 
climate governance, with its progression from global atmospheric 
stabilization targets to emissions pathways, national commitments, 
policy instruments, and implementation.  Godspeed if that 
approach can be made to work, and this Article certainly does not 
advocate the abandonment of ongoing efforts to negotiate an 
effective post-2012 climate treaty.  But in the meantime and in light 
of the considerable difficulties confronting the U.N. process (not to 
mention the U.S. Congress), it is critical to recognize and build 
upon the great deal of ongoing climate governance activities 
happening in many diverse places around the world and at 
multiple levels (including the U.N. process).  All of which is messy, 
incoherent, highly politicized, and wrapped into larger strategic 
concerns.  But this is where we are, and rather than wait for some 
transformative moment in the international negotiations or, even 
more ambitious, some new ecological awakening, it would seem 
prudent to explore novel ways to build on what is actually 
happening without retreating into localism and without abdicating 
to a crude realism that simply accepts the contemporary 
geopolitical order.  Triage perhaps, but a triage that does not have 
to be fatalistic in the face of daily reminders that the prospects of 
hitting stabilization targets are slipping away. 
Analytically, such an approach directs attention away from a 
focus on climate governance as a singular enterprise toward a 
more empirically grounded exploration of how particular states 
and state capacities are being mobilized to support and facilitate 
different global projects directed at various aspects of the climate 
change problem; the manner in which laws, customs and 
normative orders of various kinds in various places are being 
 
progressionism and predetermined outcomes commonly deployed by political 
economy.”  Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as a Mobile Technology, 32 TRANS. INST. BRIT. 
GEOGRAPHERS 3, 5 (2007).  Elaborating further on the concept, Collier & Ong note 
that 
[a]n assemblage is the product of multiple determinations that are not 
reducible to a single logic.  The temporality of an assemblage is 
emergent.  It does not always involve new forms, but forms that are 
shifting, in formation, or at stake.  As a composite concept, the term 
”global assemblage” suggests inherent tensions: global implies broadly 
encompassing, seamless, and mobile; assemblage implies hetereogenous, 
contingent, unstable, partial, and situated. 
Collier & Ong, supra note 36, at 12. 
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pushed and pulled into such efforts; the infrastructural conditions 
and knowledge practices that allow global projects to take shape 
and circulate; the possibilities for advancing stakeholder 
participation and accountability in the absence of traditional 
democratic institutions; and the implications of new value forms 
for property, territory, and control over resources.  One important 
goal of such an inquiry is to provide additional analytical content 
to the notion of an emerging “global environmental law” by 
exploring how states, markets, laws, and other institutions come to 
cohere within nested, polycentric forms of governance.39F39  Another 
is to suggest some elements of an agenda for further research that 
is sensitive to the partial, uneven, and contingent natures of 
climate governance in the post-Copenhagen era. 
These arguments are elaborated through an analysis of efforts 
to bring reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (“REDD”) into climate policy. 40F40  Deforestation, nearly 
all of which occurs in the tropics, accounts for some 15% of global 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions—more than the global 
transportation sector and roughly comparable to 2005 CO2 
emissions from the United States or China.41F41  And yet, despite this 
 
39 See generally Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global 
Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615 (2009) (discussing concept of global 
environmental law); see also infra Section 2. 
40 See infra Section 3; William Boyd, Ways of Seeing in Environmental Law: How 
Deforestation Became an Object of Climate Governance, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 843, 872–77 
(2010) (providing background on REDD). 
41 See G.R. van der Werf et al., CO2 Emissions from Forest Loss, 2 NATURE 
GEOSCIENCE 737, 738 (2009) (estimating contribution of emissions from 
deforestation, forest degradation, and destruction of peatlands at about 15% of 
total anthropogenic CO2 emissions).  Earlier estimates for the 1990s put emissions 
from deforestation at some 20% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.  See 
Raymond E. Gullison et al., Tropical Forests and Climate Policy, 316 SCI. 985, 985 
(2007) (noting that “[t]ropical deforestation released ~1.5 billion metric tons of 
carbon to the atmosphere annually throughout the 1990s, accounting for almost 
20% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions”); Nabuurs et al., supra note 14, 
at 543 (reporting that emissions from deforestation in the 1990s were 5.8 billion 
metric tons (5.8 Gigatonnes or Gt) of CO2 per year, which is approximately 1.6 Gt 
of carbon per year); see also Corinne Le Quéré et al., Trends in the Sources and Sinks 
of Carbon Dioxide, 2 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 831, 832 (2009) (“The relative contribution 
of LUC [Land Use Change] CO2 emissions to total anthropogenic CO2 emissions 
decreased from 20% in 1990–2000 to 12% in 2008, owing to increasing fossil fuel 
emissions and below-average deforestation emissions in 2008.”).  For a 
comparison of emissions from deforestation with those from the transportation 
sector, see Hans-Holger Rogner et al., Introduction to CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
MITIGATION. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 99, 105 fig.1.3b, 
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substantial contribution to the climate change problem, emissions 
from tropical deforestation were expressly excluded from the 
Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period (2008–2012), 42F42 creating 
an immense gap in international climate policy.  Since the mid-
2000s, however, there has been a clear shift in favor of including 
deforestation in climate policy at multiple levels. 43F43  Widely viewed 
as one of the few bright spots in the recent international climate 
negotiations, REDD represents an effort to mobilize the protection 
of tropical forests in various countries as part of a coordinated 
scheme aimed at valorizing the carbon embodied in standing 
tropical forests and translating this into compliance-grade 
emissions reductions that can be recognized in various pay-for-
performance schemes.  As such, REDD is an enormously ambitious 
and challenging endeavor (nothing short of a new paradigm for 
tropical land use) that is fraught with difficulty and that could 
easily fall apart.  It also represents what is likely the last best 
chance to save tropical forests at scale. 
Building on a previous article that explored the scientific, 
technical, and legal practices involved in making deforestation an 
object of climate governance,44F44 this Article uses the REDD case to 
illustrate how an incipient global project is being inserted into and 
worked out through particular national and sub-national efforts to 
govern forests and land use, measure and monetize carbon, and 
link rural actors and local communities into a new development 
model that is tied to emerging GHG compliance systems.  As a 
nascent form of climate governance, REDD puts considerable 
pressure on traditional legal conceptions of tropical forests as 
sovereign national resources, and has potentially far-reaching 
implications for existing structures of forest governance and land 
 
which shows agricultural emissions at 13.5%, forestry emissions at 17.4%, energy 
supply emissions at 25.9%, and transportation emissions at 13.1% of global GHG 
emissions in 2004).  CO2 emissions in the United States for 2005 were 5.8 Gt/year.  
Chinese emissions for the same year were 5.1 GtCO2/yr.  See INT’L ENERGY 
AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2007: CHINA AND INDIA INSIGHTS 199 (2007) 
(comparing the emissions of China and India with other regions of the world). 
42 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Rep. on 
its 7th Sess., Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001, Decision 11/CP.7: Land Use, Land-Use Change, 
and Forestry, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 60 (Jan. 21, 2002) (excluding 
avoided deforestation activities from the Clean Development Mechanism); see also 
Boyd, supra note 40, at 869–71 (discussing reasons why tropical deforestation was 
excluded from the Kyoto Protocol). 
43 See discussion infra Section 3.2. 
44 See Boyd, supra note 40. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
BOYD.DOC    
472 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:2 
use.  In keeping with the approach advanced in this Article, REDD 
can thus be seen as a global project that is taking shape in faraway 
places—an emergent assemblage, a mash up, a trading zone where 
decisions taken in international climate negotiations, the design of 
GHG compliance systems, high-tech forest monitoring capabilities, 
and the heady prospects of international carbon finance mix with 
the contingent and uneven realities of national administrative 
capacities and laws, state and local practices of forest governance, 
and a multitude of stakeholders and forest-dependent peoples. 
One of the lessons that emerges from the case study is that if 
REDD is ever going to work—that is, if REDD is ever going to 
succeed in building durable and equitable practices of sustainable 
forest governance capable of protecting standing tropical forests 
over very long time periods across different jurisdictions—it will 
only happen if the resulting assemblage builds upon the 
vernacular institutions and informal processes that are necessary to 
sustain any attempt at forging a new formal order of land use.45F45  
Conversely, if REDD is pursued in a strictly top-down manner that 
ignores, or even seeks to erase, the rights, interests, and customary 
practices of local forest-dependent communities, it will surely fail 
like so many other past schemes to improve the human 
condition.46F46  The result of such failure, of course, would almost 
certainly mean a continuation of business-as-usual, which will 
inevitably lead to the ongoing destruction of the world’s remaining 
tropical forests as global pressures on land use intensify.  Given the 
considerable momentum currently behind REDD and the lack of 
any viable alternatives to protect tropical forests at scale, it is 
critical, therefore, to make a run at getting it right.  Doing so, this 
Article contends, requires understanding not only how this 
particular form of climate governance is being assembled in 
various circumstances, but also the key elements of an enabling 
 
45 See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE 
THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 310 (1998) (“Formal order, to be more 
explicit, is always and to some considerable degree parasitic on informal 
processes, which the formal scheme does not recognize, without which it could 
not exist, and which it alone cannot create or maintain.”). 
46 See id. (describing various failed schemes to improve the human 
condition); see also TANIA MURRAY LI, THE WILL TO IMPROVE: GOVERNMENTALITY, 
DEVELOPMENT, AND THE PRACTICE OF POLITICS 4–6 (2007) (describing experiences 
with various “improvement schemes” in Indonesia and analyzing such schemes 
as a distinct governmental rationality). 
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environment for how it might work, and a sober assessment of 
what is gained and what is lost in the process. 
The Article proceeds as follows: the next Section traces the 
manner in which new ways of seeing associated with the emerging 
program of Earth systems science during the post-World War II 
period have facilitated a view of the Earth system as a unitary 
governable domain, with important implications for how 
environmental law thinks about global environmental problems 
such as climate change.  Section 2 then applies some of the insights 
from research on law and globalization to the project of global 
environmental law, with specific attention to the role of the state 
and the implications of pluralism and fragmentation for efforts to 
develop effective forms of climate governance.  Section 3 explores 
in detail the case of REDD as an emerging form of climate 
governance, illustrating how REDD has come to be constituted as a 
global project of potentially immense reach, the manner in which it 
is taking shape in faraway places all over the world, the resulting 
changes in forest law and governance, and the ways in which new 
forms of value, driven by emerging GHG compliance systems, are 
reshaping the relationship of the state to the forest and to local 
communities and forest-dependent people.  The Article concludes 
with some general claims regarding the nature and possibilities of 
post-Copenhagen climate governance. 
2. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE PROJECT OF EARTH SYSTEMS 
GOVERNANCE 
Contemporary understandings of global climate change derive 
from decades of scientific, technical, and institutional investments 
in new, comprehensive ways of seeing the Earth as an integrated 
system and an ability to monitor and assess ecological disruptions 
that are increasingly global in scale.47F47  This distinctive set of 
knowledge practices—a new epistemology of global 
environmental change—has profoundly influenced basic 
understandings of and approaches to environmental governance.48F48  
 
47 See generally PAUL N. EDWARDS, A VAST MACHINE: COMPUTER MODELS, 
CLIMATE DATA, AND THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL WARMING (2010) (tracing the history 
of how the global climate system became a coherent object of knowledge). 
48 See William C. Clark et al., Acid Rain, Ozone Depletion and Climate Change: 
An Historical Overview, in THE SOCIAL LEARNING GROUP, LEARNING TO MANAGE 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF SOCIAL RESPONSES TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE, OZONE DEPLETION, AND ACID RAIN 22–27 (2001) (discussing the 
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Indeed, the idea that the Earth system can be approached as an 
object of governance has come to operate as a powerful 
background norm for much of international environmental law 
and, specifically, climate change law and policy.  As such, it has 
important, though often unrecognized, implications for how we 
think about the prospects for global environmental governance.  
This Section explores these unrecognized implications, arguing 
that the dominant approach to climate governance embodied in the 
Kyoto Protocol and in much of the ongoing discussion regarding a 
post-2012 climate treaty suffers from an unrealistic embrace of 
global, dirigiste solutions that has blinded international climate 
policy to the possibilities of varied solutions that come with partial, 
nested forms of climate governance. 
2.1. Ways of Seeing and the Climate Problem 
The idea that human societies are capable of acting as agents of 
environmental change on a global scale has existed since at least the 
late nineteenth century, 49F49 but it is only within the last century and, 
more fundamentally, in the last several decades, that we have 
developed systematic ways of seeing and understanding the 
myriad and growing human impacts on the global environment.50F50  
While the full history of this new way of seeing has yet to be 
written, many of the key developments that underwrote it are 
relatively easy to recognize.  Early conceptual foundations were 
 
historical development of Earth systems science and understandings of human 
impacts on the global environment). 
49 See GEORGE P. MARSH, MAN AND NATURE, at iii (David Lowenthal ed., 1965) 
(1864) (“The object of the present volume is: to indicate the character and, 
approximately, the extent of the changes produced by human action in the 
physical conditions of the globe we inhabit . . . .”); see also CLARENCE GLACKEN, 
TRACES ON THE RHODIAN SHORE 704 (1967) (concluding that recognition of the 
“philosophic importance” of “man as a modifier of nature” did not happen until 
later in the nineteenth century); Mike Hulme et al., Unstable Climates: Exploring the 
Statistical and Social Constructions of ‘Normal’ Climate, 40 GEOFORUM 197, 198 (2009) 
(discussing the role of standardized instruments, formal statistical rules, and 
particular knowledge practices of meteorologists and climatologists in the 
nineteenth century that “turned the idea of climate into something that could be 
measured and quantified”). 
50 See Paul N. Edwards, The World in a Machine: Origins and Impacts of Early 
Computerized Global Systems Models, in SYSTEMS, EXPERTS AND COMPUTERS: THE 
SYSTEMS APPROACH IN MANAGEMENT AND ENGINEERING, WORLD WAR II AND AFTER 
221 (Agatha C. Hughes & Thomas P. Hughes eds., 2000) (noting that “grounded 
empirical knowledge of geophysical features and processes remained in a 
rudimentary state until the Second World War”). 
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laid in the 1920s by Russian geochemist Wassily Vernadsky who, 
drawing on previous work by Theodore Suess and others, 
articulated the modern concept of the “biosphere” as an organizing 
principle for the Earth sciences, and pointed to the growing 
planetary-scale impacts of human societies.51F51 
The experience of the Second World War gave new meaning to 
these insights.  The conduct of the war, its sheer impact on the 
environment, and the use of nuclear weapons fostered a profound 
appreciation for the capacity of human beings to fundamentally 
alter and even destroy the conditions for life on the planet.  At the 
same time, as part of the war effort and in response to rising Cold 
War tensions, the 1950s witnessed the beginning of major 
government support for the development of tools and 
infrastructures to systematically assess various aspects of the 
Earth’s bio-geophysical systems.52F52 
By the second half of the 1950s, the general conception of 
the Earth as an integrated system had begun to take shape and 
drive specific research agendas.  Increasingly formal approaches to 
“systems thinking,” which soon came to dominate fields as diverse 
as operations research and ecology, matched with growing 
computational capabilities, provided the foundations for modern 
Earth systems science.53F53  This was perhaps most apparent in work 
 
51 See generally W. I. VERNADSKY, THE BIOSPHERE (1926) (articulating the 
modern concept of the biosphere); W. I. Vernadsky, The Biosphere and the 
Noösphere, 33 AMER. SCIENTIST 1, 9 (1945) (identifying “man” as a “large-scale 
geological force”). 
52 On the Cold War as a major impetus for the study of Earth systems, see 
Ronald E. Doel, Constituting the Postwar Earth Sciences: The Military’s Influence on 
the Environmental Sciences in the USA After 1945, 33 SOC. STUD. SCI. 635 (2003).  See 
also EDWARDS, supra note 47, at 224–27 (discussing development of global data 
infrastructures for weather and climate research in the context of the Cold War); 
David M. Hart & David G. Victor, Scientific Elites and the Making of US Policy for 
Climate Change Research, 1957-74, 23 SOC. STUD. SCI. 643 (1993) (discussing 
emergence of climate research in the United States during the Cold War period). 
53 See generally Peter J. Taylor, Technocratic Optimism, H.T. Odum, and the 
Partial Transformation of Ecological Metaphor after World War II, 21 J. HIST. BIOLOGY 
213 (1988) (tracing the rise of systems thinking in ecology in the post WWII 
period).  Thomas and Agatha Hughes have elaborated on the more general spread 
of systems thinking: 
[a]fter World War II, a systems approach to solving complex problems 
and managing complex systems came into vogue among engineers, 
scientists, and managers . . . . The approach spawned new academic 
fields, new ‘sciences of management,’ and new modes of engineering 
practice.  It effloresced into a number of forms, including operations 
research, systems engineering, systems analysis, and system dynamics. 
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on bio-geochemical cycles and, specifically, research on the global 
carbon cycle, which highlighted the large and growing 
anthropogenic influence on the atmosphere.54F54  Roger Revelle, the 
famous oceanographer and one of the first scientists to raise 
concerns about climate change, summed up the basic view in 1957:   
human beings are now carrying out a large scale 
geophysical experiment of a kind that could not have 
happened in the past nor be reproduced in the future.  
Within a few centuries we are returning to the atmosphere 
and oceans the concentrated organic carbon stored in 
sedimentary rocks over hundreds of millions of years.55F55   
The next year, Charles David Keeling, a colleague of Revelle’s at 
the Scripps Institute, began measuring CO2 concentrations in the 
atmosphere at Mauna Loa Hawaii, providing the data for one of 
the most important artifacts of climate science—the famous 
Keeling curve showing continuous increases in atmospheric CO2 
concentrations—and a powerful illustration of the growing human 
influence on the climate system.56F56 
 
Thomas P. Hughes and Agatha C. Hughes, Introduction to SYSTEMS, EXPERTS, AND 
COMPUTERS: THE SYSTEMS APPROACH IN MANAGEMENT AND ENGINEERING, WORLD 
WAR II AND AFTER 1 (Thomas P. Hughes & Agatha C. Hughes eds., 2000). 
54 See Robert W. Kates, B.L. Turner II & William C. Clark, The Great 
Transformation, in THE EARTH AS TRANSFORMED BY HUMAN ACTION: GLOBAL AND 
REGIONAL CHANGES IN THE BIOSPHERE OVER THE PAST 300 YEARS 1 (Turner et al. eds., 
1990) (“Whereas humankind once acted primarily upon the visible ‘faces’ or 
‘states’ of the earth such as forest cover, we are now also altering the fundamental 
flows of chemicals and energy that sustain life on the only inhabited planet we 
know.”). 
55 Roger Revelle & Hans E. Suess, Carbon Dioxide Exchange Between 
Atmosphere and Ocean and the Question of an Increase of Atmospheric CO2 During the 
Past Decades, 9 TELLUS 18, 19 (1957).  Since Revelle’s article, the “large-scale” or 
“grand” experiment trope has been repeated often by environmental scientists 
and others. Jane Lubchenco, for example, has asserted that  
[t]he conclusions . . . are inescapable: during the last few decades, 
humans have emerged as a new force of nature.  We are modifying 
physical, chemical, and biological systems in new ways, at faster rates, 
and over larger spatial scales than ever recorded on Earth.  Humans have 
unwittingly embarked on a grand experiment with our planet.  The 
outcome of this experiment is unknown, but has profound implications 
for all life on Earth. 
Jane Lubchenco, Entering the Century of the Environment: A New Social Contract for 
Science, 279 SCI. 491, 492 (1998). 
56 See Charles D. Keeling et al., Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Variations at Mauna 
Loa Observatory, Hawaii, 28 TELLUS 538, 550 (1976) (“[T]he observed long term 
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During this period, policymakers and scientists from various 
disciplines also initiated some of the first international 
collaborations to assess global environmental change.  In 1955, for 
example, a major international symposium at Princeton University 
brought together scholars from the natural and social sciences to 
take stock of the many ways that human societies were changing 
the face of the planet.57F57  The resulting volume documented, in 
qualitative terms, numerous examples of historical and 
contemporary global environmental change, with considerable 
angst regarding the future. 58F58  Two years later, sixty-seven nations 
launched the International Geophysical Year (“IGY”) of 1957-58—
the first major multi-national effort to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the Earth as a dynamic integrated system.59F59  
Among other things, the IGY witnessed the launching of the first 
Earth-observing satellites and consolidated a global network for 
 
trend of rising CO2 appears clearly to be in response to increasing amounts of 
industrial CO2  in the air on a global scale.”). 
57 See MAN’S ROLE IN CHANGING THE FACE OF THE EARTH (William L. Thomas et 
al eds., 1956) (presenting results of the multi-disciplinary Princeton symposium 
on past and present human impacts on the Earth). 
58 See id.  Lewis Mumford, one of the conference organizers, summarized the 
implications of this new “planetary” understanding (and responsibility): “[f]or the 
first time man may, as a conscious, interrelated comprehensive group, take 
possession of the whole planet.  For the last century, not merely have we been 
able to think of the world as a whole, in time and space, but we have been able 
throughout manifold inventions to act in the same fashion.  Yet both our thinking 
and our acting have been crude, not to say primitive, because we have not yet 
created the sort of self, freed from nationalistic and ideological obsessions, capable 
of acting within this global theatre.”  Lewis Mumford, Prospect, in MAN’S ROLE IN 
CHANGING THE FACE OF THE EARTH, supra note 57, at 1151. 
59 See William C. Clark et al., Acid Rain, Ozone Depletion, and Climate Change: 
An Historical Overview, in 1 LEARNING TO MANAGE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: 
A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE, OZONE 
DEPLETION, AND ACID RAIN 22–23 (Social Learning Group eds., 2001) (describing 
the 1957–58 IGY as “one of the first coordinated, multinational efforts to study the 
earth as a dynamic system,” resulting in “a revolution in our understanding of the 
earth as a dynamic, integrated system”); see also EDWARDS, supra note 47, at 204 
(discussing the “overarching purpose for the [IGY] venture: to study Earth as a 
‘single physical system’”); Robert G. Fleagle, From the International Geophysical Year 
to Global Change, 30 REV. OF GEOPHYSICS 305, 305–06 (1992) (tracing the history of 
global change research and noting the importance of the IGY of 1957 to 1958 as 
one of the first coordinated efforts to study the Earth as a dynamic system); Sheila 
Jasanoff, Heaven and Earth: The Politics of Environmental Images, in EARTHLY 
POLITICS: LOCAL AND GLOBAL IN ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 44–45 (Sheila 
Jasanoff & Marybeth Martello eds., 2004) (noting the importance of the 1957-58 
IGY in laying the foundation for Earth systems science and in producing a new 
kind of legibility capable of generating “facts on a planetary scale”). 
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meteorological observations.60F60  Together, these efforts provided 
some of the first global data sets to support early general 
circulation models (“GCMs”) of the climate system.61F61 
These early climate models,62F62 although quite crude by today’s 
standards, represented some of the world’s most sophisticated 
scientific and technical work (second only, perhaps, to the nuclear 
weapons programs) seeking to apply digital technology and 
numerical simulation techniques to understanding complex 
dynamic systems.63F63  With leadership from John von Neumann, a 
pioneer in the field of numerical weather prediction, Jule Charney, 
and others, early modeling efforts were soon institutionalized in 
various centers in the United States and Europe, all with access to 
massive computing power. 64F64  As climate models grew in 
sophistication, driven in large part by relentless advances in 
computational capabilities, demands for data increased 
substantially, and modelers worked to “couple” existing climate 
models with models of the oceans, the cryosphere, the biosphere, 
 
60 See EDWARDS, supra note 47, at 207 (“The IGY marked a dramatic transition.  
As a concept, with its single-physical-system framework, its emphasis on three-
dimensional observing systems, and its satellite data initiative, the IGY’s global 
meteorology represented the cutting edge of science.”). 
61 See Edwards, supra note 50, at 234 (”The IGY efforts thus represent the first 
global data networks for constant, consistent, structured observation on a scale 
and grid to match the emerging atmospheric models.”).  
62 See EDWARDS, supra note 47, at 139–86, 337–55 (discussing historical 
development of GCMs and their implications for knowledge about the climate 
system). 
63 See id. at 111–15 (discussing application of simulation techniques to 
weather prediction).  As Edwards goes on to note, 
[s]imulation modeling opened up a way out of this quandary [the 
inability to do controlled experiments on the Earth system].  Only 
through simulation can you systematically and repeatedly test variations 
in the ’forcings’ (the variables that control the climate system).  Even 
more important, only through modeling can you create a control—a 
simulated Earth with pre-industrial levels of greenhouse gases, or 
without the chloroflourocarbons that erode the ozone layer, or without 
aerosols from fossil fuel and agricultural waste combustion—against 
which to analyze what is happening on the real Earth. 
Id. at 140.  On the development of simulation techniques, see Peter J. Galison, 
Computer Simulations and the Trading Zone, in THE DISUNITY OF SCIENCE: 
BOUNDARIES, CONTEXT, AND POWER 118 (Peter Galison & David J. Stump eds., 
1996); see also Eric Winsberg, Sanctioning Models: The Epistemology of Simulation, 12 
SCI. IN CONTEXT 275, 276 (1999) (describing simulation as “a form of calculation,” 
but with its own unique epistemology). 
64 See EDWARDS, supra note 47, at 153–67 (discussing the first generation of 
GCMs and the modeling groups that created them). 
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and human activities—eventually seeking to simulate the entire 
Earth system, “replicating the world in a machine.”65F65  Taken as a 
whole, the development of climate models and their supporting 
infrastructures constituted an exercise in what Paul Edwards calls 
“infrastructural globalism”—a long-term project directed at 
building and elaborating “socio-technical systems that produce 
knowledge about the whole world.”66F66  Through these practices, the 
climate system, together with the larger Earth system, became new 
objects of knowledge and governance.67F67 
At the same time that the climate research community was 
building new, increasingly sophisticated machines and ever more 
expansive data networks to understand the Earth’s climate, 
research during the 1950s on the cycling of radionuclides in the 
environment as a result of nuclear testing paved the way for 
improved understandings of global circulation patterns in the 
atmosphere.68F68  Tracking global fallout allowed meteorologists to 
“trace the movement of air around the planet far more precisely,” 
while fallout monitoring programs provided the first opportunity 
to sample carbon dioxide concentrations in the stratosphere.69F69  This 
research “proved momentous for studies of anthropogenic climate 
change,” producing “some of the first three-dimensional studies of 
global atmospheric chemistry and circulation.” 70F70 
 
65 Id. at 139. 
66 Id. at 25. 
67 See, e.g., Naomi Oreskes, Why Believe a Computer? Models, Measures, and 
Meaning in the Natural World, in THE EARTH AROUND US: MAINTAINING A LIVABLE 
PLANET 70 (Jill S. Schneiderman ed., 2000) (discussing how modeling practices in 
the sciences create new objects of knowledge).  In his recent book on climate 
change science, Paul Edwards takes this on directly: 
[h]ow did ”the world” become a system?  What made it possible to see 
local forces as elements of a planetary order, and the planetary order as 
directly relevant to the tiny scale of ordinary, individual human lives?  
How did the complex concepts and tools of global thinking become the 
common sense of an entire Western generation?  How has systems 
thinking shaped, and been shaped by, the world-scale infrastructures 
that have emerged to support knowledge, communication, and 
commerce? 
EDWARDS, supra note 47, at 3. 
68 See EDWARDS, supra note 47, at 207–15 (discussing contribution of fallout 
studies to understandings of climate change). 
69 Id. at 209. 
70 Id. at 208–09. 
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Fallout studies also provided the foundation for improved 
understandings of the fate and transport of organochlorines and 
other synthetic chemicals in the environment. 71F71  Based on earlier 
studies of strontium 90 and other radionuclides, pioneering work 
starting in the 1960s detected DDT, PCBs and other persistent, 
bioaccumulative compounds throughout the environment—from 
marine mammals in the Arctic to the breast milk of tribal women 
in remote areas of Papua New Guinea—powerfully illustrating the 
ever-widening reach of industrial chemicals and serving as a major 
source of motivation for the early environmental movement.72F72 
Enhanced understandings of the global circulation of 
radionuclides and other toxic substances were matched by a 
massive expansion of satellite-based Earth observation during the 
post-World War II period. 73F73  Driven in part by Cold War rivalries, 
 
71 See George M. Woodwell, Radioactivity and Fallout: The Model Pollution, 19 
BIOSCIENCE 884, 884 (1969) (“Biologically active materials released into the 
biosphere travel in patterns that are surprisingly well known.  A major 
contribution of atomic energy has been definition of those patterns, using as 
tracers the radioactivity in fallout from bomb tests.”); George M. Woodwell, Toxic 
Substances and Ecological Cycles, 216 SCI. AM., Mar. 1967, at 24 (discussing 
contributions of fallout studies to understanding “global, long-term ecological 
processes that concentrate toxic substances” in the environment).  Similarly, John 
Wargo notes that 
[t]he U.S. nuclear weapons program unintentionally produced the very 
first paradigm for understanding global environmental problems such as 
climate change, ozone depletion, and mercury contamination in marine 
food chains. . . . The pattern of discovery that radionuclides persist, move 
through the atmosphere, follow complex ecological pathways that lead 
to human exposures, and produce life-threatening health effects became 
a model for later efforts to understand and manage pollution and 
hazardous chemicals. 
JOHN WARGO, GREEN INTELLIGENCE: CREATING ENVIRONMENTS THAT PROTECT 
HUMAN HEALTH, at xvii (2009). 
72 See generally H.L. Harrison et al., Systems Studies of DDT Transport, 170 SCI. 
503 (1970) (discussing development and application of systems models for 
understanding long-term impacts of DDT in ecosystems); S. Jensen et al., DDT and 
PCB in Marine Animals from Swedish Waters, 224 NATURE 247 (1969) (discussing 
early discoveries of DDT and PCBs in marine mammals); David B. Peakall & 
Jeffrey L. Lincer, Polychlorinated Biphenyls: Another Long-Life Widespread Chemical in 
the Environment, 20 BIOSCIENCE 958 (1970) (documenting presence of PCBs in 
various environmental media and animal tissues); George M. Woodwell et al., 
DDT in the Biosphere: Where Does it Go?, 174 SCI. 1101, 1106 (1971) (describing how 
global modeling supports assessment of the hazards of DDT in the biosphere). 
73 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EARTH OBSERVATIONS FROM SPACE: THE FIRST 
50 YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS (2008) [hereinafter EARTH OBSERVATIONS 
FROM SPACE] (reviewing growth of satellite-based Earth observation since the 
1950s). 
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new satellite-based remote sensing capabilities created new “facts 
on a planetary scale” by allowing particular environmental 
problems to be comprehended and approached in ways (and at 
scales) that were previously unattainable. 74F74  Atmospheric 
conditions could now be measured throughout the vertical column 
of the atmosphere, greatly enhancing the existing ground-based 
observation system.  Such advances allowed stratospheric ozone 
depletion, for example, to be understood and framed as a problem 
of global scope.75F75  After some considerable work in transforming 
the flood of new data into usable formats, satellite-based 
observations also provided much needed data for ongoing climate 
modeling efforts.76F76  At the same time, remote sensing enabled the 
first truly synoptic view of global land cover change, allowing for 
major advances in understandings of the scale and scope of 
deforestation and the role of land use in the global carbon cycle.77F77  
 
74 See, e.g., id. at 1 (discussing the launch of Sputnik in 1957 as a 
transformative moment for Earth systems science); HAROLD A. MOONEY, THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF ECOLOGICAL THOUGHT 49 (1998) (characterizing remote sensing 
as “[o]ne of the foremost technological advances in recent decades” in terms of the 
“amount and quality of information on Earth System processes, at frequent 
intervals, and at many scales of resolution”); Jasanoff, supra note 59, at 45 
(discussing efforts of IGY and the Earth sciences to produce “facts on a planetary 
scale”).  To date, only a few environmental law scholars have focused on the role 
of remote sensing in environmental governance.  See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, 
Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 156–57 (2004) 
(discussing the role of remote sensing in environmental monitoring); Kenneth J. 
Markowitz, Legal Challenges and Market Rewards to the Use and Acceptance of Remote 
Sensing and Digital Information as Evidence, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 219, 219–
20 (2002) (“Satellite remote sensing and digital systems, including geographic 
information systems (GIS), provide powerful tools for visualizing and solving 
complex legal and environmental problems.”). 
75 See EARTH OBSERVATIONS FROM SPACE, supra note 73, at 38–39 (noting the 
“rudimentary view” of stratospheric ozone distribution provided by ground-
based instruments in the “pre-satellite era” compared to the “revolutionized” 
understanding of atmospheric dynamics, and stratospheric ozone in particular, 
made possible by satellite instruments); STEPHEN O. ANDERSEN & K. MADHAVA 
SARMA, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER: THE UNITED NATIONS HISTORY 5–19 (2002) 
(discussing advances in Earth systems science and satellite observations that 
allowed the destruction of the stratospheric ozone layer to be approached as a 
global environmental problem); SETH CAGIN & PHILIP DRAY, BETWEEN EARTH AND 
SKY: HOW CFCS CHANGED OUR WORLD AND ENDANGERED THE OZONE LAYER 262–76 
(1993) (discussing history and importance of satellite-based observations for 
understanding stratospheric ozone depletion). 
76 See EDWARDS, supra note 47, at 274 (discussing challenges involved in 
assimilating satellite-based observations into usable global data sets for climate 
modeling efforts). 
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Simply put, space-based observations “revolutionized” 
understandings of the global environment, creating a platform 
that, along with emerging climate models, allowed the Earth to be 
viewed as an integrated system.78F78 
It is easy to take all of this for granted today; to forget the 
qualitatively different forms of knowledge entailed by these 
developments when compared to previous understandings of 
transboundary environmental problems.  Based on exponential 
increases in computing power, climate models today can achieve 
resolutions that are orders of magnitude greater than those of early 
models from the 1960s79F79—allowing us to see the past, present, and 
future of the climate system as a single ontological whole.  
Likewise, remote sensing capabilities now provide real-time data 
 
77 See, e.g., EARTH OBSERVATIONS FROM SPACE, supra note 73, at 84 (“The advent 
of satellite data has revolutionized our ability to characterize global land cover 
and monitor land-use patterns.  Satellite sensors offer a synoptic view of Earth, as 
well as the objectivity associated with a consistent measurement and 
methodology for mapping the entire planet.”); Boyd, supra note 40 at 884–91 
(summarizing key developments in remote sensing of land cover change); Ruth 
DeFries, Terrestrial Vegetation in the Coupled Human-Earth System: Contributions of 
Remote Sensing, 33 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 369, 383 (2008) (“The synoptic 
view from remote sensing has transformed the perceived role of terrestrial 
vegetation in the [Earth] system.”). 
78 See, e.g., WILL STEFFEN ET AL., GLOBAL CHANGE AND THE EARTH SYSTEM: A 
PLANET UNDER PRESSURE 271 (2004) (“Observation of the Earth from space has 
revolutionised human perspectives and understanding of the planet . . . .”).  James 
McCarthy makes a similar point: 
[o]ver the past three decades, a broad array of Earth-orbiting satellite 
sensors and systems have evolved from proof of concept to operational 
missions and have totally transformed research approaches in many 
branches of the atmospheric, oceanic, and ecological sciences. . . . Satellite 
sensors and systems now provide observational capabilities across the 
Earth sciences with entirely new dimensions.  Today we have geographic 
continuity in data that was unimaginable a generation ago. 
James J. McCarthy, Reflections on: Our Planet and Its Life, Origins, and Futures, 326 
SCI. 1646, 1650 (2009). 
79 See Daniel A. Farber, Modeling Climate Change and its Impacts: Law, Policy, 
and Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1698 (2008) (providing a general overview of 
climate models and noting the importance of understanding the uncertainties and 
limits associated with climate models); Hervé Le Treut et al., Historical Overview of 
Climate Change Science, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 2, at 112–18 
(providing an overview of the development of climate modeling and the 
increased complexity and resolution made possible by advances in computational 
capacity); see also Leo J. Donner & William G. Large, Climate Modeling, 33 ANN. 
REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 1 (2008) (reviewing current state of climate modeling). 
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on global atmospheric conditions and land-cover change across the 
entire globe, while new “active” remote sensing applications allow 
for three-dimensional biomass mapping across the Earth’s 
ecosystems.80F80  At the micro level, instruments can now detect 
chemicals in the environment and human tissues at the parts per 
quadrillion level. 81F81 
Living in an age of global environmental assessment, we have 
grown accustomed to a rapidly expanding knowledge base 
regarding the environmental health of the planet.82F82  From the IPCC 
reports on climate change83F83 to the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment,84F84 these large-scale assessments have allowed us to 
recognize new facts about the global environment, providing a 
powerful impetus for framing particular global problems—
biodiversity loss, stratospheric ozone depletion, climate change, 
deforestation, persistent organic pollutants—that has in turn 
underwritten a push for new global forms of environmental 
 
80 See, e.g., Gregory P. Asner et al., High-Resolution Forest Carbon Stocks and 
Emissions in the Amazon, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16738, 16738 (2010) (reporting 
on use of high-resolution mapping of carbon stocks and emissions in the Amazon 
region); Gregory P. Asner, Tropical Forest Carbon Assessment: Integrating Satellite 
and Airborne Mapping Approaches, 4 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 2–8 (2009) (discussing 
opportunities to combine satellite-based remote sensing with new airborne 
techniques for measuring carbon densities to develop high-resolution carbon 
maps); Boyd, supra note 40, at 879 (discussing application of remote sensing 
technologies to forest carbon mapping). 
81 See, e.g., Ken Sexton et al., Human Biomonitoring of Environmental Chemicals, 
92 AM. SCI. 38, 40 (2004) (“Specialists can now detect extremely low levels—parts-
per-billion, parts-per-trillion, even parts-per-quadrillion—of multiple markers 
using a relatively small sample, say, 10 milliliters or less.”). 
82 See William C. Clark et al., Evaluating the Influence of Global Environmental 
Assessments, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS: INFORMATION AND 
INFLUENCE 1, 2–6 (Ronald B. Mitchell et al. eds., 2006) (discussing growth and 
influence of large-scale “global environmental assessments” over the last several 
decades as important components of international environmental governance). 
83 See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 (2007). 
84 UNITED NATIONS MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BOARD, ECOSYSTEMS 
AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS, VOLUME 1, THE MILLENNIUM 
ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT REPORT SERIES (2005); UNITED NATIONS MILLENNIUM 
ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BOARD, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: SCENARIOS, 
VOLUME 2, THE MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM REPORT SERIES (2005); UNITED NATIONS 
MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BOARD, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: 
POLICY RESPONSES, VOLUME 3, THE MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM REPORT SERIES (2005). 
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governance.85F85  By structuring our basic understandings of such 
problems and by providing new institutional frameworks for 
international collaboration, these new ways of seeing have 
profoundly shaped our views regarding the possibilities for 
response. 
2.2. The Project of Earth Systems Governance 
Understanding the Earth as a single integrated system 
combined with the recognition that human beings are altering 
biogeophysical systems on a planetary scale has fostered a deep 
commitment to particular forms of global environmental 
governance over the past several decades.  This distinctive 
approach—what some are now referring to as “Earth systems 
governance” 86F86—is not entirely novel, of course.  In its basic 
orientation, it shares a great deal with the high–modernist, 
technocratic visions that have animated state projects of various 
kinds throughout the last century,87F87 and can be seen as a logical 
extension of the early 20th century progressive program for natural 
resources management with its strong endorsement of 
rationalization, efficiency, and expertise.88F88 
 
85 See Clark et al., supra note 59, at 22–26 (describing the evolution of 
knowledge of the Earth system during the twentieth century and related efforts to 
“manage” global environmental problems). 
86 Earth system governance has been defined 
as the interrelated and increasingly integrated system of formal and 
informal rules, rule-making systems, and actor-networks at all levels of 
human society (from local to global) that are set up to steer societies 
towards preventing, mitigating, and adapting to global and local 
environmental change and, in particular, earth system transformation, 
within the normative context of sustainable development. 
FRANK BIERMANN ET AL., EARTH SYSTEM GOVERNANCE: PEOPLE, PLACES AND THE 
PLANET: SCIENCE AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN OF THE EARTH SYSTEM GOVERNANCE 
PROJECT 4 (2009).  Though its lineage is much older, the concept has gained 
currency in the contemporary period through the work of the multi-disciplinary 
human dimensions of global change research community.  See, e.g., Frank 
Biermann et al., Navigating the Anthropocene: The Earth System Governance Strategy 
Paper, 2 CURRENT OPINION IN ENVTL. SUSTAINABILITY 202, 203 (2010) (describing 
new Earth System Governance Project of the International Human Dimensions 
Program on Global Environmental Change). 
87 See SCOTT, supra note 45 (discussing various “high-modernist” state 
schemes to refashion and make “legible” various aspects of society and 
environment). 
88 See generally SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: 
THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890–1920 (1959) (chronicling the 
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What is new about this late twentieth and early twenty-first 
century approach to problems of Earth systems disruption, 
however, is the imperative of globalism that inheres in the basic 
framing, the notion that human and biogeophysical systems are 
tightly coupled, the recognition that human activity is pushing the 
Earth system outside of its “natural” operating state, and the 
resulting conviction that global environmental problems are best 
resolved through supra-national regimes.89F89  “Managing Planet 
Earth,” as the title of Scientific American put it in 1989, leads almost 
naturally to a commitment to new international institutions 
capable of mitigating transboundary environmental harms and 
protecting the global commons.90F90 
Without question, the most successful application of this 
approach has been the Montreal Protocol regime to protect the 
stratospheric ozone layer. 91F91  Based on conceptual advances in 
atmospheric chemistry and the deployment of satellite-based 
observations, which “revolutionized” the understanding of ozone 
dynamics in the upper atmosphere,92F92 the stratospheric ozone layer 
emerged as an object of worldwide concern in the late 1970s.  By 
 
dominant role of experts and the quest for rationalization and efficiency during 
the progressive conservation era). 
89 See David John Frank, Science, Nature, and the Globalization of the 
Environment, 1870–1990, 76 SOC. FORCES 409, 411 (1997) (asserting that a substantial 
increase in international environmental treaties “was catalyzed in part by a 
conceptual reconstitution of the entity ‘nature’. . . [as] a natural system with 
planet-wide interdependencies”). 
90 According to William Clark, 
[i]t is as a global species that we are transforming the planet.  It is only as 
a global species—pooling our knowledge, coordinating our actions and 
sharing what the planet has to offer—that we may have any prospect for 
managing the planet’s transformation along pathways of sustainable 
development.  Self-conscious, intelligent management of the earth is one 
of the great challenges facing humanity as it approaches the 21st century. 
William C. Clark, Managing Planet Earth, 261 SCI. AM., Sept. 1989, at 47; see also 
Peter M. Vitousek et al., Human Domination of Earth’s Ecosystems, 277 SCI. 494, 499 
(1997) (“[H]umanity’s dominance of Earth means that we cannot escape 
responsibility for managing the planet. . . . Maintaining populations, species, and 
ecosystems in the face of those changes, and maintaining the flow of goods and 
services they provide humanity, will require active management for the 
foreseeable future.”). 
91 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 I.L.M. 
1541 (1987) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. 
92 See EARTH OBSERVATIONS FROM SPACE, supra note 73, at 38–39 (discussing 
role of satellite-based observations in revolutionizing understanding of 
stratospheric ozone dynamics). 
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the early 1990s, the international community had fashioned a 
comprehensive legal instrument that allocated responsibility for 
the problem among key countries and proved flexible enough to 
accelerate the phase-out of ozone-depleting substances after 
evidence emerged that there was a gaping seasonal hole in the 
ozone layer over Antarctica—illustrating the power of Earth 
systems science in facilitating international environmental 
lawmaking.93F93  The Montreal Protocol has thus been widely and 
rightly praised as the first successful instance of international 
cooperation aimed at managing a truly global environmental 
problem. 
Building on the Montreal Protocol experience, both the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) 
and the Kyoto Protocol sought to carry forward the agenda of 
Earth systems governance, embracing the overarching goal of 
managing anthropogenic influences on the Earth’s climate system 
in a comprehensive fashion.94F94  Thus, the key objective of the 
UNFCCC—”stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system”95F95—combined 
with the Kyoto Protocol’s multi-gas, 96F96 multi-sector regime97F97 
directed at all major sources, sinks, and reservoirs of greenhouse 
gases98F98 bears witness to a fundamental commitment to global 
environmental managerialism.  The Bali Action Plan, the 
Copenhagen Accord, and the Cancún Agreement all seek to carry 
this forward, embracing the ultimate objective of reducing global 
 
93 See RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET 108–17, 163–217 (1998) (discussing new urgency 
associated with advances in the assessment of ozone depletion, with specific 
attention to the Antarctic ozone “hole,” and chronicling the response by the 
Parties to the Montreal Protocol to strengthen the instrument and accelerate the 
phase-out of ozone depleting substances); ANDERSON & SARMA, supra note 75, at 
13–19 (discussing discovery and measurement of the Antarctic ozone “hole”).  
94 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, June 12, 1992, 
1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 31. 
95 UNFCCC, supra note 94, art. 2. 
96 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 31, art. 3.1, annex A (”The Parties included 
in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic 
carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do 
not exceed their assigned amounts . . . .”). 
97 See id. annex A (identifying sectors that will be subject to emissions 
reductions requirements for Annex I Parties). 
98 Id. arts. 2–3. 
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emissions in order to achieve stabilization targets and calling for a 
comprehensive, multi-sector approach to the problem.99F99 
Of course, other powerful crosscutting norms and principles 
have shaped, and continue to shape, the international climate 
regime (such as it is).  Principles of equity and common but 
differentiated responsibilities,100F100 national sovereignty,101F101 polluter 
pays,102F102 sustainable development, 103F103 and precaution 104F104 are all 
present in the Framework Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the 
various efforts directed at a new post-2012 instrument.  Like all 
consent-based international agreements, the climate regime reflects 
the push and pull of various state actors and interests.  But 
underneath all of these, this Article contends, lies a particular way 
of understanding the climate problem that carries with it a natural 
affinity for globalist solutions. 
 
99 See UNFCCC, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties, Thirteenth Session, 
Dec. 3–15, 2007, Decision 1/CP.13: Bali Action Plan, ¶ 1(a), U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Bali Action Plan] 
(establishing an action plan to develop a new legal instrument that would 
incorporate “[a] shared vision for long-term cooperative action, including a long-
term global goal for emission reductions, to achieve the ultimate objective of the 
Convention, in accordance with the provisions and principles of the Convention, 
in particular the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, and taking into account social and economic conditions 
and other relevant factors”); Copenhagen Accord, supra note 24 (endorsing the need 
for continued international action to combat climate change); Cancún Agreement, 
supra note 24, para. 1 (affirming “that climate change is one of the greatest 
challenges of our time and that all Parties share a vision for long-term cooperative 
action in order to achieve the objective of the Convention, under its Article 2”). 
100 See UNFCCC, supra note 94, pmbl., para. 6, arts. 3.1, 4.1 (acknowledging 
that participation in the response to climate change should be on the basis of 
equity and common but differentiated responsibilities); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 
31, art. 10 (reaffirming principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” 
for determining commitments under the Protocol). 
101 See UNFCCC, supra note 94, pmbl., paras. 8–9 (reaffirming principle of 
state sovereignty). 
102 See id. pmbl., para. 3 (noting that the developed countries are responsible 
for the largest share of historical and contemporary emissions of greenhouse 
gases); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 31, arts. 3, 10 (establishing new commitments 
for Annex I Parties while nothing that the Protocol does not introduce any new 
commitments for non-Annex I parties). 
103 See id. art. 3.4 (“Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable 
development.”); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 31 art 2.1, (discussing objective of 
promoting sustainable development). 
104 See UNFCCC, supra note 94, art. 3.3 (“The Parties should take 
precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate 
change and mitigate its adverse effects.”). 
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None of which is intended to question the tremendous value 
that stems from our ability to see and understand environmental 
problems on a planetary scale.  The point of this Article is not to 
suggest that such understandings are problematic on their own 
terms.  Rather, the point is to recognize and explore the difficulties 
that arise when such understandings are applied uncritically as a 
template or roadmap for governance.  As the Brundtland Report 
pointed out more than two decades ago:  “The Earth is one but the 
world is not.”105F105  Between these two phrases lies much of the 
dilemma that has haunted modern international environmental 
law since its inception. 
But it is a dilemma that has escaped sustained engagement 
precisely because it is anathema to the very premise (and promise) 
of international environmental law:  that the world can somehow 
be brought together in the face of global environmental threats to 
act as one through consent-based treaty regimes among state 
actors. 106F106  The achievements of the Montreal Protocol reinforced 
this conviction, deflecting attention away from the fact that the 
relatively simple and unique circumstances that underwrote the 
Montreal Protocol’s success provide limited lessons for the far 
more challenging task of negotiating an effective international 
instrument to deal with global climate change.  More important, 
this conviction fails to acknowledge basic questions of political 
 
105 WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 27 (1987).  The 
Brundtland Report echoed, in many ways, earlier work on global environmental 
disruption. 
In short, the two worlds of man—the biosphere of his inheritance, the 
technosphere of his creation—are out of balance, indeed potentially in 
deep conflict.  And man is in the middle.  This is the hinge of history at 
which we stand, the door of the future opening on to a crisis more 
sudden, more global, more inescapable, and more bewildering than any 
ever encountered by the human species and one which will take decisive 
shape within the life span of children who are already born. 
BARBARA WARD & RENÉ DUBOS, ONLY ONE EARTH: THE CARE AND MAINTENANCE OF 
A SMALL PLANET 12 (1972) 
106 The Stockholm Declaration from the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human 
Environment made the point explicit: “A growing class of environmental 
problems, because they are regional or global in extent or because they affect the 
common international realm, will require extensive co-operation among nations 
and action by international organizations in the common interest.”  United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5–16, 
1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, ch. 1, 
para. 7, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 [hereinafter Stockholm 
Declaration]. 
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economy that are marginalized by the overall approach—questions 
about fairness and distribution, questions about politics and 
participation, questions about responsibility and underlying 
drivers of environmental disruption—all of which have been 
reposed, to a large extent, as technical (often legal) matters for state 
parties and the international bureaucrats who serve them.107F107 
This process of turning questions of politics and political 
economy into technical issues reflects a basic orientation in 
international law and other expert discourses. 108F108  The project of 
 
107 The more recent turn to “sustainable development,” made popular by the 
Brundtland Report and codified in the Rio Declaration, reinforces this managerial 
ethos.  See WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T AND DEV., supra note 105, at 49–65 (discussing 
strategic imperatives of the effort to operationalize sustainable development); 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, 
Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) (promoting sustainable 
development and related principles as overarching objectives of international 
environmental law). 
108 See infra Section 2.3.  In the context of international law, Martti 
Koskenneimi makes the point directly: 
The great achievement of Lauterpacht and his generation was to create 
space for progressive law outside the vocabularies of nationhood.  That 
achievement came at a cost.  Thinking about international law in 
apolitical and technical terms opened the door for expert rule and 
managerialism, not in competition with politics as in the domestic realm, 
but as a substitute for it.  What we now see is an international realm 
where law is everywhere—the law of this or that regime—but no politics 
at all; no parties with projects to rule, no division of powers, and no 
aspiration of self-government beyond the aspiration of statehood—
aspirations identified precisely as what we should escape from.  
Managerialism was the dark side of the inter-war project of imagining 
international law in technical terms. 
Martti Koskenneimi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and 
Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 29 (2007).  There is a rich social science literature 
exploring how questions of development and state projects of “improvement” are 
built upon similar processes of rendering questions of politics and political 
economy as technical issues reserved for experts.  See, e.g., JAMES FERGUSON, THE 
ANTI-POLITICS MACHINE: “DEVELOPMENT,” DEPOLITICIZATION, AND BUREACRATIC 
POWER IN LESOTHO 256 (1994) (showing how the international “development 
apparatus” operates as “the principal means through which the question of 
poverty is de-politicized in the world today”); LI, supra note 46, at 7 (“Questions 
that are rendered technical are simultaneously rendered nonpolitical.”); TIMOTHY 
MITCHELL, RULE OF EXPERTS: EGYPT, TECHNO-POLITICS, MODERNITY 15 (2002) 
(discussing the pervasive role of technical expertise in articulating programs of 
national development and economic growth during the twentieth century); 
NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT 205 (1999) 
(“When . . . numbers are used as ‘automatic pilots’ in decision making they 
transform the thing being measured—segregation, hunger, poverty—into its 
statistical indicator and displace political disputes into technical disputes about 
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Earth systems governance takes this to a new level.  Given the 
sheer intellectual and institutional complexity of the task, it is a 
project reserved by default for experts—a nascent example, 
perhaps, of what Michel Foucault called “governmentality”— a 
particular style of government built upon specific knowledge 
practices that have made the Earth system into a thinkable, 
governable domain.109F109 
As such, it can be viewed as a manifestation of the utopian 
impulse of modern international law—a noble project aimed at 
corralling and civilizing wayward nation states toward the 
collective resolution of seemingly intractable problems that clearly 
exceed the capacities of any single government. 110F110  Noble as it is, 
however, at least two nagging concerns need to be confronted.  
First, there are strong anti-democratic undercurrents apparent in 
much of the expert discourse over global environmental 
problems—reflecting a tendency, one might argue, toward a 
permanent state of exception. 111F111  Garrett Hardin, whose famous 
 
methods.”); SCOTT, supra note 45, at 4–5 (describing modern “statecraft” as resting 
on projects aimed at simplification and legibility). 
109 See Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN 
GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 102 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991) (deploying the notion 
of “governmentality” to capture an approach to government that first emerged in 
the 18th century, “which has as its target population, as its principal form of 
knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of 
security”); see also Eva Lövbrand et al., Earth System Governmentality: Reflections on 
Science in the Anthropocene, 19 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 7 (2009) (analyzing Earth 
systems governance as an example of governmentality); Nikolas Rose et al., 
Governmentality, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 83 (2006) (surveying the development 
of Foucault’s ideas on governmentality and recent work in a variety of fields 
making use of the concept). 
110 Cf. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005) (discussing utopian impulses embedded 
within the structure of certain strands of international legal argument); MARTTI 
KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960 (2002) (tracing the liberal, “civilizing” impulse of 
modern international law from its formative late 19th century roots through its 
mid-twentieth century decline). 
111 See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 6–12 
(1998) (discussing the centrality of “bare life” to sovereign power and modern 
trend toward permanent state of exception).  The general point was made in 
compelling fashion by a Brazilian participant at one of the public hearings held by 
the Brundtland Commission in its preparations for OUR COMMON FUTURE:  
You talk very little about life, you talk too much about survival.  It is 
very important to remember that when the possibilities for life are over, 
the possibilities for survival start.  And there are peoples here in Brazil, 
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1968 article The Tragedy of the Commons112F112 arguably serves as the 
locus classicus for global environmental concern, asserted shortly 
after that article that in the absence of “world government that is 
sovereign in reproductive matters,” humankind is headed for 
certain ruin in the form of global ecological crisis. 113F113  Echoing the 
strong neo-Malthusian claims of the day,114F114 Hardin’s views 
acknowledge the strong possibility (even necessity) of a bio-
political project of exception.  More recently, James Lovelock, 
progenitor of the famous Gaia hypothesis—a sort of new age 
packaging of the Earth system concept—stated emphatically that 
the nature of our current ecological crisis “may require . . . the 
suspension of democratic government for the duration of the 
survival emergency.” 115F115  One does not have to look far to find other 
examples. 116F116  And while these may be extreme positions—mere 
 
especially in the Amazon region, who still live, and these peoples that 
still live don’t want to reach down to the level of survival. 
WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T AND DEV., supra note 105, at 40.  Shelia Jasanoff sees in 
the observation of this nameless Brazilian 
an eloquent critique of modern biopolitics . . . . Policy-makers concerned 
with survival, this speaker from Brazil seems to say, will not be bothered 
by the fates of living individuals in real communities.  This is why, from 
the standpoint of those ‘who still live,’ it is a sort of demotion, a ‘reaching 
down,’ to become a cipher in a calculus concerned only with the 
nameless, faceless challenge of planetary survival. 
Shelia Jasanoff, A New Climate for Society, 27 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 233, 239 
(2010). 
112 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
113 Garrett Hardin, Living on a Lifeboat, 24 BIOSCIENCE 561, 568 (1974).  Elinor 
Ostrom, among others, has criticized Hardin’s presumption that centralized 
authority is necessary to avoid tragedies of the commons, and her research has 
demonstrated in multiple cases the adaptive governance strategies of common 
property regimes.  See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION 
OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 9 (1990) (“The presumption that an 
external Leviathan is necessary to avoid tragedies of the commons leads to 
recommendations that central governments control most natural resource 
systems.”); id. at 216 (“The models that social scientists tend to use for analyzing 
CPR [common property resource] problems have the perverse effect of supporting 
increased centralization of political authority.”). 
114 See, e.g., PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1971) (discussing the 
dangers of uncontrolled population growth). 
115 See JAMES LOVELOCK, THE VANISHING FACE OF GAIA: A FINAL WARNING 61 
(2009) (asserting that “orderly survival . . . may require, as in war, the suspension 
of democratic government for the duration of the survival emergency”). 
116 See, e.g., ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN PROSPECT 106 
(1980) (“For the majority of capitalist nations, however, I do not see how one can 
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anecdotes that do not reflect widely held views—they highlight the 
importance of examining carefully the implications of a seemingly 
permanent environmental crisis couched in terms of a project 
aimed at managing planet Earth for anyone concerned with the 
task of building structures and institutions capable of responding 
to such a crisis in a manner that remains accountable and open to 
meaningful participation. 
The second concern, while less conspiratorial in nature, is 
ultimately much more fundamental:  it’s not working!  As Gus 
Speth, a major participant in the making of both U.S. and 
international environmental law, writes: 
[t]hus far, the climate convention is not protecting climate, 
the biodiversity convention is not protecting biodiversity, 
the desertification convention is not preventing 
desertification, and even the older and stronger Convention 
on the Law of the Sea is not protecting fisheries.  Nor are 
they poised to do so in the immediate future.  The same can 
be said for the extensive international discussions on world 
forests, which never have reached the point of a 
convention.  International environmental law has had its 
successes . . . .  These successes have tended to be narrow in 
focus or regional in scope.  No blanket condemnation of 
international environmental law is appropriate.  But the 
bottom line is that on the big issues the trends of 
deterioration continue.  With few exceptions, our 
instrument of choice, international environmental law, is 
not yet changing them, and the hour is late.117F117 
Speth’s lament on the failures of international environmental law 
fingers a number of culprits, but one of the more important is the 
notion that framing a particular problem in a certain way—as one 
of desertification or biodiversity or climate change—has, when 
combined with the preferences of international law for the 
 
avoid the conclusion that the required transformation will be likely to exceed the 
capabilities of representative democracy.”); WILLIAM OPHULS & A. STEPHEN BOYAN 
JR., ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY REVISITED: THE UNRAVELING OF THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 215 (1992) (“[T]he steady-state society will not only be 
ostensibly more authoritarian and less democratic than the industrial societies of 
today . . . , but it may also be more oligarchic as well . . . .”); see also ANNA 
BRAMWELL, ECOLOGY IN THE 20TH CENTURY: A HISTORY (1989) (discussing the 
complex politics of ecological movements in the 20th century). 
117 SPETH, supra note 28, at 96. 
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Convention-Protocol model, translated into efforts to build legal 
regimes around these problems in a manner that tends to address 
symptoms and surface issues rather than deeper, underlying 
causes of environmental disruption. 118F118  The result has been weak, 
ineffectual treaties, and, in Speth’s view, a lot of time wasted 
failing to prepare for action. 119F119  To be sure, there has always been a 
certain poverty of imagination when it comes to alternatives and it 
may well turn out that, in the “final analysis” as they say, this is 
the best we can do. 120F120  For his part, Speth articulates several 
complementary alternatives, from radical reform of existing 
international environmental institutions and lawmaking to an 
enthusiastic embrace of what he calls “green JAZZ.” 121F121  Old 
governance and new, it seems, both have a role to play in trying to 
move environmental law forward in the face of a world that is 
exceedingly complicated and messy. 
2.3. Implications for Environmental Law 
The “touchstone” of environmental law, according to Richard 
Lazarus, is “ecological injury caused by human activity.” 122F122  
“Broadly stated,” says Lazarus, “environmental law regulates 
human activity in order to limit ecological impacts that threaten 
public health and biodiversity.” 123F123  It regulates, or seeks to 
regulate, in other words, the process of “ecological 
transformation”—an effort that “includes regulating the extent of 
transformation, its geographic location, and, at least as important, 
its pace.”124F124  Ecological injuries thus have distinctive spatial and 
temporal scales, and, as virtually everyone knows, these “spatial 
 
118 See, e.g., id. at 102 (concluding that treaty-protocol model of international 
environmental law fails to address the underlying nature of the problem at issue). 
119 See id. (identifying problems of international environmental law as 
stemming in part from too many conventions trying to address too many 
environmental issues that in turn “gives rise to coordination problems, limits on 
participation . . . and various inefficiencies”). 
120 See id. at 101 (noting the “failure of imagination” regarding alternatives to 
the dominant “treaty-protocol” approach of international environmental law). 
121 See id. at 173 (describing the JAZZ approach as one in which “people and 
businesses create a world full of unscripted, voluntary initiatives that are 
decentralized and improvisational”). 
122 RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1 (2004). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 8. 
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and temporal scales . . . have increased from the local and regional 
to the global.”125F125 
All of which maps neatly onto the standard history of U.S. 
environmental law.  In the beginning, there were limited common 
law actions, primarily nuisance cases, dealing with seemingly 
discrete problems of industrial pollution.  As common law judges 
sought to balance the needs of a rapidly industrializing society 
with the social costs of pollution, the limits of the common law 
became apparent, giving way to local and state regulation, 
sometimes with federal financial assistance, aimed at solving 
increasingly regional pollution problems.  This, too, soon proved 
inadequate in the face of the intensification and growing spatial 
extent of ecological disruption, providing the basis for the 
federalization of pollution control embodied in statutes such as the 
Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act and built upon a model of 
cooperative federalism and an ever-expanding administrative 
state.  Finally, we end with the inevitable recognition that many of 
our most pressing and intractable environmental problems are 
global in scope and thus demand supra-national forms of 
governance.126F126 
There is nothing incorrect in the way that the standard history 
recounts the basic facts.  Like any good functionalist 
understanding of law, it describes well enough what happened.  
But there is something incomplete in how the story ends that stems 
from a tendency to naturalize the issue of scale.  In other words, 
the standard narrative of environmental law—that ever larger 
problems require moving to higher levels of governance—contains 
within it a certain teleology that derives in large part from our 
ways of understanding environmental problems, our assumptions 
about scale, and what Elinor Ostrom identifies as an uncritical 
acceptance of the conventional theory of collective action.127F127  
 
125 Id. at 9.  As Lazarus continues, “[w]e have traveled far beyond merely 
scratching the surface of the planet’s ecosystem.  Today we are ‘altering the 
fundamental flows of chemicals and energy that sustain life,’ and ‘no ecosystem 
on earth’s surface is free of pervasive human influence.’”  Id. 
126 See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, 
SCIENCE AND POLICY 61–84 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing the evolution from common 
law to federal environmental laws in the context of air and water pollution). 
127 As Ostrom notes, 
[t]he applicability of the conventional theory [of collective action] is 
considered so obvious by many scholars that few questions have been 
raised about whether this is the best theoretical foundation for making 
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Recognizing that virtually every major environmental problem has 
turned out to be more expansive than first understood, with 
“spillover effects” and “commons problems” providing the 
dominant framings for the extra-jurisdictional reach of various 
problems, leads naturally under the standard account to the 
conclusion that environmental regulation and governance can (or 
at least should) “scale up” in response to such problems such that 
the appropriate level of governance is “matched” to the scale of the 
problem.128F128  As Professor Lazarus puts it when talking about global 
environmental change: “the nature of the ecological problems to be 
addressed compels the construction of an international 
institutional framework for lawmaking and implementation . . .”129F129  
 
real progress toward substantially reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
and taking other actions to reduce the threat of massive harm brought 
about by climate change. 
Ostrom, supra note 29, at 9.  Ostrom goes on to point out the general lack of 
empirical support for the conventional theory in a variety of contexts and argues 
for a more contextual approach to collective action related to climate change that 
recognizes the value of “polycentric” approaches to solving complex social 
dilemmas and the pathologies embedded in the view that the nature of the 
climate problem requires a “global solution.”  Id. at 4–13; see also Hari M. Osofsky, 
Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 585 (2009) (discussing issues of scale in climate governance). 
128 See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching 
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996) (“The Matching Principle suggests that, in general, the 
size of the geographic area affected by a specific pollution source should 
determine the appropriate governmental level for responding to the pollution.”).  
Jeffrey Dunhoff remarks similarly that 
much of the rational choice-influenced literature attempts to ‘match’ the 
scope or level of regulatory authority with the scope or level of the 
underlying environmental problem.  Hence, the focus is primarily on the 
‘vertical’ dimensions of governance, and the central inquiry is whether 
environmental problems are best addressed through more centralized 
(say, international or national) or less centralized (say, national or 
provincial) governance mechanisms. 
Dunhoff, supra note 35, at 90. 
129 LAZARUS, supra note 122, at 235; see also Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing 
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH L. REV. 570, 593, 626–27 (1996) (“The presence of 
a transboundary harm demands some form of overarching governmental action 
across the scope of the harm.”).  But see Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for 
Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 932 (1997) (“When one examines existing 
environmental regimes more closely, however, a paradox emerges.  
Notwithstanding the broad general trend toward centralized regulatory authority 
in environmental law, and the widespread invocation of transboundary pollution 
as a justification for this trend, little meaningful regulation of transboundary 
pollution actually exists.”). 
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Taken to its logical conclusion, such a view leads to a preference 
for more hard law and more government at increasingly higher 
levels, manifest most prominently in calls for the creation of a new 
world environment organization that possesses the tools and the 
authority to deal with problems that are global in scale.130F130  The 
project of Earth systems governance and the related effort to 
establish a comprehensive international regime to combat global 
climate change represent the apotheosis of this approach. 
But does anyone really expect to see a new world environment 
organization with teeth anytime soon?  Short of that, does anyone 
really expect a new, post-Kyoto climate treaty that will include all 
major emitters and impose a common regulatory architecture that 
could dictate, much less enforce, national level commitments and 
actions?  If anything, the Copenhagen conference brought home in 
no uncertain terms what many had already come to accept—that a 
top-down, Kyoto-type architecture for dealing with global climate 
change is simply out of reach for the foreseeable future.131F131  Even 
under the best circumstances, a ripening of the Copenhagen 
Accord and the recently adopted Cancún Agreement into a new 
legal instrument will still be built upon a plural, pledge-and-
review architecture that translates, at best, into a series of loosely 
linked compliance systems supported by robust international 
monitoring, reporting, and verification (“MRV”).  Moreover, even 
if the UNFCCC parties are somehow able in the near future to 
negotiate a comprehensive new treaty that could garner near 
universal membership, it is obvious that much of the hard work 
 
130 See, e.g., A WORLD ENVIRONMENT ORGANIZATION: SOLUTION OR THREAT FOR 
EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE? (Frank Biermann & 
Steffen Bauer eds., 2005) (presenting scholarly arguments for and against the 
creation of a world environment organization); Steve Charnovitz, A World 
Environment Organization, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323 (2002) (arguing for the 
creation of a world environment organization).  Solving global environmental 
problems, in this view, is often conceived as an enterprise that requires 
international institutions that can somehow replicate the basic lawmaking and 
enforcement capabilities that exist at the national level.  See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra 
note 122, at 235–36 (concluding that “once the institutional frameworks [are] in 
place, the increasingly compelling nature of the scientific facts regarding the need 
for coordinated global action (as witnessed in recent years with the amassed 
evidence of global climate change) would likely provide the needed impetus for 
lawmaking and law enforcement to occur”). 
131 There is some historical irony in the fact that the pledge-and-review, 
schedule-based approach embodied in the Copenhagen Accord echoes earlier 
proposals by Japan and other countries prior to Kyoto and looks similar to the 
major emitters process that President George W. Bush initiated. 
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involved in making such a treaty work will happen at national and 
sub-national levels.  Any way you cut it, climate governance goes 
deep and will involve multiple legal and normative orders across 
many different jurisdictions. 132F132  All of which underscores the 
difficult but pressing task of rethinking the conditions of 
possibility for climate governance in the post-Copenhagen world. 
3. GLOBALIZATION AND THE FACT OF FRAGMENTATION 
If one accepts the argument thus far (even if only for the sake of 
argument), efforts to understand and inform climate governance 
should start from the view that authority is fragmented, plural, 
and increasingly difficult to harness toward collective global 
projects.  Such an approach differs from traditional ways of 
thinking about environmental law, which often look first to the 
nature and scale of the problem and then to the appropriate level 
of governance and the policy instruments that will achieve optimal 
fit. 133F133  While this may work fine in terms of prescriptions for ideal 
design, it does not provide a sound basis for understanding the 
challenges and opportunities facing environmental governance 
going forward.  Beginning instead with the implications of 
fragmentation and pluralism for efforts to ground collective action 
provides a more realistic point of departure for thinking about the 
prospects for climate governance and the possibilities of global 
environmental law.  This Section explores these issues, building on 
insights developed by scholars working on the implications of 
globalization for law and governance, with particular attention to 
 
132 Viewed from this perspective, climate governance obviously implicates 
multi-scalar, diagonal forms of regulation identified by Hari Osofsky and others.  
See Osofsky, supra note 127 (analyzing the multiscalar aspects of responses to 
climate change).  Of course, the basic notion of cooperative federalism (and now 
iterative federalism) speaks directly to the importance of engaging multiple 
“levels” of governance in the effort to deal with environmental problems.  See, e.g., 
Carlson, supra note 22, at 1101 (discussing the dynamic nature of iterative 
federalism within the environmental context).  Several legal scholars have recently 
emphasized the importance of sub-national actors in plural approaches to climate 
governance.  See, e.g., Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: 
Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors 
(TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 726–58 (2008) (discussing the role of “translocalism” 
in climate governance); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global 
Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681 (2008) 
(arguing in favor of a plural model of climate regulation that allows for multiple 
regulatory systems); Trisolini, supra note 22 (concluding that local governments 
are important actors in multi-level approach to climate governance). 
133 See discussion supra Section 1. 
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the role of the state and market institutions in fashioning effective 
forms of climate governance in the context of a plural, fragmented 
legal order. 
3.1. Globalization and Environmental Law 
Much ink (perhaps too much) has been spilled in an effort to 
demarcate and define “globalization.”  This Article will not 
attempt to summarize this vast, unwieldy literature 134F134 other than to 
echo what others have said before—that, depending on how one 
defines it, globalization is not a new phenomenon when viewed in 
historical perspective; 135F135 that globalization, though not defined as 
such, is something that classical social theorists such as Marx and 
Weber clearly recognized; 136F136 that the global has occupied a very 
prominent place on the agenda of contemporary social science 
since the mid-1990s;137F137 that the intensification of international flows 
 
134 See, e.g., DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, 
ECONOMICS, AND CULTURE (1999) (providing an overview of various strains of 
globalization studies). 
135 See, e.g., 3 FERNAND BRAUDEL, CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM 15TH-18TH 
CENTURY: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE WORLD (Siân Reynolds trans., 1984) 
(emphasizing the importance of a long-term, global perspective on economic 
history); E.J. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF CAPITAL: 1848-1875, at 48–68 (1975) 
(discussing how “the tightening net of the international economy drew even the 
geographically very remote areas into direct and not merely literary relations with 
the rest of the world”); IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM: 
CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN WORLD ECONOMY IN 
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (1974) (linking the rise of capitalism in Europe to the  
exploitation of the global periphery); see also DAVID SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK 
POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMIC OF GLOBALIZATION 18 (2008) (arguing that “[i]t is a 
rather parochial conceit of contemporary commentators . . . that globalization is 
something unique to our time”); A. G. Hopkins, The History of Globalization—and 
the Globalization of History?, in GLOBALIZATION IN WORLD HISTORY 12 (A.G. Hopkins 
ed., 2002) (situating contemporary understanding of globalization in historical 
context). 
136 See, e.g., KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 39 
(Verso ed., 1998) (1848) (“The need of a constantly expanding market for its 
products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe.  It must 
nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.”); KARL 
MARX, GRUNDRISSE: FOUNDATIONS OF THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 408 
(Martin Nicolaus trans., Random House, Inc. 1973) (1858) (”The tendency to create 
the world market is directly given in the concept of capital itself.”); MAX WEBER, 
Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 129, 155 (H. H. 
Gerth & C. Wright Mills, eds., trans., Galaxy Book 1958) (1946) (“The fate of our 
times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by 
the ‘disenchantment of the world.’”).  
137 See, e.g., GLOBALIZATION THEORY: APPROACHES AND CONTROVERSIES (David 
Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2007) (presenting various contemporary 
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of people, goods, capital, technologies, and information does not 
spell the end of the nation state;138F138 and that lawyers and legal 
scholars have spent a good deal of time (and spilled a good deal of 
their own ink) facilitating various aspects of globalization and 
seeking to understand its implications for law and legal order. 139F139 
What is clear is that whether viewed in political-economic, 
institutional, or cultural terms, globalization challenges the 
traditional division of environmental law into distinct domestic 
and international spheres—a challenge that environmental law 
scholarship has recently begun to take up and one that calls for 
more sustained engagement with the various literatures seeking to 
make sense of globalization and its implications for law.  To that 
effect, while there is a long tradition of scholarship in international 
law (public and private) seeking to come to terms with various 
aspects of globalization and the international legal order, legal 
scholars and social scientists of various persuasions have recently 
begun to explore the varied and variable relationships between 
globalization and law in more direct and ambitious ways.  
Reflecting the dynamic nature of the field and the ongoing struggle 
to develop a coherent understanding of globalization and its 
implications for law (what Sabrino Cassese refers to as a “global 
 
approaches to globalization); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
MODERNITY (1990) (identifying globalization as a constitutive feature of the 
modern world). 
138 See, e.g., SASSEN, supra note 33 (discussing nation-state as a key institution 
in facilitating globalization). 
139 As David Kennedy notes  
[e]conomic globalization means legal globalization; every crate travels 
with a packet of rights and privileges, every transfer relies on a network 
of institutions and rules.  The internationalization of politics means the 
legalization of politics.  Every agent of the state, of the city, of the region, 
acts and interacts on the basis of delegated powers, through the 
instruments of decision and rule and judgment.  Indeed, globalization 
has fragmented both economic and political power, but it has not de-
legalized it. 
David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 827, 848 
(2008).  The extensive literature on law and colonialism offers another perspective 
on the manner in which law has acted as handmaiden to particular processes of 
globalization.  See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, Law and Colonialism, 25 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 889, 917–18 (1991) (discussing multiple ways in which European law 
contributed to colonialism and capitalist expansion). 
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legal grammar” 140F140), these efforts have embraced various labels and 
pursued different points of entry into the subject. 
Thus, at the most general level, a number of scholars have 
sought to understand and theorize “the globalization of law” or, in 
more truncated terms, the emergence of “global law” in multiple 
substantive domains, public and private. 141F141  A key premise of this 
literature is that the world of national legal orders is giving way to 
a more globalized society—manifest in the growth of transnational 
economic activity, the rise of a distinctly global politics, and the 
increased density of international regulatory regimes—that is 
calling forth and made possible by a proliferation of global rules, 
norms, and institutions.142F142  Somewhat more specific in approach, 
Harold Koh and others have advanced the concept of 
“transnational law and transnational legal process,” looking at the 
ways in which specific norms (human rights norms in Koh’s case) 
get articulated—often by so-called norm entrepreneurs—and then 
“downloaded, uploaded or transplanted” into various legal 
systems.143F143  More recently, a growing literature has coalesced 
 
140 See Sabino Cassese, The Globalization of Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 973, 
987 (2005) (“It is hard to analyze the vertical and horizontal concatenation of 
national, supranational, and global law because we still do not know the 
(incomplete, despite being quite developed) global legal ‘grammar’ . . . .”).  But see 
David Kennedy, One, Two, Three, Many Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the 
Cosmopolitan Dream, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 641, 654 (2007) (criticizing 
efforts to fashion a unified legal vocabulary as a response to the pluralism of the 
international legal order). 
141 See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and 
Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 490 (2005) (arguing for an expansive 
approach to “law and globalization” that recognizes the varied and complex ways 
that legal norms are constructed and disseminated “in an era when the 
prerogatives of territorially delimited nation-states, while not completely 
unimportant, have become less salient than they once were”); Cassese,  supra note 
140, at 973 (discussing different types of legal globalization and their attendant 
enabling rules); Terence C. Halliday & Pavel Osinsky, Globalization of Law, 32 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 447, 447–48 (2006) (contrasting the “ubiquity of law in the empirical 
reality of globalization” with the “equivocal status” of law in studies of 
globalization and outlining key elements for a theory of globalization and law); 
Robert Howse, The End of the Globalization Debate: A Review Essay, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 1528, 1550, 1554 (2008) (book review) (highlighting the importance of moving 
beyond debates over the merits of globalization per se to a focus on the “terms 
and conditions of global law” and “how the distinctive features of global legal 
processes . . . structure and constrain a global politics”); Martin Shapiro, The 
Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (1993) (emphasizing the 
limited, partial, and uneven globalization of public and private law). 
142 See sources cited supra note 141. 
143 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 
181, 183–84 (1996) (“Transnational legal process describes the theory and practice 
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around the concept of “global administrative law,” with particular 
attention to how principles of administrative law might be used to 
resolve problems of accountability and “good governance” in the 
development of supra-national regulatory regimes.144F144  Other 
scholars have focused less on evolving rules and norms than on 
emerging architectures and forms, attending, for example, to the 
structures that link different jurisdictions and regulatory systems—
”diagonal,” “intersystemic,” and even “dialectical” regulation145F145—
 
of how public and private actors—nation-states, international organizations, 
multinational enterprises, non-governmental organizations, and private 
individuals—interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and 
international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize rules of 
transnational law.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN 
ST. INT’L L. REV. 745, 753 (2006) (arguing that “[t]ransnational law represents a 
kind of hybrid between domestic and international law that can be downloaded, 
uploaded, or transplanted from one national system to another.”). 
144 See, e.g., Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge 
of Global Regulation, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 663, 694 (2005) (noting the 
importance of ensuring “respect for the rule of law, the principle of participation, 
and the duty to give reasoned decision” as the scale and scope of global regulation 
increase); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing 
Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006) (arguing for adoption of 
administrative law principles in context of global policymaking to enhance 
legitimacy and good governance); Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of 
Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17 (2005) (defining 
“global administrative law as comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices, 
and supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise affect the 
accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring that they 
meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and 
legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions they make”); 
Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global 
Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2006) 
(observing that “much of global governance can be understood as regulation and 
administration, and that we are witnessing the emergence of a ‘global 
administrative space’: a space in which the strict dichotomy between domestic 
and international has largely broken down, in which administrative functions are 
performed in often complex interplays between officials and institutions on 
different levels, and in which regulation may be highly effective despite its 
predominantly non-binding forms”). 
145 See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 868 
(2006) (describing “dialectical regulation” as a strong form of intersystemic 
regulatory engagement marked by jurisdictional overlap and regulatory 
dependence as compared, for example, to “dialogic” regulatory interaction 
marked by information sharing and voluntary interactions); Paul Schiff Berman, 
Dialectical Regulation, Territoriality, and Pluralism, 38 CONN. L. REV. 929, 930–32 
(2006) (characterizing “dialectical regulation” as a possible model “for 
understanding the new plural order of multiple and interlocking governance 
structures” that goes “beyond the relatively rigid legal doctrines of jurisdiction, 
choice of law, and judgment recognition”).  Berman goes on to argue that 
Ahdieh’s model of dialectical regulation needs to be broadened beyond 
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as well as the proliferation of networked forms of transnational 
governance that wield considerable influence in particular fields.146F146  
And, of course, there is an extensive literature seeking to bring 
insights from constitutional law and constitutionalism into the 
study of the international legal order. 147F147 
Although each of these different approaches carries with it a 
distinctive mix of positive and normative concerns, all of them bear 
witness to a broader effort to bring the study of law and regulation 
into a more direct confrontation with a globalizing world where 
hard distinctions between an international and a domestic legal 
order, and between a public and private sphere, are increasingly 
tenuous and where coordination between and among different 
“scales” or “systems” of governance is where much of the action 
occurs. 148F148  Lurking behind each of these perspectives, moreover, 
 
governmental actors to include the “wide variety of non-state normative 
communities” that are “empowered” as “regulatory actors . . . in a world defined 
by the simultaneous erosion of and persistence of territoriality as a relevant 
framework for understanding legal authority.”  Id. at 931–32.  See also Osofsky, 
supra note 127 (describing climate change governance as a multi-scalar process of 
diagonal regulation). 
146 See, e.g., Kanishkia Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of 
Sovereignty: The Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 425, 446–47 (1999) (discussing the fragmentation of state sovereignty and 
the emergence of regulatory networks as a form of “network governance”); ANNE-
MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 31–32 (2004) (discussing the 
“disaggregation” of the unitary state into its functional, specialized units and the 
emergence of transgovernmental networks of regulators (and courts and 
legislators) as key features of global governance); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David 
Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update, 2 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 211, 
218 (2006) (“Networks comport with deep-seated intuitions about how 
globalization really works . . . . Regulatory networks parallel and comport with 
the disaggregated but powerful way that globalization has actually happened.”). 
147 See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and 
International Regimes, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 621–22 (2009) (defending 
a “constitutionalist” approach to the international legal order).  David Kennedy 
takes issue with the “constitutionalist” approach: 
Do we know enough about the structure of global arrangements, 
whether legal or political, economic, cultural, to be confident that what 
we know domestically as ‘constitutionalism’ is a good idea for the globe?  
What if the distances are so great, the forces so chaotic, the differences in 
situation so profound that the constitution ratifies what ought rather to 
be transformed? 
Kennedy, supra note 139, at 847–48. 
148 See, e.g., GREWAL, supra note 135, at 20–22 (discussing the role of standards 
in facilitating social coordination in a globalizing world); Robert B. Ahdieh, 
Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism: Lessons from Coordination, 
73 MO. L. REV. 1185, 1223–25 (2008) (identifying coordination as “the central 
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lies a recognition that the international legal order, such as it is, is 
decidedly pluralistic and increasingly fragmented.  Put another 
way, there is a recognition among all of these approaches, 
grudging as it may be in some instances, that the various processes 
that we might group under the term globalization are taking place 
within a dense, multi-layered, overlapping set of normative orders 
and that this is not, save perhaps according to the ardent 
constitutionalists, going away.149F149 
At the same time that the literature on law and globalization 
recognizes, at least implicitly, the prevalence of pluralism and 
fragmentation in the contemporary context (a topic that will be 
returned to below), much of this scholarship also points to the 
relative importance of environmental regulation as a key site 
where law and globalization meet.150F150  And yet, despite such 
observations and despite the obvious affinity between our 
intuitions about globalization and the transboundary nature of 
many environmental problems (not to mention the proliferation of 
multilateral environmental agreements over the last several 
decades151F151), we still have limited analytical equipment and lack a 
well-developed research agenda for explaining how globalization 
is interacting with environmental law across different jurisdictions 
and problem domains. 
Seeking to fill some of these gaps, Professors Tseming Yang 
and Robert Percival have recently advanced the concept of “global 
environmental law” as part of an effort to define a research agenda 
 
dynamic of institutional engagement across jurisdictional lines in a regime of 
intersystemic governance”); Cassese, supra note 144, at 677 (“The most recurrent 
functions in global regulatory systems are coordination, the promotion of 
cooperation, harmonization, and standardization.”). 
149 But see Sweet, supra note 147, at 623 (arguing that the perceived dichotomy 
between constitutionalism and pluralism in international law is false). 
150 See, e.g., Ahdieh, supra note 145, at 906 (“[C]ross–border environmental 
regulation may offer the best examples of intersystemic regulation” that is truly 
“multi-level”); Shapiro, supra note 141, at 51 (“Perhaps globalization is clearest 
and most dramatic in environmental law.”). 
151 See ADIL NAJAM ET AL., GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: A REFORM 
AGENDA 30 (2006) (discussing the proliferation of MEAs).  More than 500 
multilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”) are registered with the United 
Nations.  Id.  And even though a significant number of these are institutionally 
linked and/or regional in nature, it is clear that international environmental law 
suffers from what some commentators refer to as “treaty congestion.”  When one 
recognizes that many of these instruments have spawned their own independent 
secretariats and subsidiary bodies of various types, the fragmentation of 
international environmental law becomes apparent. 
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that is more sensitive to the realities of globalization and its 
implications for environmental law.152F152  Borrowing from 
transnational legal process and other literatures on globalization 
and law, these authors characterize global environmental law as a 
field of inquiry that goes beyond previous efforts to chart the 
adoption and transplantation of national legal principles by other 
nations and international regimes to focus on “an emerging set of 
independent and convergent legal principles” at multiple levels.153F153  
In their view, global environmental law embraces the idea that 
“international environmental regimes are not stand-alone systems” 
but “integral parts of a larger system that also includes national 
regulatory systems.”154F154  Such an approach, moreover, emphasizes 
“problem-based approaches to regulation as opposed to 
jurisdiction-based regulation,” and seeks to broaden the focus of 
international environmental law “from negotiation and 
formulation of limited legal commitments by each party to greater 
attention to the design of institutional structures.” 155F155  Global 
environmental law, therefore, seeks to move beyond the traditional 
focus of international environmental law on the possibilities and 
limits of consent-based regimes among state actors and abstract 
arguments regarding instrument choice 156F156 toward a more 
empirically grounded focus on institutional design and problem 
solving that crosses multiple jurisdictional scales and attends to 
multiple actors coordinating through a variety of organizational 
forms.157F157  Key examples include global regulation of consumer 
 
152 See Yang & Percival, supra note 39, at 616–17 (describing global 
environmental law as “a field of law that is international, national, and 
transnational in character all at once” and that is emerging via pathways of 
“transplantation, convergence, integration, and harmonization”). 
153 Id. at 626. 
154 Id. at 655. 
155 Id. at 655–56; see also Ahdieh, supra note 148, at 1245 (pointing to “the need 
for heightened attention to questions of institutional design in the interaction of 
sub-national, national, and international authorities”). 
156 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Weiner, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument 
Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 681–83 (1999) (developing a model to test 
“optimal” instrument choice for global environmental regulation under 
alternative legal frameworks).  But see David M. Driesen, Choosing Environmental 
Instruments in a Transnational Context, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 51–52 (2000) (arguing for 
a “transnational legal process” approach to global environmental instrument 
choice that attends to national legal and political context). 
157 This resonates with the view of “modular environmental regulation” 
espoused by Jody Freeman and Dan Farber.  See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. 
Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795 (2005) (discussing 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss2/2
BOYD.DOC    
2010] POST-COPENHAGEN ASSEMBLAGE 505 
products and chemicals, the spread of environmental impact 
assessments, and nested forms of climate governance.158F158 
In its overall orientation, global environmental law thus shares 
a great deal with the broader, more established literature on global 
environmental governance and its recent new governance variants, 
which seek to understand the changing nature of environmental 
regulation in the face of a bewildering complexity of state and non-
state actors interacting at multiple levels in ways that no longer fit 
with traditional understandings of the Westphalian state system.159F159  
A key theme in much of this literature, not surprisingly, has been 
the changing nature of sovereignty in the face of global 
environmental problems and the inability of the international 
regime concept to capture the manner in which such problems are 
being addressed.160F160  Some scholars have even referred to the 
 
modular environmental regulation as an alternative to traditional approaches).  
Global environmental law, in this view, is not simply a version of “comparative 
law” as Dan Bodansky suggests.  See DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 12–13 (2010) (characterizing global 
environmental law as “the subject of comparative rather than international 
environmental law”). 
158 See Yang & Percival, supra note 39, at 619–23, 627–30, 635–37 (discussing 
global regulation of consumer products and chemicals, the spread of 
environmental impact assessments, and nested forms of climate governance as 
emerging forms of global environmental law). 
159 See Frank Biermann & Klaus Dingwerth, Global Environmental Change and 
the Nation State, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1 (2004) (detailing how global 
environmental change challenges the traditional Westphalian system by 
undermining the idea of sovereignty); Sverker C. Jagers & Johannes Stripple, 
Climate Governance Beyond the State, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 385 (2003) (arguing for 
an approach to climate governance that includes non-state actors); Chukwumerije 
Okereke et al., Conceptualizing Climate Governance Beyond the International Regime, 9 
GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 58 (2009) (advocating for an approach to climate governance 
that incorporates the increasing visibility and influence of non-state actors). 
160 On the changing nature of sovereignty in response to global ecological 
disruptions, see, for example, Karen T. Litfin, The Greening of Sovereignty: An 
Introduction, in THE GREENING OF SOVEREIGNTY IN WORLD POLITICS (Karen T. Litfin 
ed., 1998).  Litfin argues for an approach to sovereignty that moves beyond the 
“geological model” wherein sovereignty is seen as being “’eroded’ by efforts to 
address transboundary environmental problems.”  Id. at 1.  Instead, she argues for 
a more relational, malleable conception of sovereignty that changes over time.  Id. 
at 1-2; see also Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029 (2003) 
(developing the concept of relational sovereignty).  As with static notions of 
sovereignty and the “geological model,” the international regime concept, which 
is rooted in the normative assumption that independent, sovereign states can in 
principle develop cooperative approaches to global environmental problems, has 
also come under enormous pressure as scholars seek to understand and explain 
emerging forms of global environmental governance.  See, e.g., Matthew Paterson, 
Interpreting Trends in Global Environmental Governance, 75 INT’L AFF. 793, 794-95 
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contemporary situation as one of “Post–Sovereign Environmental 
Governance,” reading the prevalence of non-exclusive, non-
hierarchical, and post-territorial governance forms in certain 
contexts as symptomatic of an incipient logic of “new governance” 
applied to environmental problems. 161F161 
The post-sovereign claim, however, proves too much.  Indeed, 
it is only on the basis of a constrained and ultimately unrealistic 
view of the Westphalian system of sovereign nation states and its 
transformation in the current context that one can sustain such a 
conclusion.162F162 It is not at all clear, in other words, that there is a 
singular process called globalization that is leading toward a world 
that is somehow post-sovereign or post-territorial, much less that 
environmental governance is evolving towards some sort of post-
sovereign future.  Rather, the processes that are commonly 
 
(1999) (reviewing scholarship that seeks to go beyond the international regimes 
literature to assess emerging forms of global environmental governance that 
“break down the traditional dominance of states in such matters, and presage 
alternative forms of global politics”); see also INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES 
OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Peter M. Haas et al. 
eds., 4th prtg. 2001) (arguing that effective international environmental protection 
will require modifications to traditional notions of state sovereignty).  But see John 
Vogler, Taking Institutions Seriously: How Regime Analysis Can be Relevant to 
Multilevel Environmental Governance, 3 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 25, 38 (2003) (arguing 
for a “re-invigoration of the regime approach to global governance through an 
application of a social constructivist approach to institutions”). 
161 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Post-Sovereign Environmental Governance, 4 
GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 72, 75 (2004) (“Post-sovereign governance exhibits three 
distinguishing characteristics: it is non-exclusive, non-hierarchical, and post-
territorial.”) (emphasis in original).  Karkkainen draws heavily on “new 
governance” theory and a series of empirical case studies of adaptive ecosystem 
management (primarily in the U.S. context) to suggest that these “new 
governance arrangements represent a nascent polycentric substitute for more 
familiar forms of sovereign authority”—a development that “stands in sharp 
contrast to the model of fixed, territorially delimited, exclusive jurisdictional 
boundaries upon which the Westphalian system of sovereign states, and public 
international law as conventionally understood, are founded.”  Id. at 74, 77. 
162 See LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN 
EUROPEAN EMPIRES, 1400-1900, at 279–90 (2010) (taking issue with traditional idea 
of territorial sovereignty through a close examination of the “production of 
variegated legal spaces” and “layered systems of sovereignty” associated with 
European empires); Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the 
Westphalian Myth, 55 INT’L ORG. 251 (2001) (taking international relations theory to 
task for theorizing against a conception of the “Westphalian system” that is 
largely imaginary when viewed in historical context); Benno Teschke, Theorizing 
the Westphalian System of States: International Relations from Absolutism to Capitalism, 
8 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 5, 8 (2002) (arguing that the “decisive break towards modern 
international relations is not marked by the Westphalian Peace Treaties, but 
comes with the rise of the first modern state—post-revolutionary England”). 
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grouped under the term “globalization” are better understood as 
ones resulting in the re-constitution of sovereignty and territory in 
multiple guises as global forms or projects of various kinds are 
instantiated in the vernacular institutions of national and sub-
national formations.163F163  Such processes inevitably result in forms of 
governance that are uneven, lumpy, contingent, and incomplete 
(whether in the context of climate change, human rights, trade or 
financial markets), raising serious questions for some observers 
about the analytical utility of the very concept of globalization.164F164  
The point, though, is not to debate the analytical merits of 
globalization (a polysemic term to be sure), but rather to avoid 
ascribing causal logic to a single, totalizing process.165F165  By focusing 
 
163 See SASKIA SASSEN, A SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION 4 (2007) (“Conceiving 
of globalization not simply in terms of interdependence and global institutions 
but also as inhabiting the national opens up a vast and largely unaddressed 
research agenda.”). 
164 As Frederick Cooper notes,  
[b]ehind the globalization fad is an important quest for understanding 
the interconnectedness of different parts of the world, for explaining new 
mechanisms shaping the movement of capital, people, and culture, and 
for exploring institutions capable of regulating such transnational 
movement.  What is missing in discussions of globalization today is the 
historical depth of the interconnections and a focus on just what the 
structures and limits of the connecting mechanisms are.  It is salutary to 
get away from whatever tendencies there may have been to analyze 
social, economic, political, and cultural processes as if they took place in 
national or continental containers; but to adopt a language that implies 
that there is no container at all, except the planetary one, risks defining 
problems in misleading ways.  The world has long been—and still is—a 
space where economic and political relations are very uneven; it is filled 
with lumps, places where power coalesces surrounded by those where it 
does not, where social relations become dense amidst others that are 
diffuse.  Structures and networks penetrate certain places and do certain 
things with great intensity, but their effects tail off elsewhere. 
Frederick Cooper, What is the Concept of Globalization Good For? An African 
Historian’s Perspective, 100 AFR. AFF. 189, 189–90 (2001) 
165 See id.  Eric Wolf makes a similar point regarding the importance of 
attending to relationships and processes: 
The central assertion of this book is that the world of humankind 
constitutes a manifold, a totality of interconnected processes, and 
inquiries that disassemble this totality into bits and then fail to 
reassemble it falsify reality.  Concepts like ‘nation,’ ‘society,’ and 
‘culture’ name bits and threaten to turn names into things.  Only by 
understanding these names as bundles of relationships, and by placing 
them back into the field from which they were abstracted, can we hope 
to avoid misleading inferences and increase our share of understanding.  
ERIC R. WOLF, EUROPE AND THE PEOPLE WITHOUT HISTORY 3 (1982). 
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instead on the relationships, linkages, and mechanisms that 
constitute globalizing processes, we can understand and explain 
how particular actors, institutions, practices, and places cohere in 
specific global assemblages.  Such an exercise, it is argued, should 
be at the center of efforts to understand the implications of 
globalization for environmental law and the ways in which global 
environmental law is taking shape. 
3.2. Unbundling and De-Nationalization 
Taking globalization seriously as a point of departure for 
understanding and elaborating global environmental law, whether 
as object of research or as program for action, complicates the 
traditional state-centric approach of international environmental 
law, eliciting a more direct examination of how the state as an 
institution and, more specifically, how particular states and state 
capacities are participating in globalizing processes.  Virtually all 
of the literature on globalization, of whatever stripe, adheres to 
some version of the general proposition that the traditional 
Westphalian understanding of the state is under serious 
pressure. 166F166  Thus, scholars of various persuasions have remarked 
on the “unbundling” of territory and sovereignty as both a 
background condition and consequence of globalization, and the 
concomitant emergence of transnational regulatory regimes.167F167  
Much of the attention has focused on how sovereignty is being re-
fashioned, often in the face of particular global challenges such as 
financial regulation, human rights, or environmental disruption, 
 
166 See Neil Brenner, Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and 
Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies, 28 THEORY AND SOC’Y 39, 47 (1999) 
(noting that the “bundling of territoriality to state sovereignty is [seen as] the 
critical characteristic of the modern interstate system”).  For a critical examination 
of the foundations of the Westphalian conception of state territorial sovereignty, 
see Osiander, supra note 162; Teschke, supra note 162; see also BENTON, supra note 
162. 
167 For an early statement on this process of “unbundling,” see John Gerard 
Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 
47 INT’L ORG. 139, 171 (1993) (identifying the “unbundling” of territory and 
national sovereignty as a key feature in the transformation of the modern, 
Westphalian international order and arguing that “[t]he terrain of unbundled 
territoriality . . . is the place wherein a rearticulation of international political 
space would be occurring today”).  Ruggie goes on to decry the general lack of 
attention to territoriality by students of international politics.  See id. at 174 (“It is 
truly astonishing that the concept of territoriality has been so little studied by 
students of international politics; its neglect is akin to never looking at the ground 
that one is walking on.”). 
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and the resulting disaggregation of state capacity into its functional 
components, which in turn serve as key constituents of global 
regulatory networks.168F168  Less attention has been directed to the 
manner in which territory (the other side of the Westphalian coin) 
is itself being re-constituted at multiple scales and mobilized on 
behalf of particular global projects. 
Yet the very notion of an emerging global environmental law 
contains an implicit territoriality that departs rather starkly from 
the traditional understandings of territory in national and 
international environmental law, which have been based in large 
part on the model of sovereign states exercising authority over 
delimited national territories. 169F169  To be sure, international law has 
long struggled with how to conceptualize problematic spaces that 
extend above and beyond the jurisdictional reach of the territorial 
state—from the deep seabed to Antarctica to Outer Space—and the 
territorial reach of the state has itself changed significantly over 
time. 170F170  At the same time, the notion of extra-territorial jurisdiction 
over particular activities has been a pervasive feature of efforts to 
extend regulation beyond the borders of the territorial state.171F171  
 
168 See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 146, at 12–15 (discussing disaggregation of 
states and the consitution of global regulatory networks); see also BENTON, supra 
note 162, at 282–90 (discussing the “layered systems of sovereignty” associated 
with European empires); SASSEN, supra note 33, at 1–3 (discussing lack of attention 
by globalization scholars to the ways in which globalization takes place in and 
through particular national practices). 
169 See Brenner, supra note 166, at 47 (discussing the traditional model of the 
sovereign territorial state). 
170 See Jean Gottmann, The Evolution of the Concept of Territory, 14 SOC. SCI. 
INFO. 29, 30–32 (1976) (discussing the challenges of defining territorial rights in 
international law posed by outer space and the deep sea bed).  J.H.W. Verzijl 
offers a more “graphic” view of the changing nature of territory: 
State territory, conceived as the earthly space within which a State is 
entitled to exercise exclusive competencies, has gradually developed 
from a bi-dimensional, slightly spherical, plane into a tri-dimensional 
body, extremely irregular and complicated in shape, as far as coastal 
States with a continental shelf are concerned, showing to the eye of the 
imagination the peculiar configuration of a huge aerial skyscraper with a 
constantly soaring and broadening top structure, mounted partly on a 
thin terrestrial socle or pedestal and partly on an iceberg-like submarine 
terrace. 
3 J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: STATE TERRITORY 
14 (1970). 
171 See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE 
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 94–96 (2009) (describing increased 
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And, of course, environmental law has long been pre-occupied 
with transboundary pollution, spillovers, and problems of the 
global commons.  All of these approaches, however, have been 
constructed on the basis of a particular, naturalized understanding 
of national territory, illustrating what one scholar refers to as the 
“territorial trap.” 172F172 
In contrast, a more direct interrogation of the concept of 
territory as part of the effort to understand emerging structures of 
global environmental law trains attention to the manner in which 
space is produced and ordered as a precondition for environmental 
governance.173F173  The challenge is to recover a more general 
conception of territory that is distinct from state sovereignty—one 
that is rooted in the application of certain calculative and 
cartographic practices to the creation of modern political and legal 
space (of which the Westphalian model is the original form, but 
one that is giving way to a more globalized and differentiated 
ordering of territory). 174F174  In this view, although territory is 
“integrally related to the state” by virtue of its dual instantiation 
with the concept of sovereignty in the Westphalian system, it is not 
“inherently tied to the state.”175F175 
In other words, shifting the view from territory as jurisdiction 
to territory as a more abstract enterprise of creating calculable 
space and rendering it governable 176F176 (with concrete manifestations 
 
extraterritorial application of U.S. domestic statutes starting in mid-twentieth 
century). 
172 See John Agnew, The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of 
International Relations Theory, 1 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 53 (1994) (referring to the 
naturalized, and untheorized approach to territory in international relations 
scholarship as the “territorial trap”). 
173 Few fields of law are more thoroughly spatial than environmental law.  To 
date, however, there has been very little effort to develop a theoretical 
understanding of the complex spatialities of environmental law and governance.  
See David Delaney, Environmental Regulation: Introduction, in THE LEGAL 
GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE 218 (Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 
2001) (discussing the limited intersection between environmental law and 
geography).  For a notable exception, see Osofsky, supra note 127. 
174 Legal scholars have typically viewed territory as synonymous with 
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 
MICH. L. REV. 843, 866–67 (1999) (locating the historical emergence of territorial 
jurisdiction as the product of the science of cartography and the ideology of 
rational, humanist government). 
175 Stuart Elden, Missing the Point: Globalization, Deterritorialization and the 
Space of the World, 30 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 8, 8 (2010). 
176 See Michael Biggs, Putting the State on the Map: Cartography, Territory, and 
European State Formation, 41 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 374, 399 (1999) (“It is easy 
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in specific historical forms such as the territorial state) brings into 
focus the ways in which new forms of calculability allow for 
different renderings of territory, thereby opening up the possibility 
of new claims, legal and otherwise, over particular places and new 
forms of authority.177F177  In this view, territory is less a background 
condition—a “container” for sovereign authority—than it is a 
political project focused on making space governable through 
particular technical and legal practices. 178F178  The widely remarked 
upon unbundling of sovereignty and territory does not, therefore, 
mark the end of territory as an important feature of the 
contemporary world order any more than it spells the end of 
sovereignty.  Rather, “[t]he historical moment we call globalization 
demonstrates that the calculable understanding of space has been 
extended to the globe, which means that even as the state becomes 
less the focus of attention, territory remains of paramount 
importance.” 179F179 
 
to say ‘the state mapped its territory,’ implying that a preexisting entity increased 
the quantity of its knowledge.  It is much harder to say that, through the process 
of mapping, a new kind of territory and hence a new kind of state came into 
being.”); Stuart Elden, Governmentality, Calculation, Territory, 25 ENV’T & PLAN. D: 
SOC. & SPACE 562, 578 (2007) (“Territory is more than merely land, but a rendering 
of the emergent concept of ‘space’ as a political category: owned, distributed, 
mapped, calculated, bordered, and controlled.”).  Charles Maier makes a strong 
argument for the importance of territoriality to political history:  
Territoriality has been so pervasive a principle for organizing societies 
that only as it has begun to dissolve have social scientists and historians 
come to fathom its role.  Epochs of world history hinge not only on the 
rise and fall of great powers or the successive struggles among mobilized 
social groups but on the attributes of political space, whether weakened 
or strengthened or rescaled into larger or smaller commanding units. 
Charles S. Maier, Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives 
for the Modern Era, 105 AM. HIST. REV. 807, 809 (2000). 
177 According to Nikolas Rose, 
[t]o govern, it is necessary to render visible the space over which 
government is to be exercised. This is not simply a matter of looking; it is 
a practice by which the space is re-presented in maps, charts, pictures 
and other inscription devices.  It is made visible, gridded, marked out, 
placed in two dimensions, scaled, populated with icons and so forth.  In 
this process, and from the perspective of its government, salient features 
are identified and non-salient features rendered invisible. 
ROSE, supra note 108, at 36–37. 
178 See Stuart Elden, Land, Terrain, Territory, PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 
ONLINEFIRST 12–14 (Apr. 21, 2010) (arguing for an understanding of territory as a 
“political technology”). 
179 Elden, supra note 175, at 8–9. 
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Instead of emphasizing the emergence of post-sovereign, 
deterritorialized forms of authority as evidence of some sort of 
master trend of globalization (an observation that seems a bit 
problematic in light of recent reassertions of national sovereignty), 
it would thus seem more fruitful to examine how new 
combinations of territory and authority are emerging out of 
specific globalizing processes that are taking place simultaneously 
above, below and through the state.180F180  As an analytical matter, 
such a perspective moves away from the notion of the state as a 
unitary actor in an international system composed of formally 
equal sovereigns interacting under game-theoretic constraints 
toward an analysis of how particular states and their components 
participate in and provide important sites for certain globalizing 
processes.181F181  As will be discussed further in Section 4, this 
incipient “de-nationalization”182F182 is increasingly apparent in the 
environmental field as national and subnational authorities are 
mobilizing in pursuit of specific global environmental projects.  
And although there is considerable resistance in some quarters to 
 
180 See, e.g., SASSEN, supra note 33, at 386 (discussing “the formation of 
particular types of territoriality assembled out of ‘national’ and ‘global’ 
elements”).  As examples, Sassen cites (1) the formation of a “global network of 
financial centers” as “a novel type of multisited territoriality” made up of 
financial centers that “inhabit national territories” but are “denationalized in 
specific and partial ways” given their constitutive role in the global capital 
markets; (2) “global networks of localized activists” and the constitution of global 
civil society that is enabled by global digital networks and represents a 
territoriality that “partly inhabits specific subnational spaces and partly gets 
constituted as a variety of specialized or partial global publics”; and (3) “new 
jurisdictional  geographies” in which legal frameworks for rights and guarantees 
are becoming embedded in transnational systems, as evidenced by the ability to 
initiate legal actions involving multiple geographic sites across the globe from 
national courts or, alternatively, the manner in which international human rights 
norms get established and stabilized as part of national law.  Id. at 386–88. 
181 See id. at 227 (“Failure to differentiate state capacities, both across 
countries and inside a given national state, easily can keep globalization scholars 
from considering, let alone examining, how states may at times facilitate 
globalization.”). 
182 See Saskia Sassen, De-Nationalization: Some Conceptual and Empirical 
Elements, 22 POLAR 1 (1999) (“One way of conceptualizing this insertion of the 
global in the national is as a partial and incipient ‘de-nationalization’ of what has 
been constructed as the national, or rather, particular elements of the national.”); 
Saskia Sassen, The State and Globalization: Denationalized Participation, 25 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 1141, 1155 (2004) (“As particular components of national states become 
the institutional home for the operation of some of the dynamics that are central 
to globalization, they undergo change that is difficult to register or name.  This is 
one instantiation of what I call a process of incipient de-nationalization.”). 
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some of the more overt efforts to de-nationalize environmental 
governance,183F183 REDD and other emerging forms of climate 
governance demonstrate how new forms of calculability are 
already reshaping traditional understandings of territory—in part 
by opening up possibilities for new value forms and new claims on 
the environmental and resource practices taking place within the 
boundaries of the nation state.184F184  This is happening from above 
and below and, while it hardly signals the withering away of the 
state, it does illustrate the ways in which the state is changing as it 
reorients its capabilities to participate in these new polycentric 
forms of global environmental governance. 
3.3. Pluralism, Fragmentation, Expertise 
At the same time that globalization puts pressure on the 
Westphalian state, it also brings into relief the plurality of 
normative orders governing behavior across various jurisdictions.  
Contemporary studies of globalization have thus brought with 
them a rejuvenated interest in legal pluralism, the central premise 
of which is that the world is constituted by a seemingly irreducible 
diversity of legal and non-legal normative orders that coexist with 
the law of particular states.185F185  Initially the province of 
anthropologists and a few anthropologically minded legal scholars, 
legal pluralism in its early manifestations focused on the colonial 
encounter and the diversity of legal orders that arose out of the 
“intersections of indigenous and European law.”186F186  More recently, 
a post-1970s “new legal pluralism” has turned inward to focus on 
the diversity of normative orders within the so-called advanced 
industrial societies of Europe and the United States.187F187 
 
183 Witness the ongoing resistance by China and other countries to subject 
their domestic GHG mitigation efforts to robust international monitoring, 
reporting, and verification. 
184 See discussion infra Section 4. 
185 See Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243, 244 
(2009) (reviewing basic strands of legal pluralism and its move “into the 
mainstream of legal discourse” as a response to the challenges of understanding 
law and legal order in the context of globalization). 
186 Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 872 (1988). 
187 Merry notes that  
[t]he new legal pluralism moves away from questions about the effect of 
law on society or even the effect of society on law toward 
conceptualizing a more complex and interactive relationship between 
official and unofficial forms of ordering.  Instead of mutual influences 
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Somewhat paradoxically, then, the turn to globalization has 
reinforced the importance of both of these strands of research 
through a general recognition that while certain globalizing 
processes seek to superimpose an order or a rationality on the 
contingent, the heterogeneous, and the local, in reality such 
processes work within and through existing normative orders.  
Instead of erasing normative diversity, globalization seems to be 
enhancing it.  Legal pluralism, in short, appears to be woven into 
the very fabric of the world.  “It is,” as Clifford Geertz remarked, 
“the hardening condition of things.”188F188  Recognizing this fact, 
however, need not collapse into an “anything goes” approach to 
global governance or one that operates as an implicit apology for 
neoliberalism. 189F189  Rather, the task for global environmental law is 
to find ways to coordinate across and within this plurality of 
normative orders, building enabling environments that allow for 
the translation of global projects into the vernacular forms of a 
plural legal order.  Easier said than done. 
But it is even harder than that.  Indeed, the fact of legal 
pluralism—and it is a fact that international law has historically 
ignored 190F190—finds its corollary in the increasing fragmentation of 
 
between two separate entities, this perspective sees plural forms of 
ordering as participating in the same social field. 
Id. at 873. 
188 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, 
in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 220 
(1983). 
189 See Martti Koskenniemi, Member, U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Keynote 
Speech at Harvard University: Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and 
Multiple Modes of Thought (Mar. 5, 2005), available at http://www.helsinki.fi 
/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/MKPluralism-Harvard-05d%5B1%5D.pdf (“The 
problem with legal pluralism . . . is the way it ceases to pose demands on the 
world.”). 
190 As Paul Berman notes,  
[t]hose who study international public and private law have not, 
historically, paid much attention either to legal pluralism or social norms 
theory.  This is because the emphasis traditionally has been on state-to-
state relations.  Indeed, international law has generally emphasized 
bilateral and multilateral treaties between and among states, the 
activities of the United Nations, the pronouncements of international 
tribunals, and (somewhat more controversially) the norms that states 
had obeyed for long enough that such norms could be deemed 
customary.  This was a legal universe with two guiding principles.  First, 
law was deemed to reside only in the acts of official, state-sanctioned 
entities.  Second, law was seen as an exclusive function of state 
sovereignty. 
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international law into specialized, formal domains such as trade, 
environment, human rights, and security. 191F191  Within the 
environmental field, moreover, there is further fragmentation into 
specialized problem areas like climate change, biodiversity, 
chemicals, ozone depletion, and the law of sea (to name only a 
few).  And some of these specialized domains—climate change is 
probably the best example—are themselves fragmented into 
various functional and sector-specific areas.  
One important consequence of this proliferation of specialized 
regimes is increased dependence on experts and expert systems 
and the concomitant de-politicization of questions previously 
reserved for politics and political economy.192F192  Indeed, a great deal 
 
Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1174 (2007).  
Similarly, David Kennedy remarks that with the  
sheer density of rules and institutions in the global space [has come] the 
disorderliness, the pluralism, the uncertainty, the chaos, of all those rules 
and principles and institutions.  The globalization of law, the 
legalizations of politics and economics, has brought with it a tremendous 
dispersion of law. . . . Some of this disorder is structured in one or 
another way—various federalisms, multiple jurisdictions, choices of law 
provisions, even races to the top and bottom.  But some is also a matter 
of struggle and conflict, between legal orders, ideas, powers and 
traditions.  Our picture will need to have room for all this disorder—
there is no use denying or overlooking it, pretending coherence. 
Kennedy, supra note 139, at 848. 
191 See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: 
Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 
596 (2007) (discussing fragmentation as “the increased proliferation of 
international regulatory institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and 
ambiguous boundaries” that serves to undermine coherence and accountability in 
the international legal order).  Benvenisti and Downs argue that despite a general 
lack of concern among legal scholars regarding the consequences of 
fragmentation, it poses “a more serious problem . . . because it operates to 
sabotage the evolution of a more democratic and egalitarian international 
regulatory system and to undermine the normative integrity of international law” 
by constraining the bargaining ability of weaker states, by providing powerful 
states with opportunities to seek more advantageous venues, and by obscuring 
the role of intentionality on the part of stronger states to “create a legal order that 
both closely reflects their interest and that only they have the capacity to alter.”  
Id. at 596–98; see also Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal 
Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369, 382 
(2005) (“Most predominant states have been active forces behind the development 
of international law, and they have made extensive use of the international legal 
order to stabilize and improve their position.”). 
192 See Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between 
Technique and Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (discussing the increasing 
fragmentation of international law into a series of specialized areas or regimes 
dominated by technical experts). 
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of contemporary global governance can be viewed as a field (or, 
more precisely, a series of partially overlapping fields) dominated 
by experts and expert systems without any real recourse to 
democratic process.193F193  International environmental law and the 
entire project of Earth systems governance, for example, are deeply 
embedded within expert systems that have succeeded in taking 
fundamental issues of environmental responsibility, equity, even 
survival, and rendering them technical through a particular set of 
knowledge practices.  Any coherent account of global 
environmental law will thus need to reckon with this fact, with 
specific attention to questions regarding the possibilities for 
accountability and participation in emerging forms of climate 
governance.194F194 
Recognizing pluralism and fragmentation as starting points for 
global environmental law thus means moving away from the 
notion that a top-down, comprehensive global architecture is 
necessary (much less possible) to respond to climate change or 
other global environmental problems.  In keeping with the 
argument advanced in Section 1 above and as will be elaborated in 
Section 4 below, to the extent that REDD, and climate policy 
generally, are understood and pursued solely in such terms, they 
will never coalesce into effective forms of governance.  On the 
other hand, simply recognizing the facts of pluralism and 
fragmentation hardly provides a practical way forward.  Plural, 
polycentric, nested forms of new governance hold considerable 
appeal in the abstract, but we need much more experience, more 
thick description, of how these forms of governance are taking 
shape in various environmental domains, and how enabling 
environments that allow for coordination and translation across 
the diversity of normative orders can be constructed in a manner 
that builds upon the informal processes and institutions that all 
formal order depends upon.195F195  We need, in other words, more 
attention to the connective tissues that bind and hold these forms 
together.  The following case study explores these challenges in the 
 
193 See id.; Kennedy, supra note 139, at 846–47 (discussing rising dominance of 
experts and expertise in international law). 
194 This issue of ensuring accountability in the absence of state-centered 
democratic institutions has emerged as a principal concern of the growing 
literature on global administrative law.  See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
195 See SCOTT, supra note 45, at 310 (discussing how all formal order depends 
upon informal processes and institutions). 
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context of ongoing efforts to bring reduced emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation into climate governance. 
4. GLOBAL PROJECTS IN FARAWAY PLACES:  REDD AS AN 
EMERGING FORM OF CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 
The enthusiasm surrounding REDD as an emerging form of 
climate governance is apparent in the considerable traction that the 
issue has gained over the last several years.  In stark contrast to the 
treatment of tropical deforestation under the Kyoto Protocol, 
REDD has emerged in the eyes of many as one of the few bright 
spots in recent international climate discussions, with near 
unanimous agreement among the UNFCCC Parties on the need to 
establish a new “REDD+ mechanism” that would provide 
“positive incentives” (i.e., compensate in some fashion) to 
developing countries for national-level reductions in emissions 
from deforestation.196F196  At the same time, policymakers involved in 
the design of greenhouse gas compliance systems in the United 
States and elsewhere are contemplating provisions that would 
allow eligible REDD activities to generate offset credits.  California, 
for example, is considering what would be the first rules for 
compliance-grade REDD offsets,197F197 and all of the major federal 
 
196 The Copenhagen Accord, for example,  
recognize[s] the crucial role of reducing emission from deforestation and 
forest degradation and the need to enhance removals of greenhouse gas 
emission by forests and agree[s] on the need to provide positive 
incentives to such actions through the immediate establishment of a 
mechanism including REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of financial 
resources from developed countries. 
Copenhagen Accord, supra note 24, para. 6.  The Cancún Agreement elaborates on 
this, establishing a number of principles and a workplan for further cooperation 
on REDD+.  See Cancún Agreement, supra note 24 paras. 68–79 (establishing 
principles and guidelines for additional cooperation on “policy approaches and 
positive incentives” to build a viable REDD+ program); Id. annex II (establishing 
two-year REDD+ workplan for Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice).  
197 See CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED REGULATION TO IMPLEMENT THE CALIFORNIA 
CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Appendix A: Proposed Regulation Order §§ 95991-
95994 (Oct. 28, 2010) [hereinafter CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED REGULATION] 
(establishing requirements for sector-based offset credits and identifying REDD as 
a source of sector-based credits); CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED REGULATION TO 
IMPLEMENT THE CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Part I Vol. I, Staff Report: 
Initial Statement of Reasons II-48, III-22 to III-29 (Oct. 28, 2010) [hereinafter CAL. 
AIR RES. BD., Staff Report] (elaborating on sector-based offset program and 
proposing that “the first sector-based credits to be incorporated in the cap-and-
trade program come from Board approved REDD sector-based crediting 
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climate bills introduced in the last two Congresses have included 
extensive provisions for REDD.198F198  Meanwhile, the donor 
community, led by Norway, France, Japan and the United States, 
has pledged several billion dollars for “fast-start” REDD financing 
over the next several years,199F199 complementing ongoing efforts by 
the World Bank’s $300 million Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
to promote REDD “readiness” and pilot activities in some thirty-
seven tropical forest countries.200F200  Many of these tropical forest 
countries are in turn reforming their own laws and institutions to 
accommodate the possibility of REDD and establishing new 
mechanisms, such as Brazil’s Amazon Fund, to support national 
REDD programs.201F201  And leading states and provinces in Brazil, 
Indonesia, and other tropical forest countries are establishing their 
own REDD programs—a reflection of the fact that many forest 
governance responsibilities have been “decentralized” to the 
provincial level and below.202F202 
 
programs”) (quotation is at III-26).  California has also been a leader in the 
Governors’ Climate and Forests Task Force (“GCF”), a unique multi-jurisdictional 
collaboration between 16 states and provinces from the United States, Brazil, 
Indonesia, Mexico, and Nigeria focused on the development of compliance-grade 
REDD programs.  See About GCF, GOVERNOR’S CLIMATE AND FOREST TASKFORCE, 
http://www.gcftaskforce.org/about.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) [hereinafter 
GCF] (outlining the objectives and activities of the GCF). 
198 See, e.g., Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. 
§§ 744(e), 753 (2009) (providing for recognition of international offset credits for 
certain REDD activities); American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 
2454, 111th Cong. § 743(e) & tit. III, pt. E (2009)  [hereinafter ACES] (recognizing 
offset credits from certain REDD activities and allocating a portion of emissions 
allowances for supplemental reductions of emissions from deforestation); 
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong. tit. III, pt. H 
(2008) (providing set aside of emissions allowances to support efforts to reduce 
emissions from deforestation); American Power Act, S. ___, 111th Cong. § 756(c) 
(as circulated in draft form May 12, 2010) (recognizing offsets from certain REDD 
activities). 
199 See Beth Daley, $3.5b Pledge Buoys Climate Talks; Poorer Nations Hail 
Tentative Deal to Protect Forests, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 17, 2009, at 6, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2009/12/17/35b_pledge
_buoys_climate_talks (“The United States and five other countries pledged $3.5 
billion over the next three years to help developing countries protect trees . . . .”). 
200 See About the FCPF, FOREST CARBON PARTNERSHIP FACILITY, http://www 
.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/node/12 (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) (describing 
the work of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility). 
201 See discussion infra Sections 4.2–4.3. 
202 See, e.g., Arun Agrawal et al., Changing Governance of the World’s Forests, 
320 SCIENCE 1460, 1461 (2008) (discussing decentralization of forest governance 
over past several decades); Tanya Hayes & Lauren Persha, Nesting Local Forestry 
Initiatives: Revisiting Community Forest Management in a REDD+ World, 12 FOREST 
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Efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation are also gaining 
traction in various private sector initiatives.  Multi-stakeholder 
commodity roundtables for soy, beef, and palm oil, for example, 
are exploring ways to reduce emissions from deforestation through 
supply chain certification schemes.203F203  At least half a dozen 
voluntary carbon market standards for REDD activities are in 
various stages of development.204F204  And the number of project-level 
REDD activities in tropical forest countries has grown substantially 
 
POL’Y & ECON. 545, 545–46 (2010) (reviewing extensive research on forest 
governance decentralization and arguing for importance of decentralized forest 
governance structures for the success of REDD+ initiatives).  Elinor Ostrom’s 
research has been particularly influential in highlighting the effectiveness of 
decentralized forest governance.  In her view, 
[n]aive theories of institutions equate power and capability to regulate 
events with simple systems that are organized in a clear hierarchy of 
superior and subordinate relationships.  Substantial recent research on 
forest institutions has challenged the presumption that centralized 
agencies achieve better regulation of forest resources than do more 
complex, polycentric institutions. 
Elinor Ostrom, Scales, Polycentricity, and Incentives: Designing Complexity to 
Govern Complexity, in PROTECTION OF GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY: CONVERGING 
STRATEGIES 149, 150 (Lakshman D. Guruswamy & Jeffrey A. McNeely eds., 
1998) (citations omitted). 
203 See William Laurance et al., Improving the Performance of the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil for Nature Conservation, 24 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 377 (2010) 
(discussing efforts of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil to reduce 
deforestation impacts of palm oil production); Lesley K. McAllister, Sustainable 
Consumption Governance in the Amazon, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10873, 10878–80 (2008) 
(discussing “responsible sourcing” and certification schemes aimed at improving 
environmental performance of soy and beef industries in Brazil); Daniel C. 
Nepstad et al., Globalization of the Amazon Soy and Beef Industries: Opportunities for 
Conservation, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1595, 1600–01 (2006) (discussing potential 
for environmental certification systems to reduce deforestation associated with 
soy and beef supply chains in Brazil). 
204 These include pure carbon accounting standards such as the REDD 
methodologies being developed under the Voluntary Carbon Standard (“VCS”) as 
well as project design standards focused on ensuring certain social and 
environmental co-benefits from REDD activities such as the Community, Climate 
and Biodiversity Alliance (“CCBA”) standards.  See VOLUNTARY CARBON 
STANDARD, http://www.v-c-s.org/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) (providing 
background on program objectives of the Voluntary Carbon Standard); THE 
CLIMATE, COMMUNITY & BIODIVERSITY ALLIANCE, http://www.climate-
standards.org/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) (providing an overview of The Climate, 
Community and Biodiversity Alliance); see also ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, STATE OF 
THE FOREST CARBON MARKETS 2009 (2010) (reviewing status of voluntary forest 
carbon standards). 
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since the mid 2000s, with significant involvement from numerous 
stakeholders and the private sector.205F205 
To supporters, REDD represents nothing less than the last best 
hope for saving tropical forests on any significant scale and a 
critical element in the effort to avoid catastrophic disruption of the 
global climate system.206F206  Others see it as an essential low-cost 
mitigation option available in the near term; a way of reducing the 
costs of GHG reductions and providing much-needed flexibility in 
the transition to a low-carbon energy system.207F207  Still others view it 
as a key step toward engaging major developing countries such as 
Brazil and Indonesia in the climate protection effort and a potential 
pathway to a new paradigm for low-carbon land use. 208F208 
 
205 See ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, supra note 204 (reviewing the status of 
REDD projects around the world). 
206 See, e.g., The World’s Lungs: Forests, and How to Save Them, ECONOMIST, Sept. 
25, 2010, at 15, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17093495 (noting 
that without a serious effort to make REDD work “the risk from climate change 
will be vastly increased and the planet will lose one of its most valuable, and most 
beautiful, assets”). 
207 See MCKINSEY & COMPANY, PATHWAYS TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY: 
VERSION 2 OF THE GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT COST CURVE 116 (2009) 
(identifying avoided deforestation as large, low-cost abatement opportunity for 
GHG mitigation); NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE 
STERN REVIEW 537 (2007) (“Curbing deforestation is a highly cost-effective way of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and has the potential to offer significant 
reductions fairly quickly.”); Nabuurs et al., supra note , at 543 (noting high 
agreement and much evidence for conclusion that “[f]orestry can make a very 
significant contribution to a low-cost global mitigation portfolio that provides 
synergies with adaptation and sustainable development”).  Reducing emissions 
from deforestation, according to these analyses, could therefore provide 
significant flexibility regarding both the sequencing of emissions reductions over 
time and the geographic and sectoral distribution of such reductions (where 
flexible).  See LAWRENCE H. GOULDER & WILLIAM A. PIZER, THE ECONOMICS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE 11 (2006) (discussing concept of “where” and “when” flexibility 
in context of GHG mitigation efforts).  The enthusiasm for REDD as a low-cost, 
near-term abatement option (a point that the consultants from McKinsey & Co. 
have been making for several years) needs to be tempered with some recognition 
of the difficulties involved in getting the laws and institutions in place to make 
this happen.  One afternoon in an Indonesian village is all it would take to dispel 
the view that this will be quick, easy, or even cheap. 
208 Brazil and Indonesia are among the top global emitters when emissions 
from deforestation are included.  See LARRY PARKER & JOHN BLODGETT, 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE TOP 20 EMITTERS AND DEVELOPED 
VERSUS DEVELOPING NATIONS 6 (2008) (“Land-use practices in certain developing 
countries, notably Brazil and Indonesia, are having the effect of substantially 
upping their relative emissions ranks: The ranking of their cumulative net 
emissions from 1950 to 2000 rise from 18th to 5th, and 27th to 4th, respectively, 
when land use is taken into account.”).  For Brazil, emissions from deforestation 
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Critics, on the other hand, charge that REDD is simply another 
effort by polluters in the industrialized countries to avoid making 
real emissions reductions at home—another version of “carbon 
colonialism” aimed at appropriating cheap abatement 
opportunities from developing countries, enriching private 
companies, empowering certain state actors and driving new forms 
of enclosure, all of which pose grave threats to the rights and 
interests of indigenous peoples and local forest-dependent 
communities. 209F209  Somewhere in the middle are those who consider 
REDD to be overly complex and unrealistic given the current state 
of forest governance (and governance generally) in many tropical 
forest countries, and thus an expensive distraction from the more 
pressing task of transitioning to a low-carbon energy system. 210F210 
 
have historically accounted for some two-thirds of total emissions.  In Indonesia, 
the proportion is around 80%.  See Gustavo A. Silva Chávez, Reducing Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions from Tropical Deforestation by Applying Compensated Reduction to 
Bolivia, in AMAZON INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, TROPICAL 
DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 73 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan 
Schwartzman eds., 2005). 
209 See FRIENDS OF THE EARTH INTERNATIONAL, REDD MYTHS: A CRITICAL 
REVIEW OF PROPOSED MECHANISMS TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND 
DEGRADATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7 (2008) (arguing that REDD could 
“[r]educe developing countries’ sovereignty over their natural resources, by 
prioritising investment decisions that focus on maximizing profits and allowing 
foreign investors to buy up forest ‘services,’” “[f]oster an ‘armed protection’ 
mentality that could lead to the displacement of millions of forest-dependent 
people, including by force,” and “[f]acilitate corruption and poor governance in 
countries with tropical forests, because of the large sums of money proposed and 
the complex nature of the financial mechanisms likely to be involved”); TOM 
GRIFFITHS WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FRANCESCO MARTONE, FOREST PEOPLES 
PROGRAMME, SEEING REDD?: FORESTS, CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AND THE 
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 1 (2009) (stressing that 
“many initial REDD concepts fail to acknowledge forest governance problems, do 
not propose forest tenure reform,” and contain no clear commitments to address 
indigenous rights and equity issues). 
210 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, ROOTS FOR GOOD FOREST GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES: 
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNANCE REFORMS 33 (2009) (“In the specific 
context of REDD, for example, it is widely agreed that without good governance 
and promotion of legality in the forest sector, REDD schemes have little 
opportunity to be successful.”); Rhitu Chatterjee, The Road to REDD, 43 ENVTL. SCI. 
& TECH. 557 (2009) (detailing difficulties associated with the implementation of a 
REDD project due to limitations in funding, science, monitoring, and complexities 
of institutions and indigenous rights); Manish Bapna, Forests, Climate Change and 
the Challenge of REDD, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (Mar. 9, 2010), 
http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/03/forests-climate-change-and-challenge-
redd (last visited Nov. 28, 2010) (discussing significant challenges to REDD posed 
by the problem of weak governance in many tropical forest countries). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
BOYD.DOC    
522 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:2 
Put crudely, generalizations about REDD do not come easy and 
much depends on where one stands.  Viewed from above, REDD 
looks like a paradigmatic attempt at Earth systems governance—a 
critical step in the effort to manage the terrestrial carbon cycle and 
bring it into larger structures of climate governance.  Viewed from 
below, REDD looks like yet another forest conservation scheme; 
another iteration of what Tanya Li calls the “will to improve,” with 
massive implications for existing practices of forest governance 
and land use and plenty of reasons for skepticism.211F211  Viewed from 
the in-between, REDD looks like a host of mediating practices—
principles of GHG compliance market design, carbon accounting 
standards, remote sensing technologies and MRV platforms, new 
forms of property, private investment decisions, NGO 
conservation agendas, national and subnational laws governing 
forests and land use, and various norms and principles regarding 
the participation and rights of local people—all of which might 
provide the glue to make the whole thing cohere into an effective 
form of climate governance. 
For REDD to work, of course, many things will have to fall into 
place and no single development at any level will be enough to 
make the difference.  As an emerging form of climate governance, 
REDD is quite fragile and, as noted in the introduction, could 
easily fall apart.  Indeed, even if all of the necessary policy pieces 
fall into place regarding the establishment of an international 
REDD mechanism and/or the design of national and subnational 
GHG compliance systems that recognize efforts to reduce 
emissions from deforestation, unless REDD can be translated into 
the vernacular institutions of communities who live in and near 
tropical forests, it will surely fail. 212F212  This goes beyond simply 
 
211 See LI, supra note , at 6 (describing experiences with various 
“improvement schemes” in Indonesia and analyzing such schemes as a “distinct, 
governmental rationality”); SCOTT, supra note  (discussing various state-sponsored 
schemes to improve the human condition). 
212 As one commentator recently put it: “[m]ultispectral remote sensing, 
international negotiations, and merchant-bank deals appear to offer a heady mix 
of new opportunities to star-struck forest ecologists and conservationists, but 
REDD will come to nothing if the system is not supported by the people who own 
and live in the forests.”  David Melick, Credibility of REDD and Experiences from 
Papua New Guinea, 24 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 359, 361 (2010).  A recent study of 
some eighty forest commons in ten countries identified positive links between 
local autonomy over forest resources and increased carbon storage in forests.  See 
Ashwini Chhatre & Arun Agrawal, Trade-offs and Synergies Between Carbon Storage 
and Livelihood Benefits from Forest Commons, 106 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 17667, 
17667 (2009) (discussing links between local autonomy over forest resources and 
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getting the incentives right “on the ground.”  It goes to questions 
of meaning, significance, and value in these diverse and 
complicated places—questions that clearly exceed the 
methodological presuppositions of economics (not to mention law) 
and require sustained engagement with the work of interpretive 
social science and field-based research.  Thus, to understand REDD 
and the conditions for making it work, it needs to be approached 
not simply as a global project but as an emerging global 
assemblage of people, practices, organizations, laws, technologies, 
and territories that is taking shape at multiple sites around the 
world.  Hence, the notion of global projects in faraway places: 
REDD is a global project, but it is one that is being constituted in 
faraway places—places that are exceedingly complex and that will 
determine the fate of the effort.  This section explores the REDD 
case from this perspective, focusing on how REDD has come to be 
constituted as a global project of potentially immense reach, the 
manner in which it is taking shape in faraway places all over the 
world, the changing natures of forest law and governance that are 
accompanying REDD, and the ways in which new forms of value 
are reshaping the relationship of the state to the forest, to local 
communities and to forest-dependent people. 
4.1. Making Forests an Object of Climate Governance 
Before deforestation could be approached as a viable object of 
climate governance it had to be understood as part of the climate 
problem.  Although this may seem obvious from today’s 
perspective, such an understanding did not emerge overnight.  
Indeed, since the early 1980s, when the tropical forest crisis rose to 
 
enhanced carbon storage).  Of course, the concept of “community” is itself 
contested, and efforts to translate REDD into local institutions must be tempered 
with a critical appreciation for the politics of particular communities in particular 
contexts.  See, e.g., LI, supra note 46, at 230–69 (discussing how “community 
forestry” has operated as a key vector of neoliberal development programs in 
Indonesia); Arun Agrawal & Clark C. Gibson, Enchantment and Disenchantment: 
The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation, 27 WORLD DEV. 629, 640 
(1999) (criticizing tendency to embrace “community” as “a general answer to 
conservation-related woes”); Michael Watts, The Sinister Political Life of 
Community: Economies of Violence and Governable Spaces in the Niger Delta, Nigeria, in 
THE SEDUCTIONS OF COMMUNITY: EMANCIPATIONS, OPPRESSIONS, QUANDARIES 101, 
101–42 (Gerald W. Creed ed., 2006) (critiquing the widespread conception of 
“community” as an “unalloyed good” through a careful analysis of communities 
of violence arising out of the crisis of secular nationalism in contemporary 
Nigeria). 
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the top of the international environmental agenda, conservationists 
and policymakers have pursued multiple forest protection efforts 
outside of the climate policy context, jumping from one approach 
to the next, with biodiversity, international trade, forest 
governance, and the third world debt crisis motivating some of the 
more prominent approaches to the problem.213F213  While some of 
these approaches have resulted in important conservation 
victories, they have had very little impact on the problem as a 
whole.  At the same time, efforts to fashion a comprehensive 
international legal instrument for forests, which began in earnest 
during the early 1990s, have been a spectacular failure, foundering 
on the fundamental conflict between the view of tropical forests as 
the “common heritage of mankind” and forests as “national 
patrimony,” as well as the perennial inadequacy of donor country 
financing. 214F214  Thus, although there have been a few notable success 
stories in the fight against tropical deforestation, particularly in the 
establishment of protected areas, three decades of efforts outside of 
the climate policy context have had little impact on the overall 
scale of the problem.215F215 
The recent support for a climate policy approach to 
deforestation stems in part from a recognition that past efforts to 
deal with the problem have not succeeded and a growing sense 
that deforestation and land use must be critical components of any 
climate protection effort given their significant contribution to 
global GHG emissions.  But making deforestation into a viable 
object of climate governance has proved to be no easy task, 
depending on decades of scientific, technical, and institutional 
work aimed at developing a new way of seeing the problem of 
 
213 See Boyd, supra note , at 863–66 (discussing various approaches to 
deforestation outside of the climate policy context). 
214 Id. at 865, 880 n.144; see, e.g., Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Hostage to Norms: 
States, Institutions and Global Forest Politics, 5 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 7–12 (2005) 
(discussing the history of efforts to develop international legal instrument on 
forests). 
215 This is evidenced by the fact that deforestation rates, despite some recent 
progress in Brazil, have not declined significantly during the last decade.  See 
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GLOBAL FOREST RESOURCES 
ASSESSMENT 2010: MAIN REPORT 10 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 FOREST RESOURCE 
ASSESSMENT] (reporting gross average annual deforestation of 13 million hectares 
per year during 2000–2010). 
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deforestation—that is, a new way of constructing the problem as 
part of a larger effort to manage the global carbon budget.216F216 
Thus, intensive work in Earth systems science and carbon cycle 
research during the post-World War II period provided the 
conceptual foundation for viewing tropical forests as an important 
part of the global carbon budget, highlighting the contribution of 
tropical deforestation (and land-use change more generally) to 
global anthropogenic carbon emissions.217F217  The resulting 
simplification of diverse tropical forest ecosystems to their 
functional, aggregated role in carbon cycling (forests collectively 
became a box or sub-unit in the larger terrestrial carbon budget, 
which was itself a box or sub-unit in the larger global carbon 
budget), 218F218 laid the groundwork for making forests an object of 
climate governance.219F219 
Complementing these developments, the use of increasingly 
powerful remote sensing capabilities enabled a previously 
unavailable synoptic view of changes in global forest cover, 
establishing the basis for mapping tropical forests as terrestrial 
carbon stocks and providing an objective, transparent platform for 
the monitoring, reporting, and verification of efforts to reduce 
deforestation. 220F220  New “wall-to-wall” views of land cover change 
 
216 See Boyd, supra note , at 878–98 (discussing the scientific, technical, and 
legal practices involved in making deforestation into a viable object of climate 
governance). 
217 See id. at 880–84 (discussing conceptual advances in carbon cycle research 
that allowed forests and tropical deforestation to be understood as part of the 
larger effort to manage the global carbon budget). 
218 See, e.g., R.A. Houghton, Balancing the Global Carbon Budget, 35 ANN. REV. 
EARTH & PLANETARY SCI. 313, 316 fig.1 (2007) (illustrating role of vegetation and 
land use change in global carbon cycle). 
219 See Boyd, supra note , at 884 (concluding that the simplification and 
reduction of forest ecosystems to their role in the carbon cycle provided a 
necessary foundation for efforts to integrate forests into climate policy). 
220 See id. at 884–91 (discussing advances in remote sensing of changes in land 
use and tropical deforestation); see also Asner, supra note 80 (reporting on use of 
high-resolution mapping of carbon stocks and emissions in the Amazon region); 
Asner et al., supra note 80 (discussing opportunities to use remote sensing to 
develop high-resolution forest carbon maps).  Drawing on the work of Asner and 
others, Google is developing a new platform that will enable “online, global-scale 
observation and measurement of changes in the earth’s forests” by running high-
performance processing of raw satellite data through the “Google cloud.”  Seeing 
the Forest Through the Cloud, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Dec. 10, 2009, 7:06 AM), 
ht tp://googleblog.blogspot .com/2009/12/seeing-forest - through-
c loud.html .   According to Google, the new technology, known as Google Earth 
Engine, will provide a low-cost, publicly available, and transparent tool for forest 
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and remote sensing techniques have allowed deforestation, and its 
accompanying emissions, to be monitored at jurisdictional scales in 
a manner that was simply not possible a decade ago.221F221  By 
“fundamentally alter[ing] the capacity to observe and monitor land 
change,”222F222 this emerging remote sensing infrastructure has 
provided the technical basis for constructing new regulatory and 
management strategies to integrate terrestrial carbon into climate 
governance. 
Finally, the ongoing development of certain legal and 
accounting techniques, combined with the elaboration of standards 
to ensure quality, have been critical in the effort to translate forest 
carbon into a compliance-grade asset.223F223  Specifically, the move to 
jurisdiction-wide accounting for deforestation (at national and 
provincial levels), which has itself been made possible by advances 
in remote sensing and the ability to map forest cover change over 
large areas, together with the application of particular legal tools 
and standards that deal with environmental integrity concerns 
such as emissions leakage, non-permanence and additionality, has 
placed REDD within (or closer to) an equivalence space that works 
for other fossil fuel related emissions. 224F224 
Together, these ways of seeing have rendered a set of 
phenomena previously viewed through the lens of biodiversity 
loss, trade, macro-economic imbalances, and governance failures of 
 
monitoring, reporting and verification to support emerging REDD policy 
mechanisms.  See Introducing Google Earth Engine, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Dec. 2, 
2010, 8:00 AM), http://blog.google.org/2010/12/introducing-google-
earth-engine.html.   (introducing Google Earth Engine platform, a free, 
universally accessible source of remote sensing data and mapping capabilities that 
will faciliate global-scale monitoring of the Earth’s environment, with specific 
support for the development of systems to monitor, report and verify efforts to 
stop global deforestation). 
221 See Ruth DeFries et al., Earth Observations for Estimating Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries, 10 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 385, 389 
(2007) (“High resolution data with nearly complete global coverage are available 
at low or no cost for early 1990s and early 2000s . . . . These data serve a key role in 
establishing historical deforestation rates . . . .”). 
222 B. L. Turner II et al., The Emergence of Land Change Science for Global 
Environmental Change and Sustainability, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 20666, 20666–
67 (2007); see also DeFries, supra note , at 383 (“The synoptic view from remote 
sensing has transformed the perceived role of terrestrial vegetation in the [Earth] 
system.”). 
223 See Boyd, supra note , at 891–98 (discussing various legal and accounting 
practices involved in translating forest carbon into compliance carbon). 
224 See id. 
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various kinds comprehensible for climate mitigation efforts.  In the 
process, a new abstraction (a new global form)—forest carbon—
has emerged, opening up possibilities for applying particular legal 
technologies and new forms of property that are pulling tropical 
forests, and the many people who depend upon them, into new 
regulatory systems and new value chains that are potentially 
global in scope.225F225 
4.2. Global Projects in Faraway Places 
Without question, the effort to make deforestation into a viable 
object of climate governance represents a socio-technical 
achievement of the first order.  But it is a long way from actually 
integrating deforestation into climate policy, something that 
depends upon a host of political and institutional factors operating 
in many different places—from the U.N. process, to regulatory 
design efforts in the United States and other jurisdictions, to a 
diverse range of national and sub-national practices in tropical 
forest countries.  Thus, even if forest carbon can be fashioned into a 
compliance-grade asset for GHG mitigation efforts; even if REDD 
can be articulated as a coherent project of climate governance, the 
overall success of the effort depends upon the ways in which this 
all gets worked out in multiple sites around the world. 
One very important site (or set of sites) where REDD is taking 
shape is in the design of GHG compliance markets—at 
international, regional, national, and subnational levels.226F226  These 
efforts endeavor to create a possible pathway for integrating REDD 
into climate policy by leveraging GHG compliance markets in a 
manner that channels financing to eligible REDD activities in 
tropical forest countries through the recognition of offset credits 
generated from REDD activities or the allocation of allowances (or 
revenues from the auctioning of such allowances) to such 
 
225 For recent studies examining the emergence of new carbon property 
rights, particularly in the forest sector, see INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR 
CONSERVATION OF NATURE, LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR REDD: DESIGN AND 
IMPLEMENTATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, (John Costenbader ed., 2009) 
[hereinafter IUCN], DAVID TAKACS, CONSERVATION INT’L, FOREST CARBON: LAW & 
PROPERTY RIGHTS (2009), and Samantha Hepburn, Carbon Rights as New Property: 
The Benefits of Statutory Verification, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 239 (2009). 
226 See Boyd, supra note 40, at 872–77 (reviewing various efforts to include 
REDD provisions in an international GHG compliance system, the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme, U.S. federal cap-and-trade legislation, and in the California cap-
and-trade system). 
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activities. 227F227  California is currently the furthest along in terms of 
developing a regulatory framework that could accept compliance-
grade credits from REDD activities, which would likely be tied to 
jurisdiction-wide reductions in specific states and provinces that 
meet certain eligibility requirements and formally link with 
California.228F228   
Consistent with these efforts, REDD has also become a major 
focus of bilateral and multilateral climate change funding.229F229  This 
approach has been embraced by a number of governments, and is 
often talked about as part of a phased effort that leads to eventual 
full-scale engagement with existing and emerging GHG 
compliance markets.230F230  To date, several billion dollars in “fast 
start” financing have been made available, with more expected in 
the years ahead.231F231 
 
227 The REDD provisions in proposed federal climate legislation in the U.S. 
would do both.  See, e.g., ACES, supra note 198. 
228 See CAL. AIR RES. BD., PROPOSED REGULATION, supra note 197, §§ 95991–94 
(Oct. 28, 2010) (establishing requirements for sector-based offset credits and 
identifying REDD as a source of sector-based credits); CAL. AIR RES. BD., CLIMATE 
CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE 38 (Oct. 2008) 
(approved Dec. 2008) (identifying the possibility of accepting offsets in a 
California GHG compliance system from “those jurisdictions that demonstrate 
performance . . . in reducing emissions or enhancing sequestration through 
eligible forest carbon activities in accordance with appropriate national or sub-
national accounting frameworks”). 
229 See, e.g., ARILD ANGELSEN ET AL., MERIDIAN INST., REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM 
DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION (REDD): AN OPTIONS ASSESSMENT 
REPORT 4–11 (2009) (discussing options for the mobilization and delivery of 
international finance for REDD).  For an overview of the current state of climate 
funding, including funding for REDD, see Climate Funds Update, THE GREEN 
POLITICAL FOUND., http://www.climatefundsupdate.org (last visited Nov. 24, 
2010). 
230 See ANGELSEN ET AL., supra note 229, at 3 (advocating a phased approach to 
REDD). 
231 Norway, for example, has committed one billion dollars for REDD 
activities in Brazil and one billion dollars for REDD activities in Indonesia.  See 
Brazil Offered $1 Billion to Save Amazon Forest, MSNBC (Sept. 16, 2008), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26744780/ (stating that Norway’s billion dollar 
donation to Brazil is contingent on clear documentation that deforestation is being 
reduced); Norway Pledges $1 billion for REDD as Indonesia Re-Affirms Commitment to 
Scheme, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE (May 27, 2010) http://www 
.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=7569&se
ction=news_articles&eod=1 (describing Norwegian commitment to Indonesia for 
activities to reduce emissions from deforestation).  The current 2011 U.S. 
appropriation for REDD activities is expected to be on the order of $300 million, 
representing a part of the U.S. pledge of $1 billion for REDD activities during 
2010-12.  See U.S. International Climate Change Finance, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Apr. 
2010), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140689.pdf (last visited 
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As a result, much of the focus on REDD at the international 
level has been on developing the programmatic and institutional 
frameworks to channel bilateral and multilateral donor financing 
to REDD activities in tropical forest countries.  Most of the 
attention, not surprisingly, has been directed at “capacity 
building” or what is sometimes referred to as “REDD readiness” in 
an effort to prepare tropical forest countries for participation in a 
future REDD mechanism or other GHG compliance systems.  The 
result is a potentially far-reaching realignment of governmental 
institutions and practices to support REDD, illustrating precisely 
the process of “de-nationalization” referred to above.232F232 
Indeed, as a consequence of the increasing flow of REDD funds 
to tropical forest countries, combined with growing internal 
support for REDD, particular organs of the state—Ministries of 
Environment, Forestry, Agriculture, even Finance—are being 
partially pulled out of their national administrative contexts, 
bulked up, and redirected toward this global project.  At the same 
time, as will be discussed in the next section, new laws governing 
forests and land use are being enacted in order to prepare the 
ground for REDD by defining carbon rights, clarifying land tenure, 
and establishing new ecological zoning requirements.233F233  New 
institutions are also being established that directly challenge 
traditional conceptions of the state.  In 2008, for example, Brazil 
created the Amazon Fund—a multi-stakeholder institution 
 
Nov. 28, 2010) (emphasizing the U.S.’s commitment to REDD+ financing as part of 
its Copenhagen Accord commitment).  Other major donor countries such as 
Germany and Japan have collectively pledged some one billion dollars.  See 
WORLD RES. INST., SUMMARY OF CLIMATE FINANCE PLEDGES PUT FORWARD BY 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (2010) (summarizing climate pledges made by selected 
countries).  Several multilateral entities are also providing significant financing for 
REDD activities.  The World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility has an 
initial capitalization of $300 million, and the U.N. REDD program is currently 
funded at $48 million.  See World Bank Offers $300M for Forest Conservation, 
Emissions Reductions, MONGABAY.COM (Oct. 15, 2007), http://news 
.mongabay.com/2007/1015-world_bank.html (stipulating the World Bank’s plan 
to “help developing countries build the technical, regulatory, and sustainable 
forestry capacity to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation”) 
(internal quotations omitted); UN REDD: More Countries, More Financing, CARBON 
POSITIVE (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx 
?articleID=1941 (last visited Nov. 28, 2010) (introducing the U.N. REDD program). 
232 See supra Section 2.2; SASSEN, supra note 33, at 223 (discussing how 
formerly national agendas and “[p]articular components of the national state” are 
“denationalized” and reoriented toward the needs of a global economy). 
233 See supra Section 3.3 (examining some of the implications of globalization 
for global environmental law). 
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governed by representatives from the states, the federal 
government and civil society that is independently administered 
by the country’s largest private development bank, BNDES—to 
allocate more than $1 billion in donor financing to various REDD 
activities. 234F234  Indonesia is also developing a new institutional 
framework to allocate REDD-related financial flows in the wake of 
the Norwegian government’s recent pledge of $1 billion for REDD 
activities in that country. 235F235 
Subnational governments throughout the tropics are also 
mobilizing around REDD and will likely receive a portion of the 
interim REDD public financing discussed above given that much 
of forest governance (as an administrative matter) has been 
devolved to sub-national levels.236F236  In fact, many key states and 
provinces in large tropical forest countries are progressing faster 
on REDD than their respective national governments and, as a 
result, there is a considerable amount of REDD-related activity 
happening at provincial, district, and municipal levels.  In Brazil, 
for example, the state of Amazonas has passed climate legislation 
that specifically addresses REDD.237F237  The State of Acre has recently 
enacted a comprehensive statewide environmental services 
program based on an elaborate multi-stakeholder process with 
 
234 See Decreto No. 6.527, de 1 de agosto de 2008, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 4.8.2008 (Braz.) (establishing the Amazon Fund).  See generally FUNDO 
AMAZÔNIA, http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2010) 
(describing the purpose, organization, and operation of the Amazon Fund). 
235 See Fitrian Ardiansyah, Untangling the Web of REDD Governance, JAKARTA 
POST (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/08/03 
/untangling-web-redd-governance.html (discussing proposed new institutional 
mechanisms for REDD within the Indonesian government in the wake of 
Norway’s $1 billion commitment). 
236 See Agrawal et al., supra note 202 (describing recent shift toward 
decentralized forest governance); Krister Andersson, Understanding Decentralized 
Forest Governance: An Application of the Institutional Analysis and Development 
Framework, 2 SUSTAINABILITY: SCI., PRAC., & POL’Y 25 (2006) (evaluating local 
institutional strategies associated with effective forest governance); Hayes & 
Persha, supra note 201 (detailing research on forest governance decentralization 
and arguing that decentralized forest governance structures are necessary for the 
success of REDD+ initiatives). 
237 The law encourages “the creation of market instruments to enable the 
execution of projects for reducing deforestation emissions.”  Lei sobre Mudanças 
Climáticas, Conservação Ambiental e Desenvolvimento Sustentável do 
Amazonas, PEMC-AM [Law of Climate Change, Environmental Conservation, 
and Sustainable Development], State Law No. 3135, arts. 2(II) & 3(I) (June 5, 2007) 
(State of Amazonas, Brazil). 
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REDD as the centerpiece. 238F238  Mato Grosso has adopted an official 
deforestation reduction target and is working to regularize land 
tenure and register property owners as part of an innovative, 
remote-sensing based environmental licensing program. 239F239  In 
Indonesia, East and West Kalimantan have both adopted province-
level REDD programs as part of broader low-carbon development 
strategies that are tied directly to forest districts.240F240  Aceh has 
instituted a moratorium on logging, created a high-level REDD 
task force composed of government and non-governmental 
representatives, and placed most of the tropical forests in the 
province into two very large REDD projects, both of which depend 
upon significant involvement by local communities.241F241  On the 
other side of the archipelago, Papua is working closely with NGOs 
and the private sector to develop province-level accounting 
frameworks and architectures for nesting project activities within 
this larger jurisdictional framework. 242F242  Many of these states and 
 
238 See Do Sistema Estadual De Incentivos A Serviços Ambientais – Sisa [State 
System of Incentives for Environmental Services], Lei No 2.308 (Oct. 22, 2010) 
(State of Acre, Brazil). 
239 See INSTITUTO CENTRO DE VIDA, REFERENCE DOCUMENT FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF MATO GROSSO STATE’S REDD PROGRAM (Dec. 2009) (describing 
REDD activities in Mato Grosso); ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., BRAZIL’S EMERGING 
SECTORAL FRAMEWORK FOR REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND 
DEGRADATION AND THE POTENTIAL TO DELIVER GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
REDUCTIONS FROM AVOIDED DEFORESTATION IN THE AMAZON’S XINGU RIVER BASIN, at 
3-11 to 3-14 (2010) (describing Mato Grosso’s REDD Program). 
240 See Awang Faroek, Gubernur Provinsi Kalimantan Timur [Gov. East 
Kalimantan],  Rencana Aksi Antisipasi Pemanasan Global Dan Mitigasi 
Perubahan Iklim Melalui Kaltim Hijau Tahun 2010–2014 [Presentation at the GCF 
Meeting, Banda Aceh, Indonesia] (May 2010), available at http://www 
.gcftaskforce.org/documents/May_Aceh/Day_1_2/East%20Kalimantan%20Prese
ntation%20(May%2018%202010).pdf (detailing East Kalimantan’s REDD 
activities); West Kalimantan Redd Team, Presentation at the GCF Meeting, Banda 
Aceh, Indonesia: Overview of REDD in West Kalimantan Province (May 2010), 
available at http://www.gcftaskforce.org/documents/May_Aceh/Day_1_2/West 
%20Kalimantan%20Presentation%20(May%2018%202010).pdf (discussing REDD 
activities in West Kalimantan). 
241 See Aceh, Presentation at the GCF Meeting, Banda Aceh, Indonesia, Aceh 
Province REDD Progress Update (May 2010), available at http://www 
.gcftaskforce.org/documents/May_Aceh/Day_1_2/Aceh%20Presentation%20(M
ay%2018%202010).pdf (summarizing REDD activies in Aceh); see also JANE 
DUNLOP, REDD, TENURE AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES: A STUDY FROM ACEH, INDONESIA 
11–16 (2009) (describing REDD initiatives in Aceh). 
242 See Noak Kapisa, Presentation at the GCF Meeting, Banda Aceh, 
Indonesia, REDD and a Low-Carbon Economy: Update from Papua Province, 
(May 2010), available at http://www.gcftaskforce.org/documents/May 
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provinces are also partnering with California and other 
jurisdictions from around the world through the Governors’ 
Climate and Forests Task Force (“GCF”) to develop frameworks 
for subnational approaches to REDD with the overall goal of 
generating compliance grade emissions reductions that could one 
day be accepted in emerging GHG compliance systems, such as 
California’s cap-and-trade program, and other pay-for-
performance schemes.243F243  While much of this work is still in a 
formative stage, some of it still just on paper, and while there are 
plenty of hurdles ahead, it indicates the critical role that 
subnational governments are playing in operationalizing REDD. 
As a global project, then, REDD is taking shape in national and 
sub-national institutions all over the world:  in Bonn, Oslo, 
Washington, and Sacramento; in Brasilia, Jakarta, and Mexico City.  
But also in the state and provincial capitals of Aceh, Acre, 
Amazonas, Chiapas, Cross River State, the Kalimantans, Mato 
Grosso, Papua, and Pará.  And finally, in a host of local 
communities and projects (large and small) scattered across the 
tropical world—from the Ulu Masen project on the northern tip of 
Sumatra,244F244 to the massive Xingu carbon project in the Brazilian 
Amazon,245F245 the Makira project in Madagascar,246F246 and the Madre de 
Dios Amazon REDD Project in Peru.247F247 
 
_Aceh/Day_1_2/Papua%20Presentation%20(May%2018%202010).pdf (describing 
REDD activities in Papua).  
243 See GCF, supra note 197 (describing GCF). 
244 See DUNLOP, supra note 241, at 14 (describing the Ulu Masen project); 
GOV’T OF ACEH, REDUCING CARBON EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION IN THE ULU 
MASEN ECOSYSTEM, ACEH, INDONESIA (2007), available at http://www 
.climatestandards.org/projects/files/Final_Ulu_Masen_CCBA_project_design_no
te_Dec29.pdf (summarizing key features of Ulu Masen project). 
245 See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., supra note 239, at 7-1 to 7-7 (describing 
the Xingu carbon project in Brazil). 
246 See THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL & THE 
WILDLIFE CONSERVATION SOCIETY, REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND 
DEGRADATION (REDD): A CASEBOOK OF ON-THE-GROUND EXPERIENCE 10, 27–29, 37–
38 (2010) (discussing the Makira project in Madagascar). 
247 See GREENOXX, MADRE DE DIOS AMAZON REDD PROJECT (2009), available at 
http://www.climate-standards.org/projects/files/madre_peru/Madre_de_Dios 
_Amazon_REDD_Project_REVISED.pdf (outlining the features of the Madre de 
Dios Amazon REDD project); see also WOODS HOLE RESEARCH CTR., AN OVERVIEW 
OF READINESS FOR REDD: A COMPILATION OF READINESS ACTIVITIES PREPARED ON 
BEHALF OF THE FORUM ON READINESS FOR REDD (Tracy Johns et al. eds., 2009), 
available at www.cbd.int/forest/doc/overview-readiness-redd.pdf (compiling 
information on various REDD activities and projects around the world). 
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It is in these diverse and complicated places, and in the 
connections that get forged between them, where the proverbial 
rubber hits the road.  Indeed, for all of the enthusiasm surrounding 
REDD as a beacon of hope in the international climate 
discussions,248F248 it will succeed or fail based on what happens in 
places far removed from the negotiating halls of the United 
Nations.  The challenge is perhaps best posed as a series of 
questions:  is it possible that one day local land-use decisions made 
in these faraway places could collectively translate into provincial 
or national level emissions reductions that could themselves be 
translated through a host of mediating institutions and 
technologies into “compliance grade” assets, which in turn could 
flow up into various GHG compliance markets or some other type 
of pay-for-performance scheme?  And even if this is a realistic 
possibility, will there be institutions and laws in place to ensure 
that local communities participate on the basis of free prior 
informed consent, to guarantee that their rights and interests are 
protected, and to make sure that they get a fair shake in the 
distribution of benefits?  Put another way, is it possible to imagine 
and build a set of enabling environments such that REDD can be 
made meaningful and valuable, in whatever form, for the Adat 
communities in Indonesia,249F249 for the tribes in the Amazon, for 
landless peasants and small landowners all over the tropics—but 
also for large agricultural producers, forestry companies, NGOs, 
remote sensing experts, merchant banks, and government 
regulators?  It all seems a bit bracing when put in these terms.  But 
these are the terms of engagement if REDD is ever going to be 
more than a noble experiment. 
 
248 See Bryan Walsh, In Copenhagen’s Dark Mood, a Ray of Light for Forests, TIME, 
Dec. 17, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article 
/0,28804,1929071_1929070_1948263,00.html (stating that despite “the gloomy 
atmosphere in Copenhagen,” REDD has been a sign of hope). 
249 Masyarakat Adat literally means “people who adhere to customary 
ways,” and has been variously translated to mean “customary communities,” 
“traditional communities,” or “indigenous peoples.”  Tania Murray Li, Masyarakat 
Adat, Difference, and the Limits of Recognition in Indonesia’s Forest Zone, 35 MOD. 
ASIAN STUD. 645, 645 (2001) (citing the formal definition of masyarakat adat as 
“people who adhere to customary ways”); see DUNLOP, supra note 241, at 17–27 
(discussing recognition of Adat communities’ rights regarding land tenure and 
forest resources under Indonesian law). 
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4.3. The Changing Natures of Forest Law 
Which brings us to law.  In addition to the potentially 
significant changes in the organization of state capacities for forest 
governance (at multiple levels), REDD is also driving efforts to 
reform and revise laws governing forests, land use, and carbon 
within many tropical forest countries.  And while much of this is 
being carried out in the context of REDD “readiness” and capacity 
building efforts, framed most often as a project of legal 
modernization, it is important to recognize, at a more general level, 
the considerable challenge that REDD poses for traditional legal 
conceptions of forests and their relationship to state sovereignty. 
Forests, of course, have long had a special legal status in their 
relationship to the sovereign and to state projects of various kinds.  
The origins of the word itself are juridical, “referring to land that 
had been placed off limits by a royal decree,” 250F250 most often for the 
purposes of ensuring an adequate supply of wild game for the 
royal hunt. 251F251  Given their special territorial status tied directly to 
the crown, these early “forests” were governed by a special body of 
forest law with its own “particularized legal bureaucracy” that was 
wholly outside of the common law.252F252 
Notwithstanding this distinctive royal provenance, forest 
classification and mapping have also been intimately connected to 
the emergence of the modern state.253F253  In early European states 
such as Germany and France, for example, delineating the 
boundaries of forests and classifying their ownership and 
 
250 As Robert Harrison notes, 
[a] ”forest,” then, was originally a juridical term referring to land that 
had been placed off limits by a royal decree. . . . it could not be 
cultivated, exploited, or encroached upon.  It lay outside the public 
domain, reserved for the king’s pleasure and recreation.  In England it 
also lay outside the common juridical sphere.  Offenders were not 
punishable by the common law but rather by a set of very specific ”forest 
laws.” 
ROBERT POGUE HARRISON, FORESTS: THE SHADOW OF CIVILIZATION 69 (1992).  
251 See id. at 69–70 (noting that forests were reserved for the enjoyment of the 
king). 
252 Id. at 73 (describing early forest law enforcement and the “particularlized 
legal bureaucracy” of game wardens, forest sheriffs, and others especially 
appointed by the crown). 
253 See Nancy Lee Peluso, Whose Woods are These? Counter-Mapping Forest 
Territories in Kalimantan, Indonesia, 27 ANTIPODE 383, 383 (1995) (“Mapping of 
forest resources is therefore an intrinsically political act: whether drawn for their 
protection or production, they are drawings of a nation’s strategic space.”). 
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production were central to the larger enterprise of cadastral 
mapping. 254F254  In colonial and post-colonial states, particularly in the 
tropics, similar exercises have provided a way of extending 
jurisdiction over unruly spaces, excluding and disciplining certain 
populations, and defining natural resources as objects of state 
management and control. 255F255  Forest law and forest mapping have 
thus been bound up in very direct ways with state directed 
processes of territorialization.256F256 
To be sure, the history of forest law is a massively complex 
topic, given the layering and hybridization of multiple legal and 
normative orders across and within different jurisdictions.257F257  And 
it is well beyond the scope of this Article to attempt any sort of 
systematic treatment of the subject.  But at the risk of over-
generalization, it is clear that in many large tropical forest 
countries, official forest law has often been highly centralized at 
the national level, with the formal legal status of forests tied very 
directly to national identity and basic understandings of 
sovereignty. 258F258  Making forests part of “state space,” in other 
words, has long been a key objective of forest law.259F259 
 
254 See, e.g., ROGER J.P. KAIN & ELIZABETH BAIGENT, THE CADASTRAL MAP IN THE 
SERVICE OF THE STATE: A HISTORY OF PROPERTY MAPPING 132 (1992) (“Forest maps 
are thus an important category of early state maps.  Initially concentration was on 
delineation of boundaries and codification of the rights of the monarch, the 
nobility, and the peasantry to ownership or use of the forest.”). 
255 See NANCY LEE PELUSO, RICH FORESTS, POOR PEOPLE: RESOURCE CONTROL 
AND RESISTANCE IN JAVA (1992) (tracing efforts to extend state control over forests 
in Java); S. RAVI RAJAN, MODERNIZING NATURE: FORESTRY AND IMPERIAL ECO-
DEVELOPMENT 1800-1950, at 55 (2006) (“By the end of the nineteenth century . . . 
[w]here there had once been state-sponsored forest destruction, there were now 
extensive state-sponsored regimes of scientific resource management.”); Peter 
Vandergeest & Nancy Lee Peluso, Territorialization and State Power in Thailand, 24 
THEORY & SOC’Y 385, 391 (1995) (tracing the ways in which the classification and 
demarcation of major portions of national territory as “forest,” enhanced state 
control by extending state jurisdiction over such territory). 
256 See discussion supra Section 2.2. 
257 See Merry, supra note 186, at 876 (reviewing basic strands of legal 
pluralism and their importance in understanding law and legal order in the 
context of globalization); Nancy Lee Peluso & Peter Vandergeest, Genealogies of the 
Political Forest and Customary Rights in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, 60 J. ASIAN 
STUDIES 761 (2001) (discussing plural normative orders that helped create state 
dominated “political” forests and “customary rights” in Southeast Asia). 
258 See Peluso & Vandergeest, supra note 257 (discussing the construction of 
the “political forest” as central to the larger project of establishing national 
identity).  
259 See JAMES C. SCOTT, THE ART OF NOT BEING GOVERNED: AN ANARCHIST 
HISTORY OF UPLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA 10–11 (2009) (discussing strategies of bringing 
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Thus, the 1988 Brazilian Constitution states that “[t]he Brazilian 
Amazonian forest  . . . [is] part of national patrimony . . . .”260F260  The 
Brazilian Forestry Code echoes this, providing that the 
conservation and management of all forests, public and private, are 
under the jurisdiction of the federal government.261F261  The 
Indonesian Constitution of 1945 and the 1999 Forest Law, which 
revised and replaced the Basic Forest Law of 1967 after the fall of 
Suharto, provide that the vast majority of Indonesia’s forests are 
“state forests” owned and controlled by the central government for 
the benefit of the nation. 262F262  In other tropical forest countries, from 
Guyana to Cameroon to Thailand to Costa Rica, the bulk of the so-
called forest estate is similarly controlled by the national 
government. 263F263 
Many aspects of forest law in tropical countries, of course, 
complicate this picture.  The whole question of customary rights in 
Indonesia,264F264 the special status of indigenous territories in Brazil 
and other South American countries,265F265 and the substantial role of 
 
forests and other formerly “ungoverned regions” into the ambit of state control); 
PELUSO, supra note 255, at 353 (discussing centrality of forest mapping for defining 
a “nation’s strategic space”). 
260 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 225, ¶ 4 (1985) (Braz.), 
available at http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/titleVIII.html. 
261 See Lei No. 4.771, de 15 de Setembro de 1965, C. FLOR. art. 1 (Brazil) 
(extending federal jurisdiction over public and private forests for the common 
interests of all inhabitants of the country). 
262 See DUNLOP, supra note 241, at 21–27 (summarizing the evolution of 
Forestry Law in Indonesia and the dominance of the central government in 
controlling forest access and use). 
263 See IUCN, supra note 225 (providing an overview of REDD legal and 
policy developments in several tropical forest countries, including Brazil, 
Cameroon, Guyana, and Papua New Guinea); TAKACS, supra note 225 (explaining 
legal and policy issues regarding REDD and forest carbon in Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Indonesia, and Madagascar). 
264 See DUNLOP, supra note 241, at 23–25 (discussing specific provisions in 
Indonesia’s 1999 Forestry Law affecting adat (customary) communities); Daniel 
Fitzpatrick, Disputes and Pluralism in Modern Indonesian Land Law, 22 YALE J. INT’L. 
L. 171, 173 (1997) (discussing conflict between legal reform under Indonesia’s 
Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 and adat (customary) law); Li, supra note 249, at 657–
58 (describing ongoing efforts to define and secure recognition for customary 
rights in Indonesia); Peluso & Vandergeest, supra note 257, at 766 (tracing histories 
of how the construction of forests as objects of state management and control 
established the basis for reinscribing certain customary practices of forest use as 
“customary rights” and others as illegal activities). 
265 See Anthony Stocks, Too Much for Too Few: Problems of Indigenous Land 
Rights in Latin America, 34 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 85 (2005) (examining trends 
and challenges associated with indigenous land rights in Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, 
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community ownership in Papua New Guinea266F266 (not to mention 
the challenge of forest governance in weak or failed states in 
central Africa) 267F267 all raise questions about the extent of state control 
in certain circumstances.  Moreover, extensive efforts to 
decentralize forest management throughout the developing world 
since the 1980s have provided many local communities with 
considerable autonomy over the management of forests.268F268 
Irrespective of these differences, however, the concept of 
forests as national patrimony continues to structure the underlying 
legal status of forests throughout the tropical world and beyond 
and has come to define the basic approach to forests under 
international law.  Indeed, although forests—and tropical forests in 
particular—have long been an object of international concern, they 
have never had any sort of international legal status comparable to 
that of “common heritage” or “common concern” resources.269F269  
Rather, forests have been treated in accordance with the long-
 
Colombia, and Nicaragua).  Very little research to date has focused on the 
question of indigenous rights to carbon.  In Brazil, for example, three such 
analyses have been conducted and the Brazilian government agency responsible 
for indigenous territories (FUNAI) has issued a concept note in response to 
requests from indigenous peoples seeking clarification regarding rights to carbon 
and legal frameworks governing REDD activities in indigenous territories.  In 
general, these legal analyses conclude that indigenous communities have the legal 
autonomy to sign contracts to engage in REDD and other forest carbon activities 
subject to the Brazilian Constitution and existing international conventions to 
which Brazil is a party and which seek to protect the rights of indigenous peoples.  
See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., supra note 239, at 8-1 to 8-5 (summarizing 
existing legal analyses on indigenous carbon rights in Brazil). 
266 See IUCN, supra note 225, at 169–79 (discussing community land rights 
and REDD in Papua New Guinea). 
267 See Simon Counsell, Forest Governance in Africa (S. Afr. Inst. of Int’l Aff., 
Occ. Paper No. 50, 2009) (discussing challenges of forest governance in various 
African countries). 
268 See Agrawal et al., supra note 202 (discussing decentralization of forest 
governance over past several decades); Andersson, supra note 236 (analyzing how 
local institutional arrangements shape outcomes in the increasingly decentralized 
policy regimes of the non-industrialized world); Hayes & Persha, supra note 202 
(reviewing extensive research on forest governance decentralization and arguing 
for the importance of decentralized forest governance structures for the success of 
REDD+ initiatives); Jacob Phelps et al., Does REDD+ Threaten to Recentralize Forest 
Governance?, 328 SCI. 312 (2010) (raising concerns about the possibility that 
REDD+ could reverse trends toward decentralization of forest governance). 
269 See PHILLIPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 547 
(2d ed. 2003) (“[T]ropical and other forests are not the ‘common heritage of 
mankind’ under international law, and were not identified as a ‘common concern’ 
to mankind in the forest principles.”). 
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standing principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources as recognized in various United Nations resolutions and 
instruments.270F270  Based on this principle, tropical forest countries 
have heretofore consistently rejected efforts to “internationalize” 
forest resources under various multilateral environmental 
initiatives.271F271 
REDD, and the larger effort to bring forests into climate policy, 
challenges all of this in various ways.  At the most general level, 
the conception of forests as key components of the global carbon 
cycle (and the recognition that deforestation is a major source of 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions) pushes hard against the notion that 
forests are “natural resources” subject to the principle of 
permanent sovereignty.  Rather, forests, or more specifically the 
services they provide (or are prevented from providing through 
deforestation) start to look much more like global public goods, 
given that the climate benefits that stem from protecting forests are 
both non-rival and non-excludable within and across 
generations.272F272  Of course, these arguments have been made before, 
in the biodiversity context for example, with no real impact on the 
treatment of forests under international law, 273F273 and it seems 
unlikely that REDD will change this in any formal way—at least in 
the near term. 
 
270 See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, pmbl., para. 4, art. 3 opened for 
signature June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) 
[hereinafter Convention on Biological Diversity] (reaffirming principle of 
sovereignty over natural resources); Declaration of Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), pmbl., para. 4, U.N., 17th Sess., Supp. 
No. 17, U.N. Doc A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962) (referring to the “inalienable right of all 
states to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources in accordance with 
their national interests”); Stockholm Declaration, supra note 106, princ. 21 (stating 
that states have “the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental policies” [subject to a] “responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.”). 
271 SANDS, supra note 269, at 546 (“Attempts by developed countries to 
‘internationalize’ forest issues have so far been unsuccessful in legal terms, and 
the tropical forest resources of developing countries are carefully guarded as part 
of the national patrimony of these countries.”). 
272 See Inge Kaul et al., Defining Global Public Goods, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2, 3–12 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 
1999) (defining salient features of global public goods). 
273 See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 270, pmbl., para. 4, art. 
3 (reaffirming principle of sovereignty over natural resources). 
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But the very premise of REDD—putting an economic value on 
standing forests that derives from their functional role in the global 
carbon cycle—exerts considerable pressure on existing legal 
conceptions of forests by inserting them into new value regimes 
that are potentially global in scope.  By quantifying and 
monetizing forest carbon in a manner that allows it to circulate 
globally, a functioning REDD system will increase the value of 
standing forests.  These new value regimes will in turn usher in 
new rights and obligations (and new contests over such rights and 
obligations), begging for a rationalization of existing laws and 
practices governing forests, land use, and carbon. 
This process is already underway in a number of tropical forest 
countries.274F274  Indonesia, for example, enacted the world’s first 
national-level REDD regulations in 2009.275F275  Operating within the 
context of Indonesia’s existing forest laws, these regulations 
expressly contemplate linkage with an international REDD 
mechanism, and empower the Ministry of Forestry to identify 
eligible lands for REDD activities, establish requirements and 
procedures for REDD projects, and create a licensing scheme to 
verify the effectiveness of carbon storage and distribute carbon 
credits.276F276  Several Indonesian provinces, including two, Aceh and 
Papua, that have special autonomy agreements with the central 
government, have also enacted their own REDD-related laws and 
programs. 277F277  And in Adat (customary) communities throughout 
 
274 See IUCN, supra note 225 (discussing REDD-related legal developments in 
several countries); TAKACS, supra note 225 (discussing legal developments 
regarding carbon property rights in the forest sector). 
275 See Tata Cara Pengurangan Emisi Dari Deforestasi Dan Degradasi Hutan 
(REDD) [Implementation Procedures of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation], No. P.30/Menhut-II/2009 (2009) (Indon.) (defining the 
procedures for application, assessment, approval and duration of REDD activities, 
and specifying rights and obligations of the parties involved); Tata Cara Perizinan 
Usaha Pemenfaatan Penyerapan Dan/Atau Penyimpanan Karbon Pada Hutan 
Produksi Dan Hutan Lindung [Procedures for Licensing of Commercial 
Utilisation of Carbon Sequestration and/or Storage in Production and Protected 
Forests], No. P.36/Menhut-II/2009 (2009) (Indon.) (defining the licensing 
procedures for commercial utilization of carbon sequestration and/or storage in 
production and protected forests). 
276 See sources cited supra note 275. 
277 As part of the peace agreement with the Indonesian central government 
following the 2004 tsunami, Aceh operates under a special autonomy law that 
authorizes the government of Aceh to plan, manage, use and exploit “natural 
resources in the province . . . including minerals, geothermal energy, forests, 
agriculture, fisheries and sea resources.”  There is also a special clause in the law 
that re-affirms provincial control over the 2 million plus hectare Leuser 
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Indonesia, community leaders and their advocates are raising 
questions regarding how these emerging REDD programs will 
impact customary rights and practices with respect to forests.278F278 
Brazil, which vigorously opposed the inclusion of avoided 
deforestation under the Kyoto Protocol on sovereignty grounds, 
amended its national forest law in 2006 to clarify government 
ownership of carbon rights on public concessions,279F279 and passed 
legislation in 2009 intended to simplify the land titling process and 
allow certain current occupants to gain legal title.280F280  The Brazilian 
Congress is also contemplating legislation that would establish a 
national system for REDD. 281F281  As noted above, moreover, several 
Brazilian states are developing sub-national legal and policy 
frameworks for REDD. 282F282  And indigenous peoples and their 
advocates are seeking clarity on carbon rights in the context of 
Brazil’s existing laws regarding indigenous reserves.283F283 
Many issues have yet to be resolved by these nascent legal 
developments, and it is impossible to predict how these various 
 
ecosystem.  In 2007, Aceh’s first democratically elected Governor and former 
member of the Free Aceh Movement, Irwandi Yusuf, declared a moratorium on 
logging in the province and created a special Green Economic Development and 
Investment Strategy, known as Aceh Green, that focused on conserving the more 
than 3 million hectares of primary tropical forests in the province through REDD 
financing.  In pursuit of these goals, the Aceh government has entered into 
agreements with NGOs and the private sector to establish two very large REDD 
projects covering most of the province.  See DUNLOP, supra note 241, at 11–16 
(describing REDD initiatives in Aceh).  
278 See, e.g., id. at 28–51 (describing community issues associated with REDD 
activities in Aceh and Indonesia more generally). 
279 See Decreto No. 11.284, de 2 de Março de 2006, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÁO 
[D.O.U.] de 3.3.2006, art. 16, ¶ 1 (Braz.) (clarifying carbon rights with respect to 
forest concessions on public land). 
280 See Reese Ewing, Lula Signs Land Law Aimed at Reforming Amazon, REUTERS, 
June 26, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article 
/idUSTRE55P62M20090626 (discussing Brazilian law aimed at clarifying land 
tenure). 
281 See Comissão de Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento Sustentável – 
Relatório, Projeto De Lei No 5.586, de 10 de Novembro de 2009 (proposing a 
national REDD+ system for Brazil). 
282 See Lei sobre Mudanças Climáticas, supra note 237 (identifying REDD as 
part of climate change legislation in the state of Amazonas); Do Sistema Estadual 
De Incentivos A Serviços Ambientais, supra note 238 (establishing REDD as 
centerpiece of a comprhensive state law for environmental services in the state of 
Acre).  
283 See, e.g., Memorandum from Rodrigo Sales et al. to The Katoomba Group 
(Nov. 25, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing issues regarding legal title to 
forest carbon as part of Suruí carbon project in Brazil). 
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law reform efforts will proceed in particular jurisdictions.  Among 
the more prominent issues in need of resolution are those 
pertaining to the new entitlement lines that REDD could create and 
the implications of this for existing structures of forest governance.  
As REDD credits are sold into GHG compliance systems or 
recognized in other pay-for-performance schemes, new obligations 
are created to maintain sufficient forest carbon stocks (that is, to 
prevent the carbon embodied in tropical forests from leaking into 
the atmosphere) in order to ensure the permanence of the credited 
reductions, and, thus, make sure that the atmosphere, along with 
the buyer and the compliance system to which the credits are 
tendered, is made whole.284F284  If and when REDD goes to scale, one 
potential result is that large areas of tropical forests could become 
encumbered with something akin to long-term servitudes.  The 
implications of such a development for those who live in and near 
the forest could be quite significant, raising questions about who 
will have the obligation to ensure that forest carbon stocks are 
protected; who will bear the residual liability for so-called reversal 
risks (that is, the situation where previously credited emissions 
reductions are negated by future actions); who should have access 
to the revenues from avoided emissions; and what will happen to 
customary practices of forest use.285F285 
Related to these issues are a host of unresolved questions 
regarding who actually owns (or should own) the carbon 
embodied in standing forests and how the revenues from a REDD 
system, which could be premised on payment for avoided 
emissions from reduced deforestation, would be translated into 
carbon benefits and distributed to local communities and other 
stakeholders.  Indeed, the whole question of carbon ownership gets 
very complicated in the context of customary rights, indigenous 
reserves, and other forms of community ownership and use of 
 
284 See Michael Dutschke & Arild Angelsen, How Do We Ensure Permanence 
and Assign Liability?, in MOVING AHEAD WITH REDD: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 77–85 (Arild Angelsen ed., 2008) (discussing various approaches to 
permanence in the context of REDD). 
285 See Boyd, supra note 40, at 891–98 (discussing permanence and related 
liability issues regarding REDD).  It is worth remembering in this context that 
there is a long history of criminalization of customary forest uses throughout the 
world as part of larger state-directed efforts to control forest resources.  See, e.g., 
PELUSO, supra note 255, at 8–17 (discussing the criminalization of traditional 
practices of forest access and use); EDWARD P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: 
THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT (1975) (discussing the criminalization of customary 
forest use in England during the 17th and 18th centuries). 
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“state” forests.  Efforts within Brazil and Indonesia to resolve these 
questions are only just beginning, and there are very legitimate 
concerns that in the absence of clarity on land and carbon rights, 
REDD will drive a new land grab of sorts by governments and 
other powerful actors, to the obvious detriment of local 
communities.  Some commentators see this as an important reason 
to clarify and secure land tenure and carbon ownership in a 
manner that protects the rights of local communities living in and 
near the forest before proceeding with REDD.286F286 
Finally, because of the increased value that REDD would place 
on standing forests, there are real concerns that without adequate 
safeguards a REDD system will foster a re-centralization of forest 
law and governance at the national level, a tendency that could be 
reinforced by the preference for national-level approaches to 
tracking deforestation and accounting for REDD under an 
international program. 287F287  The new Indonesian REDD regulations 
discussed above illustrate this by vesting authority in the Ministry 
of Forestry.  Furthermore, the Indonesian government has made 
recent statements suggesting that sub-national entities will not be 
allowed to proceed with certain REDD activities without 
permission from Jakarta.  As a country’s forests are inserted into a 
REDD regime, in other words, the national government could 
emerge as the default choice for taking on new responsibilities and 
acquiring new authorities—but in a manner that is “de-
nationalized” in the sense that these new responsibilities and 
authorities are tied to a particular global project.  Thus, REDD has 
the potential to substantially bulk up the forest governance 
capacities of national governments even while it is putting those 
capacities in service to a global project.  From a normative 
 
286 See, e.g., LORENZO COTULA & JAMES MAYERS, TENURE IN REDD: START-POINT 
OR AFTERTHOUGHT? (2009) (emphasizing the importance of considering local 
forest-dependent communities and land tenure in REDD implementation); 
Benjamin Blom et al., Getting REDD to Work Locally: Lessons Learned from Integrated 
Conservation and Development Projects, 13 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 164 (2010) 
(emphasizing importance of attending to rights and interests of local communities 
in developing REDD programs); J. Phelps et al., What Makes a ‘REDD’ Country?, 20 
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 322, 329 (2010) (“The Philippines case study helps 
elucidate why governance, conservation priorities and rights frameworks should 
feed into more comprehensive REDD planning and sub-national analyses.”). 
287 See Phelps et al., supra note 268, at 312 (“By monetizing forest carbon, 
REDD+ will substantially increase the market value of forests, including those 
previously considered marginal, incentivizing central governments to increase 
control.”). 
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standpoint, such a development poses considerable risks to the 
rights and interests of local communities because of the obvious 
potential to exacerbate the pre-existing pathologies of various 
rentier states across the tropical world—all of which puts a 
premium on building into any REDD regime (at multiple sites) 
legal protections and safeguards to allow such communities to 
control the terms on which they engage with REDD. 288F288 
4.4. De-couplings 
At the most basic level, REDD seeks to create a new global 
form—forest carbon—that can be de-coupled from the physical 
forest and allowed to circulate in global value chains.  In creating 
this novel asset class with potentially global reach, REDD thus 
establishes new circumstances under which land and forests 
acquire value,289F289 thereby creating new demands for resources, 
capabilities, laws, institutions, and expertise in order to realize 
these value forms and embed them in new entitlement structures 
and frameworks of authority.  In the process, tropical forests, and 
the many people who depend upon them, are being pulled into 
emerging transnational regulatory systems, with substantial 
implications for existing structures of forest law and governance 
and, more generally, the relationship of the state to the forest, to 
conceptions of national territory, and to the multitude of local 
communities and other forest-dependent peoples.  By de-coupling 
forest carbon from the forest ecosystem, REDD de-couples territory 
and accountability from their traditional instantiations in the state. 
Understanding what is gained and what is lost in this process with 
respect to existing practices of forest use and governance will 
 
288 The World Bank estimates that some 60 million indigenous people are 
totally dependent on forests.  In addition, about 350 million people are considered 
highly forest dependent, and 1.2 billion people are dependent on agro-forestry for 
some part of their livelihoods.  IUCN, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND REDD-PLUS: 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE ENGAGEMENT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND 
LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN REDD-PLUS 2 n.2 (June 2010). 
289 As Katherine Verdery notes, 
my subject here is the circumstances under which land acquires value—
and value of what kind and for whom.  What forces come together, and 
how, to shape the value that land holds, so that people want to 
manipulate it, invoke it, own it, belong to it, identify with it?  What kinds 
of resources need they have in order to realize the value they attribute to 
that object? 
KATHERINE VERDERY, THE VANISHING HECTARE: PROPERTY AND VALUE IN 
POSTSOCIALIST TRANSYLVANIA 21 (2003).  
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require moving beyond the predominantly technical focus on 
carbon accounting and MRV that dominates much of the 
contemporary REDD policy discussion. 
To that effect, the technical forms that are underwriting REDD 
can be seen as part of the larger effort to harness national territories 
and key elements of those territories (namely, the ability of tropical 
forests to store carbon) to a global project aimed at managing the 
Earth’s carbon cycle and stabilizing the composition of the 
atmosphere.  In the process, local and provincial-level structures of 
forest governance are (re)combining with national and 
transnational capabilities to create technical, legal, and institutional 
frameworks for generating compliance grade assets and moving 
them into GHG compliance systems and other pay-for-
performance schemes.  At the most general level, REDD thus 
embodies a distinctive territorial project that derives from new 
global forms of calculability and legibility that are in turn 
facilitating the processes of unbundling and de-nationalization 
discussed previously.  The state emerges in all of this as a key 
mediating institution necessary to make REDD cohere as a nested, 
polycentric form of governance.290F290 
Supporters of REDD have tended to view the prospects of these 
developments in a positive light, celebrating the potential of 
remote sensing technologies to produce new forms of information 
about tropical forests (and their embodied carbon) that are 
objective, transparent, open-access, largely free, and auditable;291F291 
embracing carbon finance (public and private) as a means of 
putting an economic value on standing tropical forests on a scale 
not possible under previous conservation efforts; 292F292 and promoting 
 
290 Understanding the role of the state in this context thus requires 
a shift away from looking at the state first and foremost as a leviathan 
machine, a set-apart sphere of command and decision, to looking at it 
against the background of the sort of society in which it is embedded—
the confusion that surrounds it, the confusion it confronts, the confusion 
it causes, the confusion it responds to. 
Clifford Geertz, What Is a State If It Is Not a Sovereign? Reflections on Politics in 
Complicated Places, 45 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 577, 580 (2004). 
291 See, e.g., JOHAN ELIASCH, CLIMATE CHANGE: FINANCING GLOBAL FORESTS: 
THE ELIASCH REVIEW 145 (2008) (“Satellite images of changing forest cover provide 
a greater degree of transparency in monitoring forest emissions reductions than 
monitoring in other sectors.”). 
292 See, e.g., Better REDD than Dead: Tropical Forests’ Best Hope,, ECONOMIST, 
Sept. 25, 2010, at 8–9 (discussing potential of REDD to tap into large-scale carbon 
finance). 
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the seemingly inevitable rationalization of forest law and 
governance (framed in terms of clarity of land tenure and creation 
of new carbon rights) as key elements of a pathway to a new 
paradigm of forest governance.293F293 
As a global project built upon these new forms of calculability, 
value, and ownership, therefore, one might argue, along with 
advocates of new governance, that REDD will create new 
opportunities to reform notoriously corrupt forest sector practices 
in many tropical forest countries 294F294 by inserting them into new 
transnational networks of responsibility.  GHG compliance 
markets, along with the prospect of performance-based public 
finance, in this view, provide a means for leveraging improved 
forest governance through enhanced transparency and 
accountability. 295F295  Realizing such an optimistic view of REDD’s 
potential, of course, is by no means assured, and even if it does 
come to pass it will be important to understand what is gained and 
what is lost in the process of inserting tropical forests and the 
people who live in them into larger transnational systems of value 
and regulation. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than with respect to the rights 
and interests of local forest-dependent people.  To date, various 
civil society and stakeholder groups have been working at multiple 
levels to ensure that social safeguards regarding informed consent, 
participation, and protection of rights and interests of forest-
dependent people are being incorporated into some of the key sites 
 
293 See, e.g., Arild Angelsen & Stibniati Atmadja, What is this Book About?, in 
MOVING AHEAD WITH REDD: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS, supra note 284, at 1 
(describing potential for REDD as a “win-win” strategy of reducing GHG 
emissions “because the potentially large financial transfers and better governance 
can benefit the poor in developing countries and provide other environmental 
gains on top of the climate-related benefits.”). 
294 See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, SUSTAINING FORESTS: A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
31–32 (2004) (discussing poor governance and corruption in the forest sector). 
295 These efforts recognize that California, the United States, and other 
jurisdictions contemplating provisions recognizing REDD in their own GHG 
compliance systems could exercise leverage akin to that enjoyed by large retailers 
over the environmental performance of global supply chains—what Michael P. 
Vandenberg calls “the new Wal-Mart effect.”  See Michael P. Vandenberg, The 
New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA 
L. REV. 913, 918 (2007) (“The New Wal-Mart effect occurs when a mix of social, 
economic, and legal factors induces a firm to impose on its suppliers private 
environmental or other requirements that are traditionally the subject of 
government regulations.”). 
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where REDD is taking shape.  A key component of their strategy is 
to insert what might be called “accountability forcing” obligations 
or requirements into the design of provisions that would accept 
REDD credits in emerging GHG compliance systems.  Thus, 
advocates for local forest-dependent communities and indigenous 
peoples are working in the U.N. process and the U.S. policy 
debates to embed the principle of free prior informed consent, 
strong protections for indigenous peoples’ rights and interests, and 
specific benefit sharing requirements for local forest-dependent 
communities in the eligibility criteria for bringing REDD credits 
into these compliance markets.296F296  In effect, the commodity itself 
becomes a point of leverage, its compliance-grade status 
contingent upon assurances that rights and interests of local people 
are protected in faraway places.  Operationalizing this, of course, is 
exceedingly difficult.  How, for example, will EPA or the California 
Air Resources Board (or other future regulators in charge of 
administering other GHG compliance systems) ensure that REDD 
credits come from activities that meet minimum social safeguards?  
What kinds of MRV will be necessary to provide such assurances?  
Who will monitor the monitors?  What role, again, will 
governments in tropical forest countries play in all of this?  How 
can this be done in a manner that does not impose massive 
transactions costs on the whole effort?  These are the questions that 
will have to be answered if REDD is going to deliver in a manner 
that protects not only climate and topical forests but also the rights, 
interests, and livelihoods of forest-dependent people.  
 
296 Efforts under the UNFCCC to negotiate a REDD+ mechanism have been 
proceeding under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Commitments under 
the Convention (“AWG-LCA”). The recently adopted Cancún Agreement  
represents the outcome of the AWG-LCA work, and includes specific provisions 
regarding safeguards for indigenous and forest-dependent peoples in the context 
of REDD+.  See Cancún Agreement, supra note 24, para. 69 & Annex I, paras. 2(c)–
(d) (calling upon Parties to promote and support specific safeguards when 
undertaking REDD+ activities including “full and effective participation” and 
“{r]espect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of 
local communities, by taking into account relevant international obligations, 
national circumstances and laws, and noting that the General Assembly has 
adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”).  
REDD provisions in proposed federal climate legislation in the United States also 
include specific safeguards regarding rights and interests of indigenous and 
forest-dependent peoples.  See, e.g., ACES, supra note 198, § 743(e)(1)(E) (requiring 
that REDD offsets come from activities that give due regard to the rights and 
interests of indigenous and other local communities, are based upon robust 
stakeholder participation, and result in equitable sharing of benefits). 
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All of which may well turn out to represent an overly 
optimistic, even naïve, view of the possibilities that could come 
with a fully functioning REDD regime. 297F297  As with any multi-
faceted enterprise aimed at large-scale social change, there are 
many conflicting rationalizations and arguments for and against 
REDD; many reasons to doubt its prospects.  And there is little 
question that if REDD goes to scale, something important will be 
lost as some the last non-administered spaces on Earth are 
engulfed by this global project—a final “stage[] in the 
subordination of the surface of the planet to the needs of an 
industrial society.” 298F298  Needless to say, the alternative—ongoing 
destruction of the world’s tropical forests with substantial 
additional carbon loading to the atmosphere—is surely much 
worse, highlighting once again the reality of triage and tragic 
choices that marks virtually all of climate policy.  If anything, then, 
the REDD experience, still very much a work in progress, suggests 
that the road ahead will be much messier and much more 
complicated than advocates of top-down approaches to climate 
governance ever imagined. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In an influential 1970 essay, The Search for Paradigms as a 
Hindrance to Understanding, Albert Hirschman warned against 
seeking blueprints and grand strategies as roadmaps for “large-
scale social change.”299F299  The best that we can do, according to 
 
297 Such possibilities resonate with the optimistic view of global governance 
and accountability embraced by scholars of new governance and global 
administrative law.  As Joshua Cohn and Charles Sabel suggest, 
[t]he emergence of global politics is marked by a proliferation of political 
settings beyond domestic boundaries.  This proliferation expands the 
range of relevant political actors, while shifting our understanding of 
political units and of relations among them: the emergence of human 
rights as limits on Westphalian sovereignty was a first step in this shift, 
but not the last. 
Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy? 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
763, 763 (2005). See also Kingsbury et al., supra note 144, at 17 (discussing 
application of principles of administrative law to global governance). 
298 KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 179 (Beacon Press 1957) (1944); see also SCOTT, supra note 259, 
at 4–9 (discussing the “last enclosure” of various non-state spaces around the 
world). 
299 Albert O. Hirschman, The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to 
Understanding, 22 WORLD POL. 329, 343 (1970).  
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Hirschman, is to learn from experience and to have a “passion for 
what is possible.” 300F300  As Hirschman and many others before and 
after recognized, the historical record is littered with various failed 
schemes to improve the human condition.301F301  Indeed, if two 
generations of social research on the challenges of development 
have taught us anything it is that there is no one right way, no 
single recipe or algorithm that will, if followed, lead to economic 
growth, much less political stability, social order, rule of law, or 
any other desired outcome of social change. 
And yet, climate policy seems to have missed these basic 
lessons.  Seized by the conviction that there can and should be a 
blueprint for comprehensive climate governance, manifest most 
prominently in the Kyoto architecture and in the efforts to 
negotiate a successor treaty, the climate regime has stumbled 
through a series of disappointments, marked most recently by the 
dramatic failure to adopt a new treaty at the 2009 U.N. Climate 
Conference in Copenhagen and by the limited, non-binding 
workplan adopted at the 2010 climate meeting in Cancún.  This 
Article has argued that the difficulties facing international climate 
policy stem from an unrealistic embrace of top-down, global 
approaches to the problem and a corresponding lack of attention to 
the realities of a plural, fragmented international legal and political 
order.  This posture of “globalism,” which derives in part from a 
distinctive set of knowledge practices that has sought to make the 
Earth system into a unitary, governable domain, has pushed 
international climate policy into what appears to be an intractable 
political impasse regarding the prospects of fashioning a binding 
legal instrument capable of coordinating an effective global 
response to the problem. 
To be sure, an alternative approach to climate governance that 
is more sensitive to the facts of globalization, pluralism, and 
fragmentation at multiple levels of authority cannot simply 
devolve into a naïve celebration of localism or, even worse, a 
fatalism that acknowledges the enormous complexity of it all, 
recognizes that the clock has run in terms of any possibility of 
achieving prudent stabilization targets, and urges that all 
remaining resources and attention be shifted to adaptation or, in 
more extreme cases, geoengineering.  The “solutions” to climate 
 
300 Id. 
301 See, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 45 (documenting various failed schemes to 
improve the human condition). 
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change, if they can even called that, will be as varied and 
complicated as the problem itself, assembled through many new 
connections across and within levels of governance, implicating a 
vast array of actors, institutions, laws, and values.  Understanding 
how these varied and partial solutions are emerging thus becomes 
a critical component of the larger effort to learn from experience 
and expand the conditions of possibility for effective forms of 
climate governance.   
Viewed from this perspective, post-Copenhagen climate 
governance looks much more like the messy, multi-layered forms 
of governance emerging in response to other global threats such as 
terrorism, financial crisis, or infectious disease—forms of 
governance marked not by a single, overarching regulatory system 
but a complex, nested set of institutions and actors.  Wrapped up 
in all of this is a recognition that conventional regulatory structures 
associated with traditional notions of government cannot combat 
these problems effectively without tapping into a much broader 
and more fluid set of practices that spans multiple geographies and 
publics.  Confronted by a set of problems arising out of the 
exceedingly complex interplay of social, economic, and ecological 
systems and faced with an increasingly tenuous sphere of 
competence, the contemporary state appears as only one element 
(albeit a critical one) in a broader emerging assemblage of actors, 
institutions, and knowledge practices.  By taking these emerging 
assemblages on their own terms, by viewing them as partial, 
contingent forms of governance, and by seeking to understand 
how they hold together (or not) we can gain insight into the 
possibilities and the challenges of building enabling environments 
that can harness ongoing efforts and direct them toward realistic 
forms of climate governance. 
The REDD case provides one example of how a particular form 
of climate governance is taking shape at multiple levels in many 
faraway places all over the world, illustrating just how messy, 
complicated, and contingent climate governance is once we look 
beneath the international process.  Indeed, the complex, partial, 
emergent nature of REDD demonstrates clearly that if this is 
pursued in a singular, top-down fashion that ignores the 
vernacular institutions of national and sub-national formations it 
will surely fail.  In order for nested, polycentric forms of climate 
governance to work, they will have to be assembled from above 
and below, with careful attention to who wins and who loses, 
careful attention to the tactical opportunities that emerge to 
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influence the assemblage in ways that enhance meaningful 
participation across and within the different nested levels.  The 
project of global environmental law, if it is ever going to be more 
than a catch-all for the varied and variable forms of transnational 
environmental governance taking shape in multiple domains, will 
need to engage with all of this in much more direct fashion, which 
means getting out and working in these diverse and complicated 
places, getting out and understanding how global projects are 
being worked out in concrete institutional settings all over the 
world. 
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